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Abstract 
The key theoretical concern of this doctoral research is to trace the way in which 
Marx discovered and developed the determinations of the revolutionary subjectivity 
of the working class. In order to achieve this, a critical reading of Marx's `early 
writings' from the perspective of his later works was carried out in the first part of the 
thesis. Specifically, the analysis attempted to find in both the insights and limitations 
of the former and clues towards the direction that Marx's later development would 
take. One of the original results of my reassessment of Marx's early work is to 
uncover the methodological significance of those texts for Marx's re-appropriation of 
Hegel's dialectical method and the consequent determination of social science as 
practical criticism. The second part of my investigation consists in a critical analysis 
of the ways in which these early insights crystallised in the writing of Capital. The 
aim of this critical reading of Marx's most important work is to provide a 
reconstruction which goes beyond traditional Marxist theories and their unresolved 
tension between the forms of objectivity and the forms of subjectivity of capitalist 
society. In particular, my thesis is that most readings of Marx tend to see 
revolutionary subjectivity as abstractly free and as the opposite of the subjectivity 
alienated in capital. My own investigation of Marx's critical theory aims to show that, 
for him, emancipatory subjectivity itself is a social form of the alienated subjectivity 
of the modern individual. I show that the genesis of that emancipatory subject can be 
found in the transformations in the materiality of social life brought about by the real 
subsumption of humanity to capital. Finally, the investigation attempts to thematise 
the intrinsic connection between these questions of subjectivity and Marx's dialectical 
method. 
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Introduction. Revolutionary theory in an era of `post-modern' 
fragmentation 
The topic of this thesis is emancipatory subjectivity. More precisely, it is a scientific 
inquiry into the social determinations of the revolutionary subjectivity of the working 
class. Given the current state of radical intellectual labour, this may sound as an 
outmoded, if not directly a courageous but hopeless, subject of research. In effect, 
since some intellectuals proclaimed that the time had come to wish farewell to the 
working class (Gorz 1982), critical social theory has not ceased moving away from 
the notion that the working class is the social subject whose revolutionary action will 
put the alienation inherent in the capitalist form of social life to an end. As Inigo 
Carrera graphically puts it, critical social theory moved from seeing the working class 
as the social subject meant to abolish the capitalist mode of production to seeing the 
latter as having abolished the working class itself (2003: 1). 
Unfortunately, the search for answers to the question of the social determinations of 
revolutionary subjectivity in the work of contemporary Marxist scholars - where one 
would expect to find them - does not look very promising either. Certainly, there have 
been plenty of interesting developments within the Marxist tradition in recent times; 
in particular, among those working within a broadly-understood `form-analysis' 
approach. ' Thus since the 1980s there have been important contributions to the 
investigation of the determinations of the value-form (see, among others, the essays 
1 We refer to those currents that grasp Marx's critique of political economy as a critical investigation of 
the historically-specific alienated forms of social mediation of capitalist society. 
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contained in Elson 1979b; Williams 1988; Arthur and Reuten 1998; Campbell and 
Reuten 2002; Bellofiore and Taylor 2004), the state-form (Holloway and Picciotto 
1978; Clarke 1988; Bonefeld and Holloway 1991; Clarke 1991c; Bonefeld 1993), the 
legal-form (Fine 2002) and, more recently, a renewed interest in Marx's dialectical 
method (Moseley 1993; Moseley and Campbell 1997; Albritton and Simoulidis 
2003). However, not many works have actually put the problematic of revolutionary 
subjectivity at the centre of the critique of political economy. We do not want to 
imply that scientific reflection on the determinations of revolutionary subjectivity has 
been completely absent from recent Marxist theorising (although it must be said that 
many of the contributions to the resurgence of value-form theory since the late 1970s 
and early 1980s, and certainly most of the discussions of the dialectical method, did 
fail to establish 'a firm link between revolutionary theory and the concrete political 
action of the working class). 2 But in the few cases where that question has been 
explicitly addressed, emancipatory subjectivity has been usually grasped, as Postone 
rightly notes, as transcendentally or ontologically rooted (1996: 38). This means, in a 
nutshell, that the ground for emancipatory subjectivity is seen as standing outside the 
alienated forms of social mediation through which the life-process of humanity asserts 
itself. For instance, the substance of revolutionary subjectivity is seen as residing in a 
generic material content - the `constituting power of human productive practice' - 
which, in its most refined versions, constitutes the negated presupposition of capitalist 
forms of social mediation (cf. Bonefeld 1995). That is, the content of revolutionary 
subjectivity is not grasped as the `unity of many determinations' but remains simple 
and unmediated, mediation pertaining at best only to non-revolutionary forms of 
2 As commented by Mohun (1994: 4) regarding value theory in a collection of essays from those 
debates. 
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working class subjectivity. In the same vein, the exposition of the determinations of 
revolutionary subjectivity is not the synthetic result of the scientific dialectical 
unfolding of the movement of the social forms of capitalist society, but is represented 
as the product of the analytic reduction of those social forms to the postulated generic 
material content. The scientific critique of capital thereby comes down to the 
invocation of the powers of an unmediated human practice in the form of a (Kantian) 
moral imperative (as pointed out by Neary 2004). 
Eventually, the logic of this approach ends up taking the conscious reflection on the 
determinations of revolutionary subjectivity away from social theory (the critique of 
political economy) and into the realm of philosophy. Thus, in his recent investigation 
of revolutionary subjectivity, Holloway abandoned the approach of his earlier work 
on the economic and political forms of capitalist social relations of production and 
conceptualises revolutionary theory through a blend of an Adornian philosophical 
critique of `identity' and a Blochian philosophy of hope (Holloway 2002a). In 
another, widely-debated work, Hardt and Negri (2000), even if at least offering some 
insights into the social determinations of working class subjectivity (e. g. through their 
theory of `immaterial labour'), ultimately ground its revolutionary form through a 
recourse to a different philosophical combination: an ontology of the `productivity of 
desiring machines' inspired by the post-structuralism of Deleuze-Guattari, and a 
Spinozian political philosophy of the `multitude'. 
The key to the overcoming of the limitations of all these approaches has been 
correctly identified by Postone in his own recent attempt to reconstruct the Marxian 
critique of political economy: emancipatory subjectivity must be socially grounded 
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(1996: 38). Hence, it is a question pertaining to dialectical social theory - the critique 
of political economy - and not to philosophy. 
More concretely, this means grasping 
emancipatory subjectivity as immanent in the very unfolding of the reified forms of 
social mediation of capitalist society. Hence, Postone rightly argues, the question that 
critical social theory faces is to discover emancipatory consciousness as socially 
constituted by the alienated historical dynamic of capital itself (1996: 38). The 
problem with his approach is that in his idiosyncratic reconstruction of the Marxian 
critique of political economy, that historical dynamic actually denies the working 
class (qua working class) the determination of material bearer of revolutionary 
subjectivity. 
This thesis takes up the challenge posed by Postone and aims at the development of a 
materialist inquiry into the social and historical determinations of revolutionary 
subjectivity. This it also does through a critical reconstruction of the Marxian critique 
of political economy. One, however, that throws an opposite result to that of Postone, 
namely: it shows that the outcome of the historical unfolding of the dialectic of the 
objectified form of social mediation turned into the very alienated subject of social 
life (i. e. capital) is to determine, as its own immanent determination, the constitution 
of the (self-abolishing) working class as a revolutionary subject. 
A crucial element in this intellectual endeavour is the recovery of the old Marxian 
insight, contained in the oft-quoted passage from the Postface to the second edition of 
Capital into the intrinsic connection between the specifically dialectical form of social 
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science and its revolutionary content (Marx 1976a: 103). 
3 In this sense, it could be 
said that this thesis represents a methodologically-minded reconstruction of the 
critique of political economy. More precisely, the thesis argues that the latter is but 
the scientific self-consciousness of the working-class about its own social 
determinations as an alienated yet revolutionary subject. Because of this 
determination, itself the product of its dialectical form, social science becomes 
4 determined as practical criticism. 
Structure of the thesis 
To develop this argument the thesis is structured into two parts. A critical reading of 
Marx's early writings from the perspective of his later works is carried out in the three 
chapters comprising the first part of the thesis. The reading attempts to find in both 
the insights and limitations of the young Marx clues towards the direction that his 
scientific development would take and which would culminate in the intellectual and 
political necessity of writing Capital. This critical engagement with Marx's early texts 
is not carried out through an exhaustive chronological assessment of each of those 
works, a task which in itself would require a whole thesis and which, moreover, 
would presumably reveal plenty of repetitions in terms of the scientific achievements 
contained in each text (e. g. the materiality of human productive subjectivity in both 
the Paris Manuscripts and The German Ideology). Rather, the thesis selects and 
3A point forcefully made after Marx's death fundamentally by Lukäcs in History and Class 
Consciousness (1971). 
4 For the general methodological approach to the critique of political economy as practical criticism 
this thesis draws on the work of Inigo Carrera (1992; 2003). 
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concentrates on three key moments in Marx's early intellectual development which, 
we think, manifest with greater force both the achievements and limitations of the 
early writings in terms of the revolution in the mode of scientific knowledge that 
Marx was undertaking, and that would eventually crystallise in the writing of Capital 
as the most developed form of the critique of political economy, that is, of the 
dialectical critique of the capital-form. 
The first two chapters deal with two different aspects of the 1844 Paris Manuscripts. 
Chapter 1 firstly outlines some of the crucial breakthroughs contained in that text. In 
the first place, it points to this work as involving Marx's first materialist 
comprehension of the revolutionary subjectivity of the proletariat. And this meant the 
overcoming of the philosophical standpoint from which he had previously grasped the 
emancipatory mission of the working class. The chapter further argues that this 
transcendence of the philosophical representation of proletarian subjectivity actually 
springs from another fundamental achievement found in the Paris Manuscripts, 
namely: the discovery that the key to the comprehension of any historical movement 
lay in its referral to the development of the materiality of human productive 
individuality. On the other hand, we also argue in chapter 1 that Marx's elaboration of 
all these theoretical breakthroughs eventually clashed with an insurmountable barrier: 
the methodological insufficiencies underlying this first attempt at a critique of 
political economy. We show that Marx's reliance on a Feuerbach-inspired 
transformative criticism, although serving him analytically to uncover alienated 
labour as the hidden foundation of `economic categories', eventually leaves him 
unarmed to comprehend the historical dynamic of alienated labour in the qualitative 
specificity of its concrete forms. He thus resorts to an extrinsic application of a 
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general dialectic formally borrowed from Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit. The 
unfolding of the concrete social determinations of revolutionary subjectivity cannot 
but remain outside the reach of this early critique of political economy. 
0 
Chapter 2 gives a closer scrutiny to two fundamental claims made in the first chapter. 
First, that Marx's adoption of a materialist perspective was tantamount to the 
transcendence of philosophy. In the second place, we argue that, especially through 
the confrontation with Hegel's philosophy in the third manuscript, Marx starts to 
show self-awareness of the inadequacy of the transformative method inherited from 
Feuerbach as the revolutionary form of the proletarian science. Moreover, we argue 
that both questions are intrinsically connected. In order to do this, and unlike most 
commentaries, the chapter focuses not on Marx's critique of Hegel's Phenomenology 
but of his Science of Logic. It is argued that it is especially with the latter's critique 
that Marx became aware of the essential character of philosophy as alienated thought 
and, hence, of the need to overcome philosophy tout court. At the same time, the 
chapter advances the proposition that the very same confrontation with Hegel's 
Science of Logic was crucial for Marx's first steps in the critical appropriation of the 
`rational kernel' to be found in the Hegelian dialectic, namely: the discovery of the 
revolutionary essence of 'the reproduction of concrete by means of thought, ' -i. e. 
dialectical cognition - as the necessary method of science determined as practical 
criticism. Whatever the role played in the Paris Manuscripts through its materialist 
inversion as the dialectic of human labour, the self-development of Spirit through 
alienation and its overcoming is not where that rational kernel resides. Rather, the 
chapter argues, already at that early stage Marx was coming to grips with the 
fundamental distinction between what Hegel called the `understanding', with its 
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characteristic externality between the ideal necessity of thought and the inner life of 
the object of scientific cognition, and what he called `speculative thought', as the 
form of scientific cognition with the power to follow in thought the movement of 
negativity immanent in real forms. However, Marx did not uncritically appropriate 
that insight but turned that distinction against Hegel himself. 
Some of the essential ramifications of this early recovery of the revolutionary power 
of the dialectical method are explored in chapter 3 mainly by means of a 
reconstruction of Marx's critique of Proudhon. The latter, we think, constitutes 
another key moment in Marx's intellectual development that condenses the 
theoretico-methodological breakthroughs he achieved during the 1840s. The first 
methodological aspect that crops up in Marx's critique of Proudhon is the critical 
distinction between dialectical logic and dialectical method. The former is what 
results when the dialectic is conceived as a general formalistic methodology to be 
taken ready-made from Hegel's Science of Logic and then applied to whatever 
particular content we face; in the case of Proudhon, to the `material' questions of 
political economy. By contrast, the dialectical method does not consist in the 
application of the general necessity of logic - however `dialectical' in form - to 
particular objects but simply follows in thought the specific necessity immanent in 
social forms themselves. Hence the significance of the Poverty of Philosophy: it 
contains Marx's first attempt positively to reproduce in thought the real movement of 
capitalist economic forms. Moreover, we try to show that this critique of Proudhon 
entails much more than an abstractly methodological interest; rather, the text reveals 
that at stake is the knowledge of the social determinations of the political action of the 
working class. In brief, the text makes evident the political nature of the dialectical 
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critique of political economy determined as the conscious organisation of the practical 
critique of the capital-form. 
And yet the rudimentary and germinal state of Marx's critique of political economy at 
that stage rendered the scientific comprehension of the social determinations of 
revolutionary subjectivity at an equally underdeveloped stage. The political task that 
Marx faced thereby became clear to him: to put all these theoretico-methodological 
insights gained in the 1840s concretely into motion by giving the dialectical critique 
of political economy its fully developed shape. This, the first part of the thesis 
partially concludes, is what the writing of Capital was all about. 
The second part of the thesis aims at substantiating this last point through a 
methodologically-minded critical reconstruction of Volume 1 of Capital and the 
Grundrisse. Chapter 4 develops a very close reading of the first chapter of Capital in 
order to show how only through a sound comprehension of the dialectical method as 
broadly reconstructed in the first part of the thesis can the implications of Marx's 
presentation of the determinations of the commodity-form be uncovered in all their 
plenitude. Particular attention is given to Marx's investigation of the commodity-form 
as entailing both the most general form of objectivity and subjectivity of the capitalist 
mode of production. On the other hand, the chapter also problematises the relation 
between the critique of these more abstract forms of alienated social life and the 
uncovering of the concrete determinations of emancipatory subjectivity. The 
argument put forward is that the former constitutes only a first step of a laborious 
journey involving the reproduction in thought of the further mediations underlying the 
latter. Only by going through that development can the critique of political economy 
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become determined as the self-consciousness of the social necessity of revolutionary 
action. 
This point is reinforced in chapter 5 through a reconstruction of the precise form in 
which Marx introduces the class struggle in his dialectical presentation and a 
discussion of the implications that follow from it. In contradistinction to many 
contemporary readings that tend to ontologise the class struggle, thereby turning it 
into the content of the movement of social life in its capitalist form, the chapter argues 
that it is a necessary form in which the accumulation of capital realises its 
determinations. The reason for this does not lie in the methodological principles of 
structuralism. Rather, it is an expression of the concrete development of the 
historically-specific alienation inherent in the commodity-form; in the form of social 
capital, the materialised social relation becomes determined as the concrete subject of 
the movement of modern society. This does not imply the denial of the transformative 
powers of human practice personified by the workers. What this does imply is that 
whatever transformative powers the political action of workers might have - both 
capital-reproducing and capital-transcending political action - must be an immanent 
determination begotten by the alienated movement of capital as subject and not 
external to it. And in its simplest determination (i. e. as an expression of the formal 
subsumption of labour to capital), the class struggle only exists as a necessary form of 
capital's reproduction but not of its transcendence. 
As explored in chapter 6, the socio-historical genesis of the emancipatory subject can 
be found in the transformations in the materiality of social life brought about by the 
real subsumption of humanity to capital. As Marx shows in Capital and the 
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Grundrisse, through the constant revolution in the material conditions of social 
labour, capital progressively transforms the subjectivity of the workers according to a 
determinate tendency: they eventually become universal labourers, that is, organs of a 
collective subject capable of consciously ruling their life-process by virtue of their 
capacity scientifically to organise the production process of any system of machinery 
and, therefore, any form of social co-operation. This mutation of their productive 
subjectivity is the necessary prelude to the constitution of the labourers as truly social 
individuals through their self-abolition as workers and the construction of the free 
association of individuals. This, we argue, is the inner material content of social life 
which is expressed in the form of the political revolutionary subjectivity of workers. 
By way of a conclusion, chapter 7 provides a further examination of the 
determinations of revolutionary subjectivity beyond those explicitly developed by 
Marx. By drawing together and elaborating on many themes only tangentially touched 
upon in the previous chapters, the concluding remarks of the thesis explore the further 
qualities of the emancipatory subject: the alienated nature of its transformative action, 
its inner material determination as productive subject, the specific scientific form of 
revolutionary consciousness (i. e. dialectics) and, finally, the necessity for its action to 
be consciously self-organised. 
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Part I 
Marx's early critique of political economy: The 
discovery of the revolutionary subject and the 
development of science as practical criticism 
19 
Chapter 1. The dialectic of alienated labour and the determinations 
of revolutionary subjectivity in the Paris Manuscripts 
Introduction 
There was a debate a while ago among scholars over the way in which Marx came to 
embrace the idea - explicitly appearing for the first time in the Introduction to the 
Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right - of the proletariat as the 
revolutionary subject of the abolition of the capitalist mode of production. Was it 
through 'empirical' contact with real proletarians? Tucker states it was not, and claims 
that it was through the reading of socialist and communist literature of his time 
(Tucker 1961). Avineri, for his part, argues that it was through the critique of Hegel 
and his notion of a universal class (Avineri 1993: 52-64). Finally, McLellan thinks 
that it was through his immersion into a radical-socialist political and intellectual 
environment as he moved from Germany to Paris (McLellan 1973: 97). 
Now, as Perkins rightly notes, what matters is not the biographical question of how 
Marx came to discover the proletariat but the meaning of that discovery (Perkins 
1993: 33). In this sense, regardless of the precise form in which Marx came to 
discover the proletariat as a revolutionary force, the crucial point to highlight is that, 
until 1844, the proletariat was for Marx a philosophical category. More concretely, it 
was the mediating category through which he tried to make philosophy descend from 
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the heavenly realm of abstract thought to the real social life of concrete human 
beings 
(Perkins 1993). 
Thus, even if attempting to transcend what he saw as the abstract character of idealist 
philosophy as present in both Hegel and the Young Hegelians, we think that Marx's 
intellectual development before the Paris Manuscripts was carried out within the 
boundaries of philosophical discourse. In particular, he was attempting to solve the 
whole theory-practice problematic as it appeared when seen through philosophical 
lenses. And this meant that, thus conceived, his endeavour was doomed to failure 
from its very starting point. As we shall argue in the following chapter, in the Paris 
Manuscripts Marx would come to discover that it is in the very essence of philosophy 
(however 'materialist' or 'dialectical' in form) to remain trapped within abstract 
thought and, therefore, to be indifferent to the real movement of human practice. 
Within the limits of philosophical thought, no real mediation is possible between 
theory and practice, only the appearance of it. Or, seen from another angle, within 
philosophy the relation between theory and practice cannot but become inverted. 
Instead of seeing revolutionary science ('theory') as the necessary concrete form 
through which the transformative action of the proletariat (`practice') is consciously 
organised, the latter appears as the necessary form through which the universal claims 
of philosophy are realised. Revolution thus becomes a logical necessity of philosophy 
and consists in making the world become 'philosophical' (O'Malley 1970: xxii; Marx 
1992a: 257). 
Very different is the perspective of the Paris Manuscripts. In this text Marx's starting 
point is no longer the universal claims of philosophy. As he states when opposing 
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political economy's recourse to a mythical primitive society of simple commodity 
producers: 'we shall start out from a present-day economic fact' (Marx 1992b: 323). 
Marx attempted to analyse this concrete economic form in its historical specificity and 
existing reality and, from this point of departure, he then both made sense of previous 
history, and discovered the hidden transitions to the supersession of modern, capitalist 
society. Hence, communism ceased to be a philosophical ideal in any meaningful 
sense of the word, notwithstanding the mediations with the real introduced, and 
became 'a real phase, necessary for the next period of historical development, in the 
emancipation and recovery of mankind' (Marx 1992b: 358). As Marx put it in an oft- 
quoted passage from the German Ideology: 
Communism is for us not a state of affairs which is to be established, an ideal 
to which reality [will] have to adjust itself. We call communism the real 
movement which abolishes the present state of things. The conditions of this 
movement result from the premises now in existence (Marx and Engels 1976a: 
49). 
The quotation cannot be clearer. Although there is a formal similarity between Marx's 
approach to the problem of social transformation before and after August 1844 (in 
terms of the finding of the future immanent in the present), there is also a subtle 
difference expressed in the passage from philosophy to materialist science; one, 
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however, which cannot be neglected if we want to grasp the innovations in Marx's 
thought to be found in the Paris Manuscripts? 
The second central aspect of the Paris Manuscripts is a direct result of Marx's first 
attempt at the critical investigation of the specific nature of modern society through 
the critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right, i. e. through an analysis of bourgeois 
political forms. As Marx himself tells us in the short intellectual "autobiography" 
found in the Preface to the Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, the 
main conclusion he reached was that the key to the comprehension of the specific 
nature of capitalist society was not to be found in the critique of the doctrine of the 
state, but that the critique of modern society had to start with the critique of political 
economy in order to, then, continue into a critique of the state (Marx 1992d: 425-6). 
This was the science that was able to penetrate the "internal physiology" of the 
modern world to be found in `civil society' and, more precisely, in `private property' 
(Teeple 1984: 201). 
In light of this conclusion, in the 1844 Manuscripts Marx turns his attention to the 
way in which human life is materially reproduced as the key to the understanding of 
society and its historical development. Hence, he placed for the first time the 
economic forms of society in the centre of his inquiry. As Arthur points out, 
5 On the meaning of Marx's intellectual development leading to the writing of the Paris Manuscripts, 
see Murray (1988) and Teeple (1984). The latter, in particular, raises the point of the often neglected 
importance in the development of Marx's ideas of his doctoral dissertation. 
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(... ) for the first time he attributes fundamental ontological significance to 
productive activity. Through material production humanity comes to be what it 
is (... ) material production is the `mediation' in which the unity of man with 
nature is established (Arthur 1986: 5). 
The critical standpoint originally developed in the Introduction to the Contribution to 
the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right thereby acquired a more concrete 
meaning. In that text Marx stated that the radicality of the critique was to be measured 
by the extent to which it 'grasped things' as having their roots in human beings 
themselves (Marx 1992a: 251). In the Paris Manuscripts this general statement about 
tracing all socio-historical forms to the practical activity of individuals became more 
specific. The key to the comprehension of any historical movement lay in its referral 
to the development of human productive subjectivity. That is, in tracing social forms 
to what he discovered to be specifically human about the human being. 
Certainly, simply as such this emphasis on the economic forms of society is not 
peculiar to Marx. As Clarke notes, this is a feature that we can find in Classical 
Political Economy and that it inherited from the Scottish Enlightenment (Clarke 
1991a: chapter 2; 1998: 13). Yet in opposition to the ahistorical naturalism of, for 
instance, Adam Smith's theory of the co-evolution of modes of subsistence, class 
relations and forms of property, Marx's originality lay in unearthing the historical 
specificity of the social forms in which human productive subjectivity developed or 
the historicity of what he would later call the social relations of production (Clarke 
1991a: 57-8). Clearly, at this stage Marx did not posit the question explicitly in these 
latter terms. However, as Colletti rightly points out, many of the elements constituting 
the mature critique are, certainly in an underdeveloped and abstract form, in this early 
text (Colletti 1992: 56). When dealing with the question of the historicity of social 
forms, we are already entering into the discussion of another central aspect of the 
Paris Manuscripts. For here he discovered the specificity of bourgeois relations of 
production in alienated labour. 
The aim of this chapter is thus critically to investigate the breakthroughs achieved by 
Marx in that early text from 1844. The said discovery of the historical specificity of 
alienated labour and, what is the flipside of this, of the economic content of the 
communist transformation of human life, definitely constitutes one of the fundamental 
scientific achievements to be found in the Manuscripts; one, moreover, which would 
lay the foundations for Marx's subsequent intellectual development. In this sense, one 
could argue that the Paris Manuscripts constitute a necessary first step in the 
production of Marx's revolution in the mode of scientific knowledge that the radical 
transformation of the world demands. On the other hand, we shall also see that the 
methodological insufficiencies of that text did not allow Marx to take that 
revolutionary transformation of scientific knowledge into practical criticism to 
completion. And yet, as we shall see in the course of this thesis, it was precisely the 
self-awareness of those limitations that gave Marx the key to the path that his 
scientific revolution needed to undertake. 
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Transformative method and the discovery of alienated labour 
The first issue that emerges when engaging with Marx's analysis of alienated labour in 
the Paris Manuscripts is the risk of becoming bogged down in what by now might 
seem the tedious and somewhat scholastic question of the relation between Marx's 
earlier works and Capital. This story is quite well-known. In opposition to 
structuralist readings of Marx, which postulate a rupture between an Hegelian-idealist 
young Marx and a materialist-scientific mature Marx, 6 'heterodox' Marxist 
perspectives tend to have as their defining characteristic the view that there is 
continuity running through the whole of Marx's work. According to the latter, this 
unity within Marx's intellectual enterprise is determined by his discovery of 
alienation as the fundamental aspect of his critique of capitalist society. In this sense, 
this tradition of unorthodox Marxism stresses the importance of the Hegelian 
influence on Marx's thought for understanding the critical nature of his work. Hence, 
these authors tend to adopt as a strategy the return to both Hegel and the young Marx, 
in order to recover the critical force that resides in Capital. 
Writing in the twenty first century, it is more than fair to say that this debate has been 
settled both from a theoretical and textual point of view (Markus 1982: 140). The 
existence of an inner unity underlying the different phases of Marx's intellectual 
project is now part of the 'ABC of Marxism'. Yet this consensus still begs two related 
6 The locus classicus of this position within non-Soviet Marxism is Althusser (1969). The most 
comprehensive critical assessment of Althusser's work can still be found in an early work by Clarke 
(1980). 
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questions. First, the precise meaning of 'alienated labour' in Marx's thought. Second, 
the question of the difference through which that unity of Marx's thought asserts itself 
(Markus 1982: 14 1). 7 The clarification of these questions is crucial for our purpose of 
tracing Marx's discovery of the determinations of the revolutionary subjectivity of the 
proletariat. Or, to be more exact, the former task is synonymous with the latter. An 
abstract emphasis on the identity between `the young Marx' and `the mature Marx', 
leads to an obliteration of the differences that it is possible to find in the concrete 
development of Marx's work and, therefore, to an external imposition of the young 
Marx's analysis of alienation onto Capital (cf. Walton 1972; Elliot 1979). Moreover, 
inasmuch as those differences imply a deepening of Marx's investigations of the 
social determinations of alienated labour into an analysis of the particular forms that 
this alienation takes, of their movement - i. e. their inner connection - and of their 
contradictory historical development into their own annihilation, those readings risk 
depriving the critique of political economy of its concrete revolutionary power. The 
key to avoiding these shortcomings consists, as Levin (1997: 63-4) suggests, in 
inverting the reading strategy of most defenders of the 'continuity thesis'. That is, 
instead of trying to demonstrate the presence in Capital of the themes developed in 
the Paris Manuscripts (cf. Avineri 1993), it is necessary to assess the early texts in 
light of the mature form in which Marx presented those very same insights. Only in 
this way is it possible to grasp both the merits and the limitations of Marx's early 
critique of political economy. 
7 Clarke (1991a: 70-8) develops a useful critical assessment of the shortcomings of both orthodox and 
heterodox readings of Marx's analysis of alienated labour. 
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In this regard, we think that the very form of Marx's investigation (i. e. the method 
utilised in this first critical encounter with political economy) constitutes the main 
limitation to be found in the Manuscripts. Marx's critical appropriation of the critical 
power of the dialectical method had not fully developed at this stage and he was still 
under the influence of Feuerbach's transformative criticism (O'Malley 1970: xxviii- 
xxxii; Avineri 1993: 10). 8 In this work Marx attempted to do with political economy 
what he had previously done with Hegel's Philosophy of Right (and what Feuerbach 
had done with religion). That is, whereas in 1843 he applied the transformative 
method to the theorists of the political forms of bourgeois society, in 1844 he applied 
it to the scientific representations of economic forms. 
Marx's transformative method involves basically four interrelated moments. 
(First, 
the 
denunciation of the hypostasis whereby the forms of social objectivity are presented 
by theory as self-subsistent and actually determining the life of the human individual, 
who becomes determined as the predicate of those social institutions turned into the 
subjects of social life. Secondly, the refutation of the claims of those theories by 
referring all forms of autonomised social objectivity back to their origin in the 
practical life of the human being, that is, understanding the former as forms of 
8 Colletti (1992: 23-4), however, warns the reader of his edition of Marx's Early Writings that the 
influence of Feuerbach should not be overstated, since the theme of the inversion between subject and 
predicate 'is in fact one of the most profound and ancient themes in philosophical history'. Still, 
Colletti himself concedes that it was a contribution of Feuerbach to develop that theme in the specific 
context of the critique of Hegel. Moreover, what is relevant for our argument is not the intellectual 
lineage of the method of transformative criticism but the fact that Marx resorted to it. Another author 
who casts doubts over the alleged influence of Feuberbach is Teeple (1984: 
47-8) But, again, he does 
not deny that the method of inversion of subject and predicate plays a part 
in Marx's critique of Hegel. 
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alienated objectification of specifically human attributes, capacities and relations. 
/ 
Thirdly, the exposure of the contradictions that arise in theory for its naturalisation of 
I 
this inversion between subject and predicate. ý Finally, the recognition that those 
theories are not simply false in the sense of offering an inaccurate characterisation of 
social life, but that both their conceptual inversion of subject and predicate and their 
internal contradictions are uncritical expressions of real inversions and contradictions 
existing in society. 
What is important to note is that, in this approach, the motion of social forms 
themselves is not engaged with. Transformative criticism of capitalist society 
develops through the (textual) analysis of the theories of those authors who, within the 
limits of their bourgeois horizon, took the scientific comprehension of the former to 
its highest possible development. But there is no independent analysis of the 
movement of social forms themselves. Hence, the object under critique (capital or 
alienated labour) can only be grasped as an undifferentiated totality whose historical 
'laws of motion' are not subject to investigation. In fact, as Markus suggests (1980: 
82; 1982: 141-2), at times Marx gives the impression that the whole enterprise of 
offering an alternative critical presentation of the concrete forms of motion through 
which alienated social life develops is doomed from its very beginning. Especially in 
the first pages of the Manuscripts, the tone of his presentation seems to equate such a 
project with a complicit attitude towards these alienated forms of social life. Yet we 
cannot generalise this to the whole of the Manuscripts. As we will see, it is one of 
Marx's scientific results in this text to reach the conclusion that not only does such an 
alternative account not involve an uncritical stance towards capital, but it is the 
necessary form to discover the ways in which to transcend it. Without this mediation, 
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the scientific critique of capital remains too general and abstract and, hence, impotent 
to develop into conscious revolutionary action. 
Hence the crucial importance of the question of the methodological limitations of the 
Manuscripts, which impinge on the rest of the exposition and, therefore, in Marx's 
analysis of the social determinations of the revolutionary subjectivity of the 
proletariat. In fact, Marx's awareness of this problem acted as a trigger for the 
direction that his subsequent research would take: the self-clarification regarding the 
adequate form of critical scientific knowledge and the positive (dialectical) exposition 
of the determinations of the totality of capitalist social forms. Retrospectively, we can 
say, paraphrasing the mature Marx, that his utilisation of Feuerbachian transformative 
criticism enabled him 'to discover by analysis the earthly kernel of political economy' 
(alienated labour). However, this method proved impotent to 'develop from the actual, 
given relations of life the forms in which these have been apotheosized' (Marx 1976a: 
494). In order to substantiate this claim, let us move to the concrete examination of 
Marx's discussion of the determinations of alienated labour. 
As already noted, Marx does not take as his starting point the economic forms 
themselves, but instead engages with the categories and (external) relations through 
which political economy represents them. Thus the first part of the first manuscript is 
devoted to an unoriginal exposition of the theories of political economy in their own 
terms, showing the antinomies which arise according to the very same 'laws of 
movement of private property' (Markus 1980: 81). On the one hand, political 
economy finds in labour the 'subjective essence of private property, ' which is thus 
turned into the principle of this specifically modem science (Marx 1992a: 341). On 
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the other, the autonomous movement of private property it postulates results in the 
degradation and misery of the worker, the material bearer of that principle. Even 
when the wealth of society is increasing, the poverty of the worker does so too, if not 
in absolute, at least in relative terms. Moreover, every progress in the productivity of 
labour is also turned against the worker: its outcome is not the creation of disposable 
time for his/her spiritual development but an expansion of amount of the manual work 
he/she performs. The introduction of machinery, through which this increase of 
productivity takes place, also has the effect of deskilling the capacities of the labourer 
(Marx 1992a: 285-9). In brief, political economy, as `private property become 
conscious for itself (... ) modern industry as self', postulates at the same time the 
affirmation and denial of the human being (Marx 1992a: 341). As Marx himself tells 
us at the beginning of the section on alienated labour, it is by advancing through the 
concepts of political economy taken as given that he arrives at this contradiction: 
We have started out from the premises of political economy. We accepted its 
language and its laws (... ) From political economy itself, using its own words, 
we have shown that the worker sinks to the level of a commodity, and 
moreover the most wretched commodity of all; that the misery of the worker is 
in inverse proportion to the power and volume of his production (Marx 1992a: 
322). 
Since political economy 'proceeds from the fact of private property', it just 
unconsciously expresses this contradiction without actually 'explaining it ' (Marx 
1992a: 322). Through the path consisting in the development of the concepts of 
political economy, Marx was able to discover the foundation of this contradiction in 
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the character of productive activity under the specific capitalist form, namely: in 
alienated labour. The objectivity in which the subjective powers of the worker are 
realised is turned into an alien power that dominates the producer himself/herself. 
This, says Marx, is the reason behind the autonomous movement of private property 
that results in the mutilation of the worker's subjectivity: 
All these consequences contained in this characteristic, that the worker is 
related to the product of his labour as to an alien object. (... ) The 
externalization [Entäusserung] of the worker in his product means not only 
that his labour becomes an object, an external existence, but that it exists 
outside him, independently of him and alien to him, and begins to confront 
him as an autonomous power; that the life which he has bestowed on the 
object confronts him as hostile and alien (Marx 1992a: 324). 
Two important remarks are in order in light of the previous quote. In the first place, as 
Clarke remarks, it is clear that this alienation of the worker's productive powers as 
attributes of the product of labour does not refer either to an ideological or 
psychological problem of false consciousness on the part of the labourer (1991a: 75), 
or to his/her subjective experience of indifference towards the work he/she is doing 
(De Angelis 1995) -although this is likely to be the case as a concrete manifestation 
of alienated labour. Nor does it refer to the fact that the labourer has to subordinate 
the exercise of his/her consciousness and will in the production process to the direct 
authority of the capitalist who, in turn, expropriates the product of the former's labour 
(Mandel 1971; Maguire 1972: 67). The alienation of the productive activity of the 
labourer refers to a real inversion between subject and object, where the latter 
dominates the former. In order to make this point clear, it is important to note that, for 
Marx, this alienation also reaches the capitalist. The alienation inherent in the 
capitalist social form of human life involves, as we shall comment on below, the 
realisation of the human species-being itself - i. e. productive activity - in the form of 
an alien and impersonal power, the power of a thing. And this includes the non- 
labourer too. This is why Marx states at the end of the first manuscript that 
`everything which appears for the worker as an activity of alienation, of estrangement, 
appears for the non-worker as a state of alienation, of estrangement' (Marx 1992b: 
334). As much as the labourer, the capitalist actualises his/her human species-being 
too. However, he/she does so only in the form of the direct coercive control over the 
productive activity of the labourer in the alienated name of his/her capital. Therefore, 
his/her conscious life-activity does not participate directly in the active transformation 
of the objective world. Nonetheless, in this process the capitalist does not act freely. 
He/she only acts as the immediate personification of the human powers incarnated as 
attributes of the product of labour which dominates the producer. Hence, he/she is 
alienated too, but this alienation is expressed in the capitalist as a state instead of as 
an activity. In other words, the realisation of the activity of the labourer under the 
direct `coercion and yoke of another man' (Marx 1992b: 331) is a concrete form of an 
essentially inverted mode of existence of humanity's life-activity. In the words of 
Marx: 
So through estranged labour man not only produces his relationship to the 
object and to the act of production as alien and hostile powers; he also 
produces the relationship in which other men stand to his production and 
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product, and the relationship in which he stands to these other men (Marx 
1992b: 331). 
r And this leads to the\second remark. Because now there can be no doubts that for 
Marx alienated labour (understood as this real inversion between the producer and 
the product) is the defining characteristic of the specific form of labour under 
capitalist social relations of production .9 This becomes evident in the section on rent 
of the first manuscript, with the analysis made by Marx of feudal landed property and 
its necessary transition into capitalist private property. There he contrasts the 
command over the human productive power of the serf as a personal attribute of the 
feudal lord (and hence as the direct or personal political domination of the former by 
the latter), with the command over the human capacities of the free worker as an 
impersonal, objective attribute of the product of labour in the form of capital, which, 
as stated above, dominates both the producer and the non-producer: 
It is inevitable that this appearance should be abolished and that landed 
property, which is the root of private property, should be drawn entirely into 
the orbit of private property and become a commodity; that the rule of the 
property owner should appear as the naked rule of private property, of capital, 
divested of all political tincture (... ) Finally, it is inevitable under these 
conditions of competition that landed property, in the form of capital, should 
manifest its domination both over the working class and over the property 
9A point that cannot be grasped if alienated labour is seen as an unmediated expression of the direct 
domination of the labourer by the capitalist in the process of production, as happens with the orthodox 
approach. On this point, see Clarke (1991a: 75). 
34 
owners themselves, inasmuch as the laws of the movement of private property 
are either ruining them or raising them. In this way the medieval saying nulle 
terre sans seigneur gives way to the modern saying l'argent n'a pas de maitre, 
which is an expression of the complete domination of dead matter over men 
(Marx 1992b: 319). 
So far, then, we have followed Marx's discovery of alienated labour as the concealed 
foundation of political economy with emphasis on the relation of the worker to the 
product of his/her labour as an autonomous power. However, this initial expression of 
alienated labour constitutes only the first of its four determinations. From this initial 
relation, Marx goes on to describe further developments of this alienation in the 
relation of the human being to his/her own productive activity (since the alien 
character of the product of labour cannot but be the outcome of the alien - and hence, 
forced - character of the productive activity itself); to his/her very species-being (since 
conscious productive activity is what distinguishes human life from animal life); and 
to other human beings (since the relation of the human individual to his/her own 
activity also reveals his/her relation to the activity of other human beings). In all these 
other forms the content of the first determination is maintained: these relations take 
the form of hostile potencies which dominate the human individual. Particularly 
remarkable is Marx's analysis of the third determination of alienated labour since 
through its exposition he presents for the first time the general determinations of 
human life from his materialist perspective, a conception which, remarkably, would 
remain basically unaltered throughout the rest of his works, namely: the specific 
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determination of the human being as a productive subject or of human individuality as 
an expression and mode of development of his/her productive subjectivity. 
'0 
The historicity of the social relations of production and the determination of 
communism as the supersession of alienated labour 
The importance and centrality of Marx's discovery of the specific determination of the 
human being in its productive subjectivity cannot be overestimated. For what is at 
stake in this insight is precisely the uncovering of the material foundation from which 
the revolutionary powers of the proletariat must spring. Hence, although through this 
discussion Marx seems to move far away from the concrete question he was trying to 
answer - namely, the necessary form of the revolutionary political action of the 
working class - he actually never lost contact with that immediate problematic. From 
the dialectical perspective of his mature works we can easily understand the role of 
these reflections. Basically, we can read Marx as engaged in the analytical moment of 
the dialectical research process (i. e. the movement from the concrete to the abstract, in 
his later terminology). In other words, he was attempting to grasp the abstract forms 
that were behind that immediate concrete form that triggered his whole intellectual 
endeavour, i. e. the will to social transformation of the proletariat. This general 
material content cannot by itself account for the social necessity of the proletariat's 
10 The exposition of the generic determinations of the labour process in chapter 7 of Capital Volume 1 
(Marx 1976a: 283-90) does not involve any substantive change in comparison with the analysis of the 
human species-being in the Manuscripts. In both cases the main point is the same: it is the mediation of 
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revolutionary subjectivity. The relation between the latter and the former is not 
immediate. To put it simply, the mere fact of being the direct producers whose 
productive activity - the key mediator in the production of human 
life - is alienated 
does not constitute the foundation of the capacity of the workers to abolish alienated 
labour, that is, of their determination as a revolutionary class (in this respect, see our 
discussion of Arthur 1986 below). Or, better stated, we shall see that this fact 
constitutes the basis for the revolutionary subjectivity of the working class only with 
the mediation of the material mutations in their subjectivity as such direct producers 
that the historical movement of alienated labour brings about. " In fact, the crux of the 
matter resides precisely in the mediations that make the radical transformation of the 
r 
i 
mode of development of human productive activity take the form of the revolutionary 
action of the working class. Evidently, Marx would not solve this question thoroughly, 
in the Paris Manuscripts. However, this text is full of interesting insights that, 
retrospectively, show how Marx was moving in that direction. 
The reconstruction of the exposition in the Manuscripts reveals that what Marx offers 
in this text up to this stage is a description of what he discovered as the hidden 
foundation of the independent movement of private property, i. e. alienated labour. 
However, it is clear that it is not sufficient for an investigation of the real nature of 
capitalist society to claim that human subjectivity is realised in this alienated form and 
individual consumption by labour or conscious productive activity that distinguishes the human form of 
the appropriation of nature from its animal form. 
11 To put it in the `mature' terminology of Capital, the determination of the working class as a 
revolutionary subject is not an expression of the fornial subsumption of labour to capital but of the real 
subsumption; more concretely, of the productive subjectivity of its most developed form as large-scale 
industry. 
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to describe the characteristics of this mode of existence of humanity. A real 
explanation must include an account of how and why labour becomes alienated. 
Aware of this situation, towards the end of the first manuscript Marx poses the 
question in the following way: 
We have taken the estrangement of labour, its alienation, as a fact and we 
have analyzed that fact. How, we now ask, does man come to alienate his 
labour, to estrange it? How is this estrangement founded in the nature of 
human development? (Marx 1992b: 281). 
It is our view that the first question leads Marx to the investigation of the specific 
capitalist form in which social labour is organised, i. e. the social relations of 
production of capitalist society. The other side of this is the discovery of the general 
content of the form of social relations that can overcome alienated labour. In turn, the 
second question leads Marx to try to find the historical reason for the existence of 
capitalist society (its historical mission in the genesis of communism). Obviously, the 
answer to these two questions must lie at the very basis of the social determinations of 
revolutionary subjectivity. We shall argue that, in trying to answer these two 
questions (especially in the case of the second one), Marx's analysis starts to become 
blurred. The limits of an exposition which started with the categories and laws of 
political economy as a given presupposition become increasingly manifest. 
Regarding the first question, it is clear that it is a necessary corollary of Marx's 
discussion of the determinations of the human species being. For, although human 
productive powers are borne by each particular individual, the actualisation of these 
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potentialities characterising the species - that is, the realisation of the transformative 
powers of the human being - can only affirm itself through the organic unity of 
individual lives, through social life. Marx's discussion of scientific activity in the 
third manuscript amounts to nothing more than this (see Marx 1992b: 350). It is a 
clear comment on the necessary social character of individual life-activity or, seen the 
other way round, the necessity for the process of social metabolism to be realised 
through individual life-processes. 
It is above all necessary to avoid once more establishing `society' as an 
abstraction over against the individual. The individual is the social being. His 
vital expression - even when it does not appear in the direct form of a 
communal expression, conceived in association with other men - is therefore 
an expression and confirmation of social life. Man's individual and species-life 
are not two distinct things (... ) (Marx 1992b: 350). 
In other words, the realisation of the human species-being (and so the development of 
human productive subjectivity) necessarily takes concrete form in the social relations 
of production, i. e. in the concrete historical form through which society organises the 
reproduction of its life. Hence, an alienated mode of existence of the human species- 
being can only have its foundation in the specific historical form of the social 
relations of production. Consequently, one would expect Marx to proceed to the 
exposition of the specificity of the capitalist mode of production in order to clarify the 
source of alienated labour. Unfortunately, this is not the path he follows. Instead, he 
starts to consider communism as the historical negation of capitalist society and as the 
supersession of alienated labour. Yet implicit in his analysis of communism lies 
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hidden the specific nature of capitalist relations of production as its opposite. For if 
Marx considers communism as the becoming fully social of the human individual, it 
is clear that he is contrasting this unity between the individual and the social character 
of human activity with their separation in bourgeois society - that is, with the private 
character taken by social labour. Moreover, as Clarke (1991a: 75) notes, even if this 
appears ambiguously in the Paris Manuscripts, it is discussed explicitly in the 
Comments on James Mill. In this text Marx focused on the development of the 
connection between alienated labour and money. In a nutshell, he dealt with money as 
the concrete material incarnation of the social powers of alienated labour. And 
although this idea appears in the Paris Manuscripts as well, the importance of the 
Comments is that they present in a clearer form the connection between alienated 
labour and the most abstract economic forms of capital: the value-form and the 
money-form. 
Why must private property finish up in money? Because as a social animal 
man must finish up in exchange and exchange - given the premise of private 
property being presupposed - must finish up in value. For the mediating 
movement of man engaged in exchange is not a social, human movement, it is 
not a human relationship: it is the abstract relationship of private property to 
private property, and this abstract relation is the value which acquires a real 
existence as value only in the form of money (Marx 1992c: 261). 
In turn, this investigation leads Marx to posit in a more explicit form the question of 
the specificity of capitalist social relations of production. Thus, he shows very clearly 
that the ground of alienated labour lies in the fact that the reproduction of human life 
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is organised through the exchange of commodities. In other words, he shows that 
labour becomes alienated because social labour takes the form of its opposite: private 
and independent labour. Obviously, this is the terminology of Capital. In this earlier 
text he still uses a somewhat philosophical language and speaks of the contradictory 
existence of universal - `the community' - and particular - `the human individual'-. 
Thus Marx states, 
The process of exchange both of human activities in the course of production 
and of human products is equal to the species-activity and the species-spirit, 
whose real, conscious and authentic existence consists in social activity and 
social enjoyment. Since the essence of man is the true community of man, 
men, by activating their own essence, produce, create this human community, 
the social being which is no abstract, universal power standing over against 
the solitary individual, but is the essence of every individual, his own activity, 
his own life, his own spirit, his own wealth. Therefore, this true community 
does not come into being as the product of reflection but it arises out of the 
need and egoism of individuals, i. e. it arises directly from their own activity 
(Marx 1992c: 265). 
In brief, already at that time Marx discovered that the alienation of human powers as 
attributes of capital springs from the private form of social production or, what is the 
same, from the commodity-form of social relations. 12 However, neither in the 
Manuscripts nor in the Comments does Marx develop this profound insight into the 
12 Private property, the general juridical form of this alienation, is always conceived by Marx as the 
consequence of private (hence, alienated) labour. 
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direction which, on its own terms, it demanded, namely: the establishing of the 
connection between the private character of labour and all the different alienated 
economic forms which political economy represented with its categories and, more 
importantly, their historical movement towards their own dissolution through the 
revolutionary action of the proletariat. Without this link, the critique was condemned 
to remain too abstract and external. Nevertheless, we think that Marx himself was 
aware of this necessity and, one may say, took it as a sort of workplan. 13 
J 
On the other hand, this discovery of the specificity of capitalist social relations made 
Marx turn his attention to the form of the social life-process that negates the alienation 
immanent in capitalist social forms, i. e. communism. With his discussion of 
communism as the 'positive supersession of private property' Marx was making an 
important step forward in the concretisation of the nature of the determinations of the 
complete human emancipation that he had previously counterposed to the merely 
political emancipation demanded by the Young Hegelians. In particular, in the 
Manuscripts the content of the supersession of modem society is no longer posited 
simply in terms of its political forms (true democracy as the abolition of the 
separation between state and civil society, or citoyen and bourgeois) but becomes 
13 Towards the end of the first manuscript he states: 
Just as we have arrived at the concept of private property through an analysis of the concept 
of estranged, alienated labour, so with the help of these two factors it is possible to evolve all 
economic categories, and in each of these categories, e. g., trade, competition, capital, money, 
we shall identify only a particular and developed expression of these basic constituents (Marx 
1992b: 333). 
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essentially economic (communism or the conscious universal co-operation between 
the associated producers). 
What is, then, according to Marx, the economic content of the communist 
transformation of social life? In the Manuscripts, Marx presents his views on the 
specific determinations of communist social forms after the critical account of the 
content of communism by previous socialist thinkers. His first statement in this regard 
is the following: 
Communism is the positive supersession of private property as human self- 
estrangement, and hence the true appropriation of the human essence through 
and for man; it is the complete restoration of man to himself as a social, i. e. 
human, being, a restoration which has become conscious and which takes 
place within the entire wealth of previous periods of development (... ) it is the 
genuine resolution of the conflict between man and nature, and between man 
and man, the true resolution of the conflict between existence and being, 
between objectification and self-affirmation, between freedom and necessity, 
between the individual and the species. It is the solution to the riddle of history 
and it knows itself to be the solution (Marx 1992b: 348). 
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Briefly put, Marx is implying that the production of communism involves the 
supersession of alienated labour and the full realisation of the human species-being. '4 
14 Passages like the one just quoted, when read out of the context of Marx's overall work, could give 
the impression that he sees the human essence as a generic content (an abstractly free and creative 
human subjectivity) that is realised in defective appearances until showing itself immediately as such 
under communism. The use of phrases like `restoration of man' can certainly lead to such a reading. 
Marx's immediate identification of the human individual as a free being (see Marx 1992b: 328) - 
simply by virtue of having conscious life-activity - is also misleading (as pointfully noted by Oilman 
1971: 112). But it is clear from Marx's overall argument that human productive subjectivity (i. e. the 
human species-being) only exists and develops (and, therefore, is produced and reproduced) in and 
through its historically-determined social forms, there being absolutely no exteriority between them. 
'Really' free subjectivity is not an abstract human essence that 'returns to itself after ridding itself of 
the limitations imposed by 'inhuman' social forms, but a concrete form that the materiality of human 
individuality acquires in the course of its historical process of development when becoming fully 
conscious. Indeed, under those circumstances the human individual embodies the potentiality 
consciously to affirm his/her historically-achieved material powers of the species in their plenitude, i. e. 
universally. On the other hand, it is self-evident (but a triviality) that the concrete form of freedom 
acquired in history by human life must be a potentiality intrinsic to its species-determination, in the 
same way that it is a real material potentiality of the silk-worm to become a butterfly. The recognition 
of this does not amount to any sort of abstract, ahistorical 'essentialism'. On the other hand, however, 
this does not make human freedom the content or substance striving for realisation in the course of 
history. The latter, essentially Hegelian, view, is precisely the approach ridiculed by Marx and Engels 
in their critique of the Young Hegelians in the German Ideology (see especially their critique of Stirner 
Marx and Engels 1976a: 254). And yet, as we shall see in the second part of the thesis, one could argue 
that it is precisely that view that, implicitly or explicitly, underlies most contemporary Marxist 
approaches to the determinations of revolutionary subjectivity, seen as the expression of the affirmation 
of an abstractly free humanity ridding itself of capitalist forms of social mediation, the opposite of its 
capital-determined, alienated form of existence. See Clarke (1991a: 64-6) for a critique of those 
approaches in relation to the Paris Manuscripts. In terms of readings of Capital, the Marxist-Humanist 
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This is quite a strong statement so it deserves a close scrutiny. Let us then try to 
disentangle the meaning of Marx's dense quotation. We have already mentioned that 
Marx saw the specifically human form of the natural life-process in the fact that 
human beings regulate their process of metabolism through consciousness. That is, 
they appropriate the objective powers of the environment through the organisation of 
the externalisation of their own objective, socially-developed forces by means of 
thought, thus giving their life-process the form of productive activity, of a labour- 
process. Through this process of appropriation of the objective world, human beings 
expand their own productive powers and, therefore, their capacity to regulate the 
metabolic 'dialogue with nature' by means of conscious activity. Hence, Marx's 
reference to the 'strife between existence and essence' can only mean that, before the 
advent of communism, the development of that human potentiality consciously and 
universally to act upon nature takes the concrete form of its own negation. In pre- 
capitalist social forms, this negation is the result of the restriction of the manifestation 
of human life within particularistic boundaries. Modern capitalist society develops 
and mobilises the universality of human powers, but only to negate their immediate 
manifestation as such, through their inversion as powers borne by the product of 
labour. As the negation of this negation, communism involves giving both 'subjective 
and objective nature' a 'form adequate to the human being' (Marx 1992b: 391). Hence 
a first determination of communism must be the development of productive 
subjectivity in a form adequate to the display of the universality of its 'mastery over 
current associated with Dunayevskaya is particularly expressive of this in its `materialist' appropriation 
of the Hegelian dialectic of freedom as the substance of human history and, hence, of revolutionary 
subjectivity (Dunayevskaya 1988; 1989: chapters 1 and 2). See the excellent critique of this aspect of 
Dunayevskaya's thought by Paul Mattick (1958). 
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natural forces, of his own nature as well of those of so-called "Nature"' (Marx 1993: 
488), i. e. as directly taking the form of the universal `self-confirmation' of human 
productive powers in and through the subjectivity of each human individual. 
On the other hand, we have seen that, according to Marx, the affirmation of human 
productive powers and, therefore, the development of productive consciousness, can 
only assert itself through the integration of the individual processes of metabolism 
into a process of social metabolism, that is, through social productive co-operation. In 
other words, the human being is, by its very nature, a social being. This means that 
the development of that potential universality of productive subjectivity can only take 
concrete form through the universality of social relations. Again, 'private property' 
develops this universal sociability but only in the form of. estrangement, that is, as 
universal relations of atomisation and separation between human beings. 
Communism, as the determinate negation of the rule of private property, can only 
mean the positing of this universal sociability as a direct, conscious determination of 
social existence. 
The fact that in the third manuscript Marx takes stock with Hegel's reduction of 
human (productive) subjectivity to knowing self-consciousness and, in particular, 
with the abstraction `absolute knowing' as the speculative identity of thought and 
being, should not blind us to the centrality of consciousness to the social 
transformation which brings about the communist constitution of social life. If ' it is 
true that thought and being are distinct, but at the same time they are in unity with one 
other' (Marx 1992b: 351) this can only imply that the form of human subjectivity that 
results from the immediate positing of the human individual as a social being must 
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involve the complete awareness of this necessarily social character of individual life. 
In a passage where Marx anticipates his well-known dictum that social existence 
determines social consciousness, he states: 
As species-consciousness man confirms his real social life and merely repeats 
in thought his actual existence; conversely, species-being confirms itself in 
species-consciousness and exists for itself in its universality, as a thinking 
being (Marx 1992b: 350-1). 
It is crucial to bear in mind Marx's emphasis on the human individual's consciousness 
of its own social determinations as a fundamental condition for the communist form 
of productive association. This is the reason why Marx states that communism not 
only is the solution to the riddle of history but 'knows itself to be this solution. ' As a 
consequence of this, it is clear that the revolutionary subjectivity that produces the 
communist society must be the bearer of a consciousness that is fully aware of the 
socio-historical necessity of its action. Revolutionary action is such for being a fully 
conscious action. For the communist 'thinking consciousness', 
The entire movement of history is therefore both the actual act of creation of 
communism - the birth of its empirical existence - and (... ) the 
comprehended and known movement of its becoming (Marx 1992b: 348) 
In brief, Marx now clearly sees that the transcendence of this inverted social existence 
has its content in the transformation of the economic forms of society (although this 
obviously involves the transformation of the whole of social life). Thus he discovers 
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the economic content of the proletarian revolution and, therefore, of the form of social 
life that supersedes capital, i. e. of communism, as the conscious, directly social 
productive association of individuals. 
This leads us to the second question that follows from the determination of 
communism as the conscious realisation of the social being of the human individual. 
For it should be clear by now that the communist constitution of social life involves a 
transformation of the forms of human subjectivity and, therefore, of the forms of 
human consciousness. Now the question arises as to the specific character of this 
revolutionary consciousness that becomes aware of the social necessity of its action. 
Is it just an immediate consciousness which can discover the determinations of its 
social being through mere intuition or feeling? Or is it a mediated form of 
consciousness? And in this latter case, is it a scientific consciousness or a 
philosophical one? We shall give a more complete answer to this question in the 
course of this investigation. But from what has already been anticipated above 
regarding Marx's critique of philosophy as a developed expression of the alienated 
consciousness, it seems fair to narrow the question down to the dichotomy between 
seeing revolutionary consciousness as an expression of immediate intuition or as a 
scientifically mediated form of subjectivity. The following passage, I think, speaks 
quite eloquently in favour of the latter. 
But natural science has intervened in and transformed human life all the more 
practically through the industry and has prepared the conditions for human 
emancipation, however much its immediate effect was to complete the process 
of dehumanization. Industry is the real historical relationship of nature, and 
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hence of natural science, to man (... ) Natural science (... ) has already become 
- though in an estranged form - the basis of actual human life. The idea of 
one basis for life and another for science is from the very outset a lie (Marx 
1992b: 355). 
As Marx states very clearly, the scientific transformation of human life already 
happening under the rule of 'private property' constitutes the necessary preparation of 
the material basis for human emancipation. It is clear then, that the consciousness that 
arises out of this new form of 'industry' in order to emancipate it from its alienated 
mode of existence, must be a scientific one, since there 'cannot be a different basis for 
life and science'. This is why Marx is very explicit in recognising the progressive role 
of private property in the historical development of human productive subjectivity. 
Moreover, it is on these grounds that he criticises those crude, romantic versions of 
communism that, in light of the inhuman consequences of the alienated form of 
existence of the scientific appropriation of the powers of nature, want to negate 'the 
entire world of culture and civilisation', and to return to `the unnatural simplicity of 
the poor, unrefined man who has no needs and who has not even reached the stage of 
private property, let alone gone beyond it' (Marx 1992b: 346). Needless to say, this 
has nothing to do with a positivistic technocratic utopia, built on the basis of the 
existing forms of natural-scientific consciousness. Quite to the contrary, Marx is very 
emphatic that the emancipation of humanity does not simply involve the de- 
subordination of natural science to the requirements of the alienated movement of 
private property, but also the transformation of the very nature of scientific 
consciousness itself. This new form of science, on the basis of which the 
revolutionary subjectivity will be able to achieve the communist transformation of 
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society, Marx refers to as the 'human natural science, or the natural science of man, ' 
or, simply, 'true human science'. In Marx's view, it will comprise the totality of what 
in its alienated form of existence appears as the different objects of distinct forms of 
science (the natural and the social), on the one hand; and as a purely theoretical 
activity, on the other, 'since true practice is the condition of a real and positive theory' 
(Marx 1992b: 364). Its basic principle, discovered in its general form by Feuerbach, 
consists in putting at the centre of the inquiry 'the social relation of "man to man"' 
(Marx 1992b: 381). Yet, as we shall see, this basic principle as such would prove 
insufficient to give the revolutionary science its adequate form. ls 
The determinations of the revolutionary subjectivity of the proletariat and the 
limits of the Paris Manuscripts 
In the previous section we left a question unanswered, namely, Marx's explanation of 
the necessity of alienation in human historical development. In other words, the issue 
at stake is the grounding of capital's historical raison d'etre and, therefore, of its 
overcoming. Having shown how for Marx the realisation of the human species-being 
can only be the product of historical development, it is clear that he is not suggesting 
that it is a contingent and extrinsic tragedy imposed onto an otherwise eternally free 
human essence and that it is a matter of recovering a pure subjectivity oppressed by 
private property. The alienated existence of human subjectivity must play a 
15 More concretely, we shall argue that the transformation at stake of the nature of science concerns its 
very form, i. e. its method. A `true human science' can develop such a revolutionary content only by 
virtue of its dialectical form. 
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determinate role in its development. Moreover, it is precisely the fulfilment of this 
role that has to constitute the necessary condition for its historical supersession. This 
is what links the future and the present so that the former is not just a utopian project 
but finds the conditions for its emergence immanent in the historical movement of 
bourgeois society. In this sense, for Marx freedom can only be the result of a 'self- 
superseding movement', which `will in reality undergo a very difficult and protracted 
process' of social transformation (Marx 1992b: 365). In turn, this theme is 
immediately linked with the question of the determinations of the revolutionary 
subjectivity of the proletariat. For if the working class is the historical subject whose 
revolutionary action is to achieve the abolition of alienated labour, this can only mean 
that those conditions which private property engenders in the course of its 
development, and which generate the necessity of its own dissolution as a form of 
existence of human subjectivity, are necessarily activated through the political action 
of the former. 
We would like to argue that it is especially in this aspect of Marx's early critique that 
its abstract character is most strongly felt and the course of his exposition becomes 
increasingly blurred. As we shall see, in the Manuscripts Marx was unable to develop 
the mediations that connect the revolutionary transformation of the forms of social life 
required by the further development of the materiality of the human species-being 
with the political action of the workers. 
Yet this does not mean that no evolution obtains with respect to Marx's previous 
formulation, which posed the question in terms of the realisation of philosophy. An 
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expression of the novel insights developed can be read in Marx's critique of other 
socialist thinkers: 
But the antithesis between propertylessness and property is still an indifferent 
antithesis, not grasped in its active connection, its inner relation, not yet 
grasped as a contradiction, as long as it is not understood as the antithesis 
beteween labour and capital (Marx 1992b: 345). 
This passage can be taken as a kind of self-criticism of his previous views on social 
transformation. For the antithesis between lack of property and property is what he 
posited in the Introduction to the Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy 
of Right as the ground for the revolutionary subjectivity of the proletariat. Since he 
showed that private property is only the juridical expression of alienated labour, it is 
clear that the overcoming of alienation can only spring from the abolition of the latter. 
Without the annihilation of the alienated character of productive activity, the juridical 
elimination of private property can only lead to another form of the reproduction of 
alienated labour, one in which the 'community is simply a community of labour and 
equality of wages, which are paid out by the communal capital, the community as the 
universal capitalist. Both sides of the relation are raised to an imaginary universality 
- labour as the category in which everyone is placed, and capital as the 
acknowledged universality and power of the community' (Marx 1992b: 346-7). 
On the other hand, by posing the question in terms of alienated labour, he eliminates 
the externality between the revolutionary subjectivity of the proletariat and capitalist 
social forms that characterised his previous formulation. That is, from an abstract 
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negation of capital, revolution becomes its determinate negation. Whereas before he 
conceived of the proletariat as being excluded from the general social relation of 
modern society (private property) and founded his revolutionary role precisely in this 
social existence alienated from society (propertylessness), he now sees the worker as 
within the general social relation of bourgeois society (alienated labour or capital). So 
much so, that in the second manuscript Marx shows that the inversion between subject 
and object is so real to the point of directly turning the conscious existence of the 
worker into a mode of existence of capital. 
The worker is the subjective manifestation of the fact that capital is man 
completely lost to himself, just as capital is the objective manifestation of the 
fact that labour is man lost to himself. But the worker has the misfortune to be 
a living capital (... ) (Marx 1992b: 335). 
Instead of deriving the proletariat's revolutionary being from the universal exclusion 
from the specific, alienated social relations governing modern society (and therefore, 
from some sort of pure subjectivity uninfected by private property), he came to derive 
it from the proletariat being the concentrated, active incarnation of the former. Hence, 
the externality between labour and capital is eliminated and they are now seen in their 
necessary, albeit contradictory, unity. It is this contradictory character, deriving from 
the fact that human productive subjectivity develops its powers as an attribute of its 
product that gives alienated labour its dynamic, self-moving character that drives it 
into its own dissolution. And Marx makes explicitly clear that the revolutionary 
movement can only derive its transformative powers from the historical movement of 
this alienated social existence. This is why he argues that `it is easy to see how 
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necessary it is for the whole revolutionary movement to find both its empirical and its 
theoretical basis in the movement of private property or, to be more exact, of the 
economy' (Marx 1992b: 348). Simply put, what this means is that the consciousness 
of the workers is a concrete form of the alienated consciousness. And this holds for 
both the forms of working class subjectivity that reproduce the movement of 
alienation and that which develops the historical powers necessary to abolish it, that 
is, revolutionary consciousness. 
This crucial point is correctly highlighted by Meszäros's detailed study on the Paris 
Manuscripts when he states that the revolutionary consciousness is not a free, non- 
alienated consciousness but a 'consciousness of being alienated' (Meszdros 1970: 
181). However, this insight is not argued on the grounds of the development of the 
concrete determinations of the alienated consciousness that make it become conscious 
of its own alienation. The reason he gives is purely formal and comes down to the fact 
that if the movement of the alienated consciousness did not produce the awareness of 
its own social existence, the conscious transformative action aiming at its 
transcendence would be impossible. Thus he states, 
Were society an `inert totality of alienation', nothing could possibly be done 
about it. Nor could there be any problem of alienation, or awareness of it, for 
if consciousness were the consciousness of this `inert totality' it would be one 
with alienation... not a consciousness that reveals and opposes - in however 
abstract a form - the alienated nature of this inert totality. Alienation is an 
inherently dynamic concept: a concept that necessarily implies change. 
Alienated activity not only produces `alienated consciousness', but also the 
`consciousness of being alienated'. This consciousness of alienation, in 
however form it might appear... not only contradicts the idea of an alienated 
inert totality, but also indicates the appearance of a need for the supersession 
of alienation (Meszäros 1970: 181). 
This is certainly true but close to a truism. That is, once we correctly highlight that 
there is no 'outside' from which to dissolve this alienated social existence, and that this 
is a transitory, historical phenomenon that is bound to disappear, it is evident that it 
must be the movement of alienated activity itself that produces the antagonistic form 
of alienated consciousness capable of putting alienation to an end. The question is 
about the concrete forms in which this negation of the negation asserts itself. Thus 
stated, Meszäros's argument simply involves a purely logical necessity. Moreover, 
what interests us here is the concrete, fully developed revolutionary consciousness of 
this alienated social existence and not one that opposes it in 'however abstract a form' 
(Meszäros 1970: 181). This is not for any scholastic reasons but because we are 
searching for the determinations of the transformative action of the proletariat 
embodying the social powers that enable it to abolish alienated labour. Hence, we do 
not find satisfactory the only reference to the materiality of social life that this author 
puts forward in simply arguing that 'needs produce powers just as much as powers 
produce needs' (Meszäros 1970: 181). For the central question remains unanswered: 
what are the concrete social determinations of the materiality of the productive 
subjectivity of the labourers that give those very same 'powers and needs' a conscious 
revolutionary form? No response to this crucial question can be found in Meszäros's 
reading. No wonder, then, that he ends up offering a moral basis for the necessity of 
transcending the alienated forms of bourgeois society. More incredibly, he even states 
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that after the abolition of alienation not only morality persists but the legal-form as 
well (Meszäros 1970: 186-9)! 
Without entering into a detailed discussion of the merits and limitations of Meszaros's 
own account, let us just point out that, at least from the exegetic point of view, this 
grounding of the revolutionary subjectivity of the proletariat on a moral necessity is 
completely misguided. As matter of fact, Marx makes the explicit critique of moral 
consciousness as an uncritical form of the alienated consciousness. Thus he states: 
It is inherent in the very nature of estrangement that each sphere imposes on 
me a different and contrary standard: one standard for morality, one for 
political economy, and so on. This is because each of them is a particular 
estrangement of man and each is centred upon one particular area of estranged 
essential activity; each is related in an estranged way to the other ... (Marx 
1992b: 362). 
Meszäros is aware of this Marxian critique of morality as an uncritcal expression of 
alienation (Meszäros 1970: 187). 16 But he reads Marx as implying that what is wrong 
is not morality per se but the abstract, transcendental form of the moral argument. 
One, precisely, that abstracts from the material questions with which political 
economy deals. For him, the unalienated moral consciousness is that which, while still 
16 To be more exact, moral consciousness is the alienated consciousness of the commodity-producer 
who, unaware of the social determinations of his/her life-activity, sees his/her social being as an 
external force standing over and against his apparently independent individuality in the form of an 
`ought to be'. 
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arguing in terms of moral evaluation, critically reflects upon those material questions 
of the concrete life-activity of human beings, e. g. the nature of productive activity. 
Yet we think that the quotation is quite revealing as a critique of moral standards 
altogether as the basis for any action aiming to revolutionise the alienated conditions 
of social life. 
Although Meszaros's recourse to a moral necessity as the ground for the revolutionary 
subjectivity of proletariat is unacceptable, his inability to find a consistent account of 
its determinations in the Manuscripts is, to some extent, understandable. For one of 
the problems of this early text is precisely the lack of a rigorous exposition of those 
social determinations and their historical genesis through the unfolding of the 
contradictions of alienated social life. This does not imply that no reference to this 
problematic can be found. Certainly, as we commented above, Marx was well aware 
of the necessity to address this question. But the problem resides in the unsatisfactory 
character of his attempt at an explanation, derived, in turn, from the limitations of 
Marx's own comprehension of the 'laws of motion' of alienated labour at that time. 
What is, then, Marx's account of the necessity of alienated labour and its 
transcendence in the Paris Manuscripts? It is difficult to find a straightforward answer 
to this question since Marx's own discussion is unclear and hesitant. Thus he seems to 
oscillate between different grounds for the workers' revolutionary subjectivity. Now, 
we would like to argue that behind this insufficiency of Marx's exposition we can find 
the methodological limitations of this early text. For a satisfactory account of this 
problematic would have required the deployment of the critical power of the 
dialectical method understood as the 'reproduction of the concrete by means of 
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thought'. This is the method that Hegel discovered but mystified in his Science of 
Logic. The critical appropriation of Hegel's discovery fully crystallised only some 
years later in Marx's life through the development of his `mature' critique of political 
economy. Regarding the question of the abolition of alienated labour, Marx's 
appropriation of the insights developed by Hegel related more to the 'materialist 
inversion' of Hegel's account of the historicity of the forms of human subjectivity and 
their historical development through the process of self-alienation and its 
transcendence: 17 hence Marx's account of the reason to be of private property. In a 
quite Hegelian fashion, he grounds the necessity of alienation in a very abstract and 
general dialectic, as a kind of movement of engendering a determinate negation 
through the previous development of its opposite into extreme maturity. What Hegel 
essentially sees in terms of an abstract mental labour, that is, as a movement of 
consciousness, Marx grasps in its reality as the historical movement of real, sensuous 
productive activity of human beings. 18 Yet he takes from Hegel's account the validity 
of the general form of the historical movement in the 'dialectic of negativity as the 
producing principle' (Marx 1992b: 385-6). Although in the Phenomenology 'the 
various forms of estrangement which occur are therefore merely different forms of 
consciousness and self-consciousness' (Marx 1992b: 385), Hegel has the merit of 
conceiving 
17 And yet, we shall argue in the next chapter that, already in the Paris Manuscripts - more precisely, 
in the section discussing Hegel's Logic - Marx initiated the critical appropriation of the rational kernel 
of the dialectical method as developed by Hegel. 
18 For a good discussion of this aspect of the young Marx's critique of Hegel which avoids the 
misreading of existential and phenomenological Marxism, see the already-cited work by Arthur (Arthur 
1986). 
the self-creation of man as a process, objectification as loss of object 
[Entgegenständlichung], as alienation and as supersession of this alienation; 
that he therefore grasps the nature of labour and conceives objective man - 
true, because real man - as the result of his own labour (Marx 1992b: 386). 
It is this form of the Hegelian 'dialectic of negativity' that Marx uses to account for the 
necessity of the historical dynamic of alienation and its supersession. For he seems to 
suggest that private property is necessary insofar as the human species-being, in order 
to develop the plenitude of its powers to objectify itself, must first negate itself as a 
fully conscious social productive activity, thus affirming itself as alienated, 
unconsciously social activity. In turn, only after the expansion and generalisation of 
private labour - hence, of private property - and the consequent plenitude of 
alienation, can the moment of negation of the negation emerge. 
The real, active relation of man to himself as a species-being, or the 
realization of himself as a real species-being, i. e. as a human being, is only 
possible if he really employs all his species-powers - which again is only 
possible through the cooperation of mankind and as a result of history - and 
treats them as objects, which is at first only possible in the form of 
estrangement (Marx 1992b: 386). 
We can see that the movement appears presented as following an abstract and generic 
`dialectical' necessity. This is not necessarily wrong as a formal description of the 
movement of self-production of humanity, but it is precisely its generality that makes 
it insufficient to account for the concrete determinations that we are searching for. In 
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other words, this general dialectic lacks any concrete specificity regarding the form of 
motion of the annihilation of capital through the revolutionary action of the working 
class. 19 This led Marx to offer several grounds for the proletariat's revolutionary 
subjectivity. The reason for this it that every extreme manifestation of the alienated 
social existence (whether progressive or not) can be seen as a symptom of that state of 
plenitude and could therefore fit into that general scheme as the condition for the 
emergence of the revolutionary powers of the workers. One instance of this we can 
find in the passages we have already referred to regarding Marx's views on a 'truly 
human science. ' There he argues that since the universal alienation in the object leads 
to the development of 'industry' and the consequent coming into being of the complete 
humanisation of nature, it must engender the scientific consciousness which 
eventually frees itself from all traces of its alienated existence through the practical 
abolition of private property (Marx 1992b: 355). That is, it is the generalisation and 
complete intensification of inhumanity that produces the constitution of real 
humanity. As he states some pages later in the section called Money: 
Only through developed industry, i. e. through the mediation of private 
property, does the ontological essence of human passion come into being, both 
in its totality and in its humanity; the science of man is therefore itself a 
product of the self-formation of man through practical activity (Marx 1992b: 
375). 
I 
19 One can say that in the Manuscripts Marx is guilty of the charges made by During of externally 
imposing the negation of the negation on history. Engels correctly points out why this is not the case of 
Capital (Engels 1975: 107-12). 
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On another instance he poses this movement as pertaining to the development of the 
totality of the physical and intellectual senses of the human being (Marx 1992b: 351- 
354). These can develop in a truly human form only after acquiring an alienated mode 
of existence whose synthetic expression is their one-sided subordination to the sense 
of having. Again we see the general dialectic at work: 
Therefore all the physical and intellectual senses have been replaced by the 
simple estrangement of all the senses - the sense of having. So that it might 
give birth to its inner wealth, human nature had to be reduced to this absolute 
poverty (Marx 1992b: 352). 
Marx, somehow idealistically, also fits the 'self-development of communist 
consciousness' into this general scheme. In his critical account of the different forms 
of communist consciousness, he states that 'the supersession [Aufhebung] of self- 
estrangement follows the same course as self-estrangement' (Marx 1992b: 345). He 
seems to be arguing that, in order to develop itself, truly communist consciousness 
must first negate itself as the real determinate negation of private property by taking 
some undeveloped form. In the form of 'crude communism, ' the political programme 
put forward would not lead to the abolition of private property, but to its 
generalisation (Marx 1992b: 346). This 'first positive abolition of private property' is 
partially negated by those forms of communistic consciousness that, although clear 
about the necessity to abolish private property (instead of equalising its distribution) 
as the form of superseding human self-estrangement, are 'still held captive and 
contaminated by private property' (Marx 1992b: 347-8). Finally, communist 'thinking 
consciousness' develops the plenitude of its critical powers completely to abolish 
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alienated labour. In this form, it no longer represents the abstract negation of private 
property, but its determinate negation and therefore, its truly positive supersession 
(Marx 1992b: 348). 
Marx thus alternates between different foundations for the social necessity of 
abolishing alienated labour without offering a solid ground for this process of social 
transformation. Moreover, there is no account of the different stages through which 
alienated social development must pass before attaining its communistic form, or of 
the role of the political action of the workers - the class struggle - in that contradictory 
process. Marx just states the necessity of the starting point and the finishing line. But 
he does not demonstrate the genesis of either of them. What is worse, there is no real 
mediation between that material ground for the abolition of private property and the 
subjectivity of the labourers. The need for such mediation is correctly identified by 
Arthur: 
(... ) there are two levels of necessity for the overthrow of private property: (a) 
abstractly, there is the need to restore man to himself subsequent to the 
supersession of the system of estrangement; (b) concretely, there is the process 
whereby capital in its own development leaves the proletariat with no other 
option than to take the struggle against alienation to its conclusion through 
identifying the problem as capital, itself the product, expression and mediation 
of alienated labour (Arthur 1986: 40) 
The key, as far as the revolutionary subjectivity is concerned, is, precisely, the 
mediation between these two points. In the Manuscripts, the only connection in this 
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regard is that condition (a) refers to the development of productive subjectivity and, 
regarding point (b), that the proletarians are the class of direct producers. Thus the 
emancipatory mission of the proletariat is derived from their being the active 
incarnation of the estranged relation to productive activity which lies at the basis of all 
forms of alienated social existence due to the 'ontological centrality' of labour in the 
constitution of social being. 
It further follows from the relation of estranged labour to private property that 
the emancipation of society from private property, etc., from servitude, is 
expressed in the political form of the emancipation of the workers. This is not 
because it is only a question of their emancipation, but because in their 
emancipation is contained universal human emancipation. The reason for this 
universality is that the whole of human servitude is involved in the relation of 
the worker to production, and all relations of servitude are nothing but 
modifications and consequences of this relation (Marx 1992b: 333). 
Arthur is right in pointing out that we should not read Marx as implying that the 
identification of the proletariat as the 'class of the future' is based on its universal 
suffering, as a 'matter of a sympathetic identification with their problems' (Arthur 
1986: 145). However, we disagree with this commentator's view that Marx's 
grounding of the revolutionary nature of the proletariat in its 'strategic position in the 
economic order' where productive activity is the 'key social mediator', suffices as an 
analysis of the social determinations of the revolutionary subjectivity. This analysis 
must include the positive exposition about the forms of capital's development that 
produce in the workers not only the will to social transformation but also the material 
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powers to achieve it. And it is this latter investigation that is missing in the 
Manuscripts. What is more, the materiality of the conditions generating Arthur's 
'abstract necessity (a)' seems to stand in blatant contradiction to the barbaric 
materiality of the life conditions of the workers that Marx described to be the result of 
the movement of private property. Hence, it is not clear how that 'abstract level of 
necessity for the overthrow of private property' can be activated concretely in the 
subjectivity of the workers. In other words, how to reconcile that revolutionary 
scientific consciousness that discovers the necessity to abolish capital with the 
brutalised state to which the workers are condemned by the division of labour of 
manufacture? How to turn the degradation of the physical and intellectual senses of 
the workers into that fully developed human sensuousness that Marx claimed to be a 
necessary prerequisite for the emergence of communism? As Markus points out, 
'there seems to be no imaginable practico-political strategy, able to bridge this gap 
and to render the initial contact between theory and practice, between the actual 
situation of the revolutionary subjects and the radical content of the theory possible' 
(Markus 1980: 84). No wonder, then, that in attempting to offer this mediation, Marx 
only deploys again that generic dialectic of generation through extreme negation of 
the previous stage. Without a detailed positive account of the laws of motion of 
alienated labour and the determinations of the political action of the workers as 
personifications of the former, no significant guide to action can be drawn from the 
revolutionary theory. Or, better stated, from a too general and undifferentiated 
account of the nature and movement of capitalist society, only a general and abstract 
political programme can be advanced: abolish alienated labour! The scientific critique 
of capital was bound to remain external and thus impotent fully to unite with practice. 
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Chapter 2. The overcoming of philosophy and the development of a 
materialist science 
Introduction 
In the first chapter we have traced Marx's initial discovery of the proletariat as the 
revolutionary subject. Our partial conclusion was that the Paris Manuscripts 
represented an enormous breakthrough in Marx's intellectual development. More 
concretely, we attempted to show that it is in that text that we can find Marx's first 
attempt at a materialistic point of view about the determinations of the revolutionary 
subjectivity of the working class. However, we also argued that that first step did not 
solve all the questions that it had set itself to answer. Rather, this early text can be 
seen as laying down the foundations for the future research that he would undertake 
throughout the rest of his life. We may see the Paris Manuscripts as both asking the 
correct questions and giving the general direction to be followed in order to find the 
social determinations of the revolutionary political action of the proletariat. That 
approach, we argued, consisted in focusing on the development of the materiality of 
human productive subjectivity in its historically-specific forms as the basis for any 
investigation about the transformative powers of human action. However, we also 
showed that beyond a certain point, Marx's exposition became impotent further to 
advance his discoveries. In brief, we tried critically to engage with this 'early Marx' in 
order to highlight both the insights and limitations to be found at that stage of his 
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development of the critique of political economy in the light of its developed form in 
Capital. 
Regarding the merits of the Paris Manuscripts, we pointed out that one of the crucial 
steps forward made which, besides, marked a difference in relation to his previous 
writings, was the definitive abandonment of the standpoint of philosophy. In other 
words, we claimed that Marx's adoption of a materialist perspective was tantamount 
to the transcendence of philosophy. On the other side, we argued that most limitations 
of Marx's early critique could be explained by the inadequacy of the transformative 
method inherited from Feuerbach as the revolutionary form of the proletarian science. 
In the previous chapter these two rather strong claims were just tangentially touched 
upon. It is a first aim of this chapter to give those assertions a closer scrutiny. We 
shall see that, in fact, both aspects are interrelated. This because, although Marx's 
positive development throughout the whole of the Paris Manuscripts already moves 
beyond the philosophical discourse, it is not until the third Manuscript that he feels 
the need explicitly to address the question of the status of philosophical thinking. 
Initially, Marx develops this investigation through the critique of the Hegelian 
dialectic from a still Feuerbachian methodological perspective. However, in the very 
course of his discussion he becomes aware of both the limitations of Feuerbach's 
materialist 'science of man' and the critical power which, once purged from its idealist 
inversions, could be found in the dialectic. As we shall see, from this moment 
onwards Marx scientific enterprise consisted in further developing this insight up to 
the point of giving the critique of political economy a fully developed dialectical 
form. 
AA 
The need to come to terms with Hegel's philosophy 
As Arthur suggests, Marx's turn to the critique of the Hegelian dialectic in the Paris 
Manuscripts seems to be quite abrupt. In effect, up to that point Marx had been 
developing his first critical confrontation with political economy along Feuerbachian 
methodological lines (Arthur 1986: 45). More concretely, a look at the original order 
in which Marx developed his argument (different from the one in which it was 
published), shows that this sudden turn occurs in the context of the discussion of the 
historical movement leading to the supersession of alienated labour in communism. It 
is at that point that he veers radically, leaving momentarily behind the critique of 
economic categories, in order to develop 'by way of explanation and 
justification 
... some considerations in regard to the Hegelian dialectic generally and 
especially its exposition in the Phänomenologie and Logik and also, lastly, the relation 
(to it) of the modern critical movement' (Marx 1992b: 379). 
How are we to understand this abrupt change in Marx's object of criticism? In his 
detailed commentary on the Paris Manuscripts, Arthur gives a plausible explanation 
for this. According to him, in discussing the process of the genesis of man as man (the 
historical realisation of the human species being), Marx became aware of the formal 
similarity between that movement and the one Hegel attributes to the absolute spirit in 
his Phenomenology of Spirit (Arthur 1986: 46). Both involve a process of immediate 
unity between subject and object, a stage of opposition or radical difference and a 
recomposition of that unity but now as a mediated unity, in which both the subject and 
the object appear as the former's own product. In other words, in both cases we are 
facing a process of historical self-production. The difference between them lies in 
their views on which the subject is: absolute spirit for Hegel and the human being as a 
natural productive being for Marx. 
Whilst we do not want to deny the exegetical accuracy of this line of argument, we 
think that it is not the most fruitful way of approaching the question. First, this 
materialist appropriation of Hegel's historical dialectic, although important for Marx's 
discovery of communism as the immanent result of the historical development of 
human productive subjectivity in its alienated capitalist form, eventually proved 
impotent to ground the revolutionary subjectivity of the working class. As we have 
already mentioned, that abstract dialectic could only account for the general form of 
movement of the development of human productive subjectivity up to the negation of 
its alienated form, but could not explain the concrete forms through which it unfolds 
in the course of history. In other words, that abstract dialectic did not say anything 
about the specific 'laws of motion' presiding over the movement of modem society. 
And neither did it explain the concrete historical genesis of the capitalist mode of 
production and, therefore, its concrete role in the 'natural history' of human productive 
subjectivity. In fact, we shall see that as Marx advanced in the scientific cognition of 
the concrete determinations of the movement of capital (and therefore, of the concrete 
determinations of the development of the conscious revolutionary action of the 
proletariat), he progressively dropped the recourse to that general dialectic as the 
ground for the abolition of capital. Hence, whatever the role it played in 1844, that 
'materialist inversion' of the formal movement of Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit, 
played no significant part in Marx's subsequent intellectual development. 
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In the second place, although in the Paris Manuscripts Marx clearly started his 
critique of Hegel with a critique of the latter's Phenomenology of Spirit, he also 
engaged with Hegel's Science of Logic. And it is especially with the latter's critique 
that Marx became aware of the essential character of philosophy as alienated thought. 
By converting logic into ontology, Hegel actually took philosophy to its necessary 
extreme, thereby exposing the idealist inversion inherent in all forms of philosophical 
thought. While other philosophers dogmatically and extrinsically imposed a logical 
necessity upon the movement of real concrete forms, according to Marx Hegel went 
further and self-consciously took the movement of logical forms as engendering the 
content and movement of the real itself. In an absolutely inverted form, Hegel thus 
claimed to have eliminated the exteriority between the form and content of scientific 
knowledge, between method and object of cognition. 
As we shall try to show, this confrontation with Hegel's Science of Logic was crucial 
for Marx's discovery of the revolutionary essence of 'the reproduction of concrete by 
means of thought, ' - i. e. dialectical cognition - as the necessary method of science 
determined as practical criticism. A one-sided emphasis on Marx's materialist 
inversion of the form of motion of Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit overlooks this 
crucial step in Marx's advance in the production of the critique of political economy 
as the scientific revolutionary consciousness of the proletariat. 
Hence, to the implicit reason behind Marx's engagement with Hegel's thought 
mentioned by Arthur, we think it necessary to add the explicit one put forward by 
Marx himself in the opening passages of that section. There he states: 
69 
Modem German criticism was so pre-occupied with the old world, and so 
entangled during the course of its development with its subject-matter, that it 
had a completely uncritical attitude to the method of criticism, and was 
completely unaware of the seemingly formal but in fact essential question of 
how we now stand in relation to the Hegelian dialectic. The lack of awareness 
about the relation of modem criticism to Hegelian philosophy in general and 
to the dialectic in particular has been so pronounced that critics like Strauss 
and Bruno Bauer are still, at least implicitly, imprisoned within Hegelian 
logic, the first completely so and the second in his Synoptiker (where, in 
opposition to Strauss, he substitutes the "self-consciousness" of abstract man 
for the substance of abstract nature) and even in his Das entdeckte 
Christentum (Marx 1992b: 379-80) 
According to this passage, what moved Marx to a critical engagement with Hegel's 
philosophy is the fact that the critical form of consciousness prevailing in Germany at 
that time, far from going beyond the Hegelian mystification of the dialectic, was 
actually reproducing it 'word by word' (Marx 1992b: 380). The motivation, then, was 
not abstractly theoretical but political through and through. In this sense, it is 
important to remember the domination by the Young Hegelians of the radical circles 
in Germany (Shortall 1994: 12-15). In particular, what Marx is reproaching 'modern 
German criticism' for is the fact that, by'becoming imprisoned within Hegelian logic, ' 
their critique of modern society remains inevitably philosophical, that is, impotent to 
develop into a practical criticism involving the radical transformation of the existing 
state of affairs. Instead of leading to the practical abolition of the contradictions of 
modern society, 'absolute Criticism' ends up trapped 'into the single dogmatic 
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antithesis of its own cleverness and the stupidity of the world', which stubbornly 
remains indifferent to the 'absolute truths' discovered by the former (Marx 1992b: 
381). 
But why is philosophical critique necessarily incapable of achieving a practical 
transformation of the world? Is that not a specific problem of Hegel's idealist 
philosophy, which can be overcome by replacing it with a materialist one? As stated 
above, Marx's critique of Hegel's philosophy actually involved the critique of 
philosophy as such: this because, as we shall see, Hegel is considered by Marx to be 
the one who pushed philosophy to its limits, unconsciously laying bare its essential 
nature as 'nothing else but religion brought into thought and developed in thought, and 
that it is equally to be condemned as another form and mode of existence of the 
estrangement of man's nature' (Marx 1992b: 381). Therefore, a truly critical 
appropriation of Hegel's thought could only mean for Marx the transcendence of the 
philosophical standpoint tout court. For how can a mode of existence of the alienated 
consciousness intrinsically bound to uncritically express human alienation, be the 
basis for its supersession? The 'establishment of true materialism and of real science' 
(Marx 1992b: 381) initiated by Feuerbach and which Marx attempted to bring to 
completion, was incompatible with the starting point of philosophical reflection. A 
real science, Marx learnt from Feuerbach, can only have as its point of departure 'the 
social relationship of `man to man' (Marx 1992b: 381). In fact, it was Feuerbach who 
had accomplished the development of a true materialist philosophy. Through the 
inversion of Hegel's dialectic, he showed that a true philosophy should take nature not 
as a mediating stage in the self-development of the Idea, but must have the former as 
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both starting point and endpoint of its theoretical reflection. As Schmidt (Schmidt 
1971: 24) points out: 
For Feuerbach, Hegel's philosophy is philosophy from the standpoint of the 
philosopher, while he is a philosopher from the standpoint of non-philosophy. 
Instead of beginning with philosophy in order to end with philosophy, he 
wanted to begin with non-philosophy in order to return through philosophy to 
non-philosophy... The new philosophy no longer claimed any special position 
as against the other sciences but had its presupposition, like them, in nature. 
Yet even if developed from the standpoint of 'non-philosophy', Feuerbach remained a 
philosopher. Although he did not see his own philosophy as bearing any privilege 
over the rest of the sciences, he still saw his intellectual endeavour as a philosophical 
reflection. In other words, he offered a general - in his case naturalist - interpretation 
of the world (a 'world-view') that was meant to provide an external 'philosophical' 
foundation for the objectivity of human subjectivity. And from that philosophic 
standpoint which ultimately still 'regards the theoretical attitude as the only genuinely 
human attitude, ' it was impossible for him to see the materiality of human thought as 
the form in which `sensuous human activity, practice' is organised (Marx 1976e: 3). 20 
This, we think, is the only meaningful way in which to understand the so-called'unity 
of theory and practice. ' 
20 For good analyses of the similarities and differences between Marx and Feuerbach see Colletti 
(1973: 222-228; 1992: 51-6), Schmidt (1971: 24-33) and, especially, Arthur (Arthur 1986: 114-25). 
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In brief, Feuerbach cleared the terrain for the necessary step forward in the 
development of a materialist standpoint. However, it was only Marx who took up this 
challenge and discovered that the completion of the materialist inversion of Hegel 
required more than the 'naturalisation' of philosophy. It involved the discovery that the 
starting point for any true materialist science was not just the 'social relation of man to 
man' in the abstract, but grasped in its essential determination as historically- 
determined conscious productive practice. It was in the very nature of philosophy to 
be incapable of grasping this elementary determination of human subjectivity. The 
development of a materialist science, as the comprehension - and hence conscious 
organisation - of human practice, entailed the overcoming of philosophy. 
Hegel and the 'dilemma of epistemology' 
The central question of modern philosophy is, to put it simply, an epistemological 
one, in the sense of being an enquiry into the conditions for the genesis and attainment 
of true scientific knowledge. As Gunn puts it, modem philosophy is essentially a 
`metatheory', a `second-order discourse' aiming at evaluating and validating the 
categories employed by scientific theory, conceived as `first-order discourse' (Gunn 
1989: 89). More concretely, philosophy is meant to offer, in the manner of an external 
arbiter, the criteria on which to attribute `objective validity' to the representations 
produced by scientific theory. This means, therefore, that the objectivity of scientific 
knowledge is considered to be grounded in the generic subjectivity of an abstractly 
rational thinking being (Inigo Carrera 2003: 221). The difficulties of epistemology 
arise because of its attempt to provide, through an act of cognition, a foundation for 
ýýT' 
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the conditions under which a valid act of cognition can take place (Colletti 1973: 
199). From this starting point two possible paths seem necessarily to follow. Either 
the formulation of a further external arbiter which could validate the procedures of the 
epistemological cognitive act itself, which would in turn be in need of external 
grounding; or the dogmatic utilisation of those very same criteria with which it 
attempts to found the original act of knowledge, in order to account for the objectivity 
of its own activity. Epistemology's own claims to truth seem to fall into the trap of 
either circularity or infinite regress (Arthur 1986: 50; Gunn 1989: 89-90). Faced with 
this dilemma, Kant ended up claiming that the only way out is humbly to recognise 
the limits of true human knowledge which thus becomes restricted to the phenomenal 
world, leaving the 'thing-in-itself as an unreachable content for the act of cognition 
(Williams 1989: 32-8). 
With his characteristic sarcastic tone, in the Introduction to the Encyclopaedia Hegel 
summarises very clearly the oxymoron that self-conscious traditional epistemology 
(which he saw in what he calls 'critical philosophy') had set for itself. 
One of the main points of view in the Critical Philosophy is the following: 
before we embark upon the cognition of God, or of the essence of things, etc., 
we should first investigate our faculty of cognition itself, to see whether it is 
capable of achieving this. We should first get to know about the instrument, 
before undertaking the task that is supposed to be accomplished by means of 
it; for, otherwise, if the instrument is inadequate, then all further effort would 
have been expended in vain (... ) But the investigation of cognition cannot take 
place in any other way than cognitively; in the case of this so-called tool, the 
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"investigation" of it means nothing but the cognition of it. But to want to 
have 
cognition before we have any is as absurd as the wise resolve of Scholasticus 
to learn to swim before he ventured into the water (Hegel 1991: 34) 
This point was also made by Hegel in the Introduction to the Science of Logic. There 
he remarked on the specific nature of the science which had thought as its own 
particular content. For the rest of the sciences, method and subject matter are 
distinguished so that they are 'permitted to speak of their ground and its context and 
also of their method, only as premises taken for granted which, as forms of definitions 
and such-like presupposed as familiar and accepted, are to be applied straight-way, 
and also to employ the usual kind of reasoning for the establishment of their general 
concepts and fundamental determinations' (Hegel 1999: 43). However, logic, having 
those laws of thinking themselves as its own content, cannot presuppose them but 
needs to discover them itself in the course of its development. And yet this does not 
mean that no justification for the objectivity of pure thinking is needed. But this is not 
to be part of the science of pure thought itself but the presupposition of its beginning. 
This deduction, which is nothing more than the movement of consciousness itself 
until discovering the objectivity of its own cognising activity, Hegel had given in the 
Phenomenology of Spirit (1999: 49). 
The point is that the whole problematic arises because epistemology starts from the 
radical separation between knowledge and reality, or subject and object of 
knowledge. Hegel's alleged solution was then to solve those contradictions by going 
right to their essential source in that deficient starting point of traditional 
epistemology. The general result of his Phenomenology of Spirit is precisely the 
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ontological identity between thought and being (Houlgate 1998; 2001). This is the 
essential content of absolute knowledge as the self-knowledge of absolute spirit's own 
dialectic. Certainly, Hegel does not extrinsically confront this essential truth with the 
allegedly wrong starting point of traditional epistemology in order to replace it with 
his own, more satisfactory account. This would leave him with exactly the same 
dilemma that traditional epistemology faced. The whole gist of his phenomenological 
method consists precisely in taking what he calls the standpoint of consciousness (i. e. 
that which sees a radical separation between consciousness and its object) as the 
starting point for his science of the experience of consciousness (that is Hegel's 
definition of phenomenology). More precisely, he starts from the simplest figure of 
that knowing subjectivity, i. e. immediate certainty. From this beginning, and through 
a method of immanent critique Hegel attempts to show that his own absolute 
knowledge is a necessary concrete form into which that simple initial figure of the 
knowing consciousness develops (on immanent critique in Hegel, see Hyppolite 
1991). The phenomenology is the laborious odyssey of consciousness passing through 
all of its defective figures until reaching its plenitude as absolute knowledge. The 
crucial thing is that this development is not the product of the failure of the different 
forms of consciousness to measure up to some external yardstick provided by the 
philosopher, the alleged bearer of absolute truth. On the contrary, this motion is 
generated by the contradictions produced by each figure of consciousness itself when 
measured against its own standards. Although at first there seems to be a perfect 
identity between what consciousness takes to be the object in itself and the way it 
knows the object (i. e. the object for consciousness), a closer scrutiny of each figure's 
cognising experience reveals that those two moments are actually in opposition. It is 
the development of its own contradictions that pushes consciousness forward to ever 
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newer, more complex forms until reaching the stage of absolute knowing. In this 
sense, it is a process of philosophical self-education of ordinary consciousness. The 
philosopher does not teach ordinary consciousness the content of absolute knowing 
(the identity of thought and being) but just describes the self-movement of the latter 
through which it eventually grasps that essential truth by itself. The false is then 
revealed to be not simply 'wrong' but a partial view that results from the fixation and 
absolutisation of what actually is a determinate moment or appearance of a more 
comprehensive, concrete totality, namely: absolute spirit's self-development. At the 
end of the journey consciousness thus learns that the distinction between subjectivity 
and objectivity was posited by consciousness itself. 
In this way, absolute knowing reveals that the externality between form and matter of 
cognition is an appearance that vanishes as soon as one comes to adopt its standpoint. 
Thus, according to Hegel, the problem of traditional epistemology is solved. The 
determinations of thought are not pure subjective forms that organise a given content 
but the immanent essential determination of everything that exists when grasped in its 
universality, that is, in the objectivity of its 'logical element'. Liberated from 'the 
opposition of consciousness', pure thinking recognises its own objectivity as the 
Notion, i. e. as 
(... ) the nature, the peculiar essence, that which is genuinely permanent and 
substantial in the complexity and contingency of appearance and fleeting 
manifestation, (... ) the notion of the thing, the immanent universal (... ) the 
very heart of things, their simple life-pulse, even of subjective thinking of 
them (Hegel 1999: 36-7). 
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On this basis, logic is thus free to proceed with the presentation of the self- 
determining movement of the Notion by showing the multiplicity of different thought- 
forms that structure being in all its complexity. However, after the reconstruction of 
the experience of consciousness in the Phenomenology of Spirit it becomes evident 
for philosophy that this exposition of objective pure thinking cannot consist in the 
mere external 'aggregate of definitions and propositions which ordinarily passes for 
logic' (Hegel 1999: 51). This collection of external relations among the different 
thought-forms is, according to Hegel, the picture philosophy gets when it wrongly 
borrows its scientific method from the science of 'the quantitative aspects of the 
determinations' (Hegel 1999: 52), i. e. mathematics. Quite to the contrary, Hegel 
argues, in the Phenomenology of Spirit he had already shown the workings of the 
'scientifically correct method' as the ideal reproduction of the 'inner self-movement' of 
the object of cognition, which is governed by the 'dialectic which it possesses within 
itself (see also 1977: 31-2; Hegel 1999: 54). That is, science must proceed by 
following 'the inner negativity of the determinations as their self-moving soul' (Hegel 
1999: 56): 
All that is necessary to achieve scientific progress - and it is essential to 
strive to gain this quite simple insight - is the recognition of the logical 
principle that the negative is just as much positive, or that what is self- 
contradictory does not resolve itself into a nullity, into abstract nothingness, 
but essentially only into the negation of its particular content, in other words, 
that such a negation is not all and every negation but the negation of a specific 
subject matter which resolves itself, and consequently is a specific negation, 
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and therefore the result essentially contains that from which it results; which 
strictly speaking is a tautology, for otherwise it would be an immediacy, not a 
result. Because the result, the negation, is a specific negation, it has content. It 
is a fresh Notion but higher and richer than its predecessor; for it is richer by 
the negation or opposite of the latter, therefore contains it, but also something 
more, and is the unity of itself and its opposite. It is in this way that the system 
of Notions as such has to be formed - and has to complete itself in a purely 
continuous course in which nothing extraneous is introduced (Hegel 1999: 
54). 
Thus Hegel distinguishes between what he terms the `understanding' and `speculative 
thought'. The former grasps thoughts as self-subsistent entities or immediate 
affirmations: 
Thinking as understanding stops short at the fixed determinacy and its 
distinctness vis-a-vis other determinacies; such a restricted abstraction counts 
for the understanding as one that subsists on its own account, and simply is 
(Hegel 1991: 125). 
Moreover, and this is what distinguishes understanding from mere `representation', on 
that basis it attempts to establish `a necessary relation between the isolated 
determinations of representation - whereas representation leaves them side by side, in 
its undetermined space, linked only by the simple "and". ' (Hegel 1991: 50) However, 
unwilling to recognise that `according to its proper determinacy (... ), the dialectic', or 
negativity, `is the genuine nature that properly belongs to the determinations of the 
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understanding, to things, and to the finite in general', the understanding can only end 
up establishing a connection among all those conceptions by means of purely 
subjective reflection, that is, by following a necessity which is extenzal to the 
immanent determination of the object of cognition at stake (Hegel 1991: 128). 
Conversely, speculative thought involves the consciousness both of the `dialectical 
moment' present in all `things [as they are] in and for themselves (Hegel 1991: 129) 
and, also, of `the affirmative that is contained in their dissolution and in their 
transition' (Hegel 1991: 131). It therefore discovers in the dialectic `the moving soul 
of scientific progression (... ) the principle through which alone immanent coherence 
and necessity enter into the content of science' (Hegel 1991: 128). Speculative 
science thus grasps the relations among things in their objective, immanent necessity. 
In this way, Hegel claims to have moved beyond the antinomies of philosophical 
thought. He sees himself as not only overcoming the externality between the form and 
content of knowledge but also as discovering in the dialectic the form in which the 
universality of the Notion moves, thus giving life and motion to every particular real 
form, whether natural or 'spiritual. ' Thus seen, logic 'no longer stands as a particular 
alongside other particulars but includes them all within its grasp and is their essence, 
the absolutely True' (Hegel 1999: 59). 
It is with these conclusions, according to Marx, that far from solving the dilemma of 
epistemology, Hegel carried the idealist inversion intrinsic to all philosophical 
thought to its limit. And this, in a two-fold sense. Negatively, he thereby unwittingly 
exposed the source of the idealist inversion inherent in philosophy in the replacement 
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of the movement of the real, i. e. its determinate immanent necessity, with a logical 
necessity. The content of the materialist inversion needed thus became clear, namely, 
the overcoming of all forms of logical representation of reality through the discovery 
of the specific necessity immanent in the determinate object of cognition (and hence 
of transformation) at stake, that is, through the `reproduction of the concrete by means 
of thought'. 21 Positively, in discovering contradiction as the 'negativity which is the 
indwelling pulsation of self-movement and spontaneous activity' (Hegel 1999: 442) of 
every existing real form, Hegel grasped the dialectic as the form of cognition (i. e. the 
method) capable of expressing the aforementioned 'inner necessity controlling the 
object' to be known. With these two insights in their unity, Marx would begin his 
positive development of science determined as a necessary concrete moment of the 
revolutionary transformation of society into the free association of individuals. 22 
21 Following Inigo Carrera (2003), we shall use the expressions 'logical representation' or 
`representational thought' to refer to the form of scientific or philosophical cognition that moves 
according to a purely ideal necessity, external to the real forms to be known. By the 'reproduction of 
the concrete by means of thought' or, simply, 'dialectical knowledge', we shall mean that form of 
science which grasps the necessity for self-transformation immanent in things themselves. They 
correspond to what Hegel respectively called 'understanding' and 'speculative thought', minus his 
idealist inversion. 
22 The reduction of the materialist inversion of Hegel to the latter insight only, generally coupled with 
the dogmatic claim that the subject of the movement described by Hegel's Logic is not the 'Idea' but 
'Matter', does not move an iota beyond logical representation. It just formally changes an idealist 
dialectical logic, into a 'materialist' one, to be extrinsically applied to every determinate concrete form 
of material reality. 
81 
Marx's Critique of Hegel's Philosophy in the Paris Manuscripts 
Even among the most lucid commentators of Marx's Paris Manuscripts, the section 
on the critique of the Hegelian dialectic is read primarily as an attempt to develop a 
materialist inversion of Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit. In this sense, Arthur's 
detailed commentary is a case in point. 23 According to this author, the essence of 
Marx's criticism consists in the inversion of Hegel's historical dialectic through the 
replacement of 'his Bildungsroman of spirit with that of man' (Arthur 1986: 56). Thus 
Marx is seen as part of the Young Hegelian tradition of critical appropriation of 
Hegel's thought. This involves the recognition that Hegel's dialectic expresses truth 
but in mystified form. Feuerbach's influence in particular consisted in that attempt to 
refer all that in Hegel belongs to that abstraction called 'Spirit' to real man as an 
objective, natural being. However, the argument goes, against the passivity and 
ahistoricity of Feuerbach's views about the human being, Marx recovered the 'active', 
productive and historical side contained in the Hegelian dialectic. Hence the latter's 
positive aspect of the 'dialectic of negativity as the producing principle' (Marx 1992b: 
385-6). The self-development of Spirit through alienation and its overcoming is 
actually a mystified representation of the human being's self-production through 
labour (Arthur 1986: 60). The essential difference between Marx's and Hegel's 
account thereby lies in the concrete subject of the dialectic of negativity. Whilst for 
Hegel the subject of this activity is an abstraction called consciousness, for Marx, 
building on Feuerbach's criticism, it is the 'real, corporeal man, his feet firmly planted 
on the solid earth, and breathing all the powers of nature' (Marx 1992b: 389). In turn, 
around this question would revolve the difference in political stances towards 
23 But see also Markus (1980: 82-3). 
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capitalist society between Hegel and Marx. For the former, the overcoming of 
alienation does not involve the practical, real abolition of an alienated social world but 
only a change in the attitude of consciousness regarding those forms of objectivity. 
24 
In brief, in this reading the primary aspect of Marx's criticism of Hegel in the Paris 
Manuscripts concerns the question of the idealist character of the Hegelian dialectic 
of human consciousness. Moreover, this critique would have served Marx as a way of 
developing the central insight of his 'social ontology, ' namely, the essentiality of 
productive activity in the historical development of human beings. 
Although the relevance that this question about the idealism of Hegel's 
Phenomenology of Spirit had for Marx's development in those years is beyond 
dispute, I think that a more fruitful reading strategy should focus not on the critique of 
that 1807 text but on Marx's confrontation with Hegel's Logic. And there are mainly 
two reasons for this. First, as was already discussed, although the question of 
productive subjectivity and its historical forms remained the essential element of 
Marx's materialist standpoint, the general dialectic of negativity as the foundation for 
24 Although we cannot address the question here, we would like to acknowledge the existence of a 
debate over the fairness of Marx's critique of Hegel. Thus Rose (1995: 214-5) has challenged Marx's 
reading of Hegel for being essentially Fichtean (see Arthur 1986: 74-6, for a reply to Rose; and Smith 
1990b for a critique of Arthur). Other authors have also criticised Marx for not realising that, actually, 
there is no difference between Hegel's dialectic and his own (Fraser 1998: 34-6). Fine (2001: chapter 
5) also argues that Marx failed to recognise the methodological affinity between his dialectical method 
and Hegel's. But, in addition, he explores the consequences of the misreading of Hegel for Marx's own 
thought. Be that as it may, the relevant point for this thesis is not whether Marx was right or wrong in 
his reading of Hegel but the positive methodological insights developed through the critique of the 
latter. 
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the overcoming of alienated labour was left behind in his later works. Secondly, that 
one-sided emphasis on the discussion of the Phenomenology of Spirit overlooks the 
fact that Marx's concern for that early text is subordinate to his critique of the Science 
of Logic as the consummation of Hegel's hypostasis of logic's ideal necessity. 
25 
Hence, according to our reading the significance of those pages for Marx's subsequent 
intellectual development is not so much 'socio-ontological' as methodological. 
Certainly, Marx's initial entry point for the discussion of Hegel is the latter's abstract 
dialectic of absolute Spirit with its allegedly conservative result. After praising 
Feuerbach for positing nature and the human being - 'the self-sustaining positive' - as 
the starting points of his philosophy, he goes on to argue that it is for exactly the 
opposite reason that Hegel's dialectic is to be criticised. However, this critique should 
recognise that, albeit in an idealist form, Hegel had unconsciously discovered the 
general form of motion of the historical process through which the human being is 
produced. According to Marx, 
25 The only commentator that we are aware of who adopts this reading strategy of that section of the 
Manuscripts is Murray (Murray 1988: 46-7). However, he does not develop this in the methodological 
direction of the distinction between representational thought and dialectics. Instead, he uses it to put 
forward his own variant of the'homology thesis', which sees a parallel between Hegel's logical concept 
and capital, inasmuch as they are both hypostasised abstractions indifferent to any qualitative 
distinction. On the `homology thesis', see the debate between Chris Arthur (2003a; 2003b) - supporter 
of a strong version of the thesis, whereby the parallel between the Idea and Capital is not just general 
but applies to almost every single category - and Tony Smith (2001; 2003) - for whom the thesis does 
not stand close scrutiny. 
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Hegel has merely discovered the abstract, logical, speculative expression of 
the movement of history. This movement of history is not yet the real history 
of man as a given subject, it is simply the process of his creation, the history 
of his emergence (Marx 1992b: 382). 
While in the conventional reading this quotation is read with an emphasis on Hegel's 
finding of the form of the 'movement of history, ' we think that, conversely, the crux of 
the matter resides in Marx's emphasis on the 'abstract, logical, speculative' nature of 
Hegel's account. Thus Marx's praise of Hegel's discovery of the dialectic of negativity 
as the 'producing principle' should be qualified. The latter not only served Marx to 
reveal its material content in the dialectic of labour self-alienation but also gave a 
clear illustration of Hegel's speculative transformation of logic into the source of all 
movement and life. This is a crucial point. It exposes the procedure of philosophical 
representation consisting in the substitution of a mental, logical necessity for the real 
one. Instead of following the real movement of humanity's historical self-development 
and then discovering that, as far as its form is concerned, it moves according to a 
dialectic of negativity, Hegel sees the movement of real history only as an(other) 
instantiation of the logical principle of pure negativity. 
Since this so-called negativity is nothing more than the abstract, empty form 
of that real living act, its content can only be a formal content, created by 
abstraction from all content. Consequently there are general, abstract forms of 
abstraction which fit every content and are therefore indifferent to all content; 
forms of thought and logical categories torn away from real mind and real 
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nature. (We shall expound the logical content of absolute negativity later. ) 
(Marx 1992b: 396-7) 
This passage shows with utmost clarity the point which Marx is getting at and of 
which the discussion of the Phenomenology of Spirit constitutes a prelude, namely, 
the alienated nature of philosophy. That is why Marx wants to take stock of Hegel's 
philosophy in its entirety, which, inasmuch as he sees it as the most developed form 
of philosophical consciousness, entails a critique of philosophy tout court. In this 
sense, as Murray points out, Marx's 'concern for Hegel's Phenomenology must be 
understood in terms of the attention to his logic [of absolute idealism]' (Murray 1988: 
46). As Marx makes clear right at the beginning of that section of the Manuscripts, 
the critique of Hegel should aim at his philosophical system as a whole, as presented 
in the Encyclopaedia, since it is that work which condenses the essence of 
philosophical thought as alienated thought thinking itself. 
Hegel's Encyclopaedia begins with logic, with pure speculative thought, and 
ends with absolute knowledge, with the self-conscious, self-comprehending 
philosophical or absolute mind, i. e. superhuman, abstract mind. In the same 
way, the whole of the Encyclopaedia is nothing but the extended being of 
philosophical mind, its self-objectification; and the philosophical mind is 
nothing but the estranged mind of the world thinking within its self- 
estrangement, i. e. conceiving itself abstractly (Marx 1992b: 383) 
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On the other hand, it is to be remembered that Hegel's Phenomenology is not part of 
his system but constitutes its introduction (Houlgate 2003: 368-70). This is why Marx 
states that the critique of Hegel's philosophy as a whole 'must begin with his 
Phenomenology, which is 'the true birthplace and secret of the Hegelian philosophy' 
(Marx 1992b: 383, our emphasis). Hegel considers the Phenomenology the work that 
leads consciousness from its immediate mode of existence to the essential 
determination of absolute knowledge in the identity of thought and being. In this way 
consciousness recognises that its thought-determinations are not something different 
from the determinations of objects existing independently 'out there' but that its own 
thinking about itself is the thinking about the determinations of being. In the words of 
a contemporary Hegel scholar, 
What consciousness comes to understand at the end of the Phenomenology, 
therefore, is the Kantian idea that the determinations of being are in fact the 
determinations of consciousness, together with the un-Kantian idea that the 
determinations of consciousness are the determinations of being (Houlgate 
2001: 135) 
It is only once consciousness has gone through that journey that lands it on the realm 
of absolute knowledge that proper philosophy can actually begin by reconstituting the 
path from the abstract determinations of being to its most concrete forms of existence 
as Spirit. To put it differently, abstractly considered, a consciousness that for 
whatever reason does not hesitate a second about the identity between thought and 
being, could easily skip the phenomenological experience and move straight to the 
starting point of the system of philosophy which begins with the Logic (Houlgate 
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2003: 368). Hence Marx's critique of Hegel's false starting point with an abstract 
consciousness, the philosophical representation of the real, corporeal human 
individual. Because that possibility demonstrates that far from moving from the 
sensuous concrete to the abstract, Hegel's philosophical standpoint never abandoned 
the realm of abstraction. The alienated essence of philosophy is precisely exposed by 
its systemic starting point with logic, the science of pure thinking. In particular, the 
idealist inversion appears with full force in the problematic of the transition from the 
logical idea to nature. The autonomisation of thought-forms from nature and 
consciousness in the form of pure logical categories and their further integration as 
moments of the logical Idea reaches its moment of truth when faced with its self- 
determination as its 'other'. Here Marx resorts to a Feuerbachian line of criticism. The 
difficulties of that transition betray the absoluteness of Hegel's Idea and actually 
constitute a proof that abstract, presuppositionless thought is nothing without nature. 
Hegel's positive achievement in his speculative logic is to present determinate 
concepts, the universal fixed thought forms in their independence of nature 
and mind, as a necessary result of the universal estrangement of human 
existence, and thus also of human thought, and to comprehend them as 
moments in the process of abstraction (... ) But the abstraction which 
comprehends itself as abstraction knows itself to be nothing: it must relinquish 
itself, the abstraction, and so it arrives at something which is its exact 
opposite, nature. Hence the whole of the Logic is proof of the fact that abstract 
thought is nothing for itself, that the absolute idea is nothing for itself and that 
only nature is something (Marx - 1992b: 397). 
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What makes this metaphysical transition from the idea to nature necessary is precisely 
the fact that during the whole movement of the idea in its purity (the Logic) no 
particular, determinate content was touched upon. Only the general, the logical, the 
essentialities or thought-determinations were developed, which, because of their 
generality, are said to structure all forms of the real. But the abstraction reached in 
this form cannot but long for a particular content, otherwise abstract thought would 
keep revolving around itself. And this would mean the recognition of its non-absolute 
character, since its other (nature) would persist in its independence and 'otherness'. 
Thus the need to bring nature in. However, says Marx, alienated thought can only 
acknowledge nature as a thought-entity. Its existence is the last logical necessity of 
the absolute idea in its purity, which, to demonstrate its absoluteness, has to self-posit 
itself in the form of externality, i. e. as nature. 
(... ) this whole idea, which conducts itself in such a strange and baroque 
fashion, and which has caused the Hegelians such terrible headaches, is purely 
and simply abstraction, i. e. the abstract thinker; abstraction which, taught by 
experience and enlightened as to its own truth, resolves under various 
conditions - themselves false and still abstract - to relinquish itself and to 
establish its other-being, the particular, the determinate, in place of its self- 
pervasion [Beisichsein], non-being, universality and indeterminateness; to let 
nature, which it concealed within itself only as a mere abstraction, as a thing 
of thought, issue freely from itself, i. e. to abandon abstraction and to take a 
look at nature, which exists free from abstraction (Marx 1992b: 397-8). 
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The philosopher, who, as pure thinker, sees him/herself as the ultimate incarnation of 
the human, is actually the ultimate incarnation of the alienated existence of the 
human. Inasmuch as he/she sees his/her own species-being (that is, his/her specific 
determination as a labouring natural being) as the very negation of true humanity 
(Fracchia 1991: 155-7), he/she can separate thought from concrete, real thinking man 
and consider it as the attribute of an abstractly pure thinking subjectivity. Thought- 
forms are thus transformed into categories of pure thinking, which moves according 
to its own mental necessity and is therefore indifferent to every natural (and hence 
human) determination. In other words, thought-forms are turned into logical 
categories and their movement into logic. In this abstract universality, thought-forms 
are thus seen to express the ideal necessity of reason in its purity, uncontaminated by 
the contingency of particular contents. While different philosophers tended to 
privilege this or that group of pure thought-forms as the essential logical categories, 
Hegel synthesised them all in his Logic as the science of pure abstraction. This is one 
of the ways in which, according to Marx, Hegel represented the ultimate expression of 
philosophical thought. But additionally, as we have already noted, Hegel pushed the 
idealist inversion to a complacent self-awareness and hence, to its plenitude. Certainly 
in a mystified form, philosophers before Hegel had still preserved some link between 
thought and the human being. To be more precise, an alienated, abstract 
representation of the human being as a purely thinking subject. But Hegel went one 
step further and completed the severance of thought from the human subject, the 
result of which could only be their reunion in an inverted form, that is, with the 
process of thought turned into an independent subject itself (Marx 1976a: 102). 
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The man estranged from himself is also the thinker estranged from his 
essence, i. e. from his natural and human essence. His thoughts are therefore 
fixed phantoms existing outside nature and man. In his Logic Hegel has locked 
up all these phantoms (Marx 1992b: 398). 
And in a footnote Marx adds, 
We shall see later why Hegel separates thought from the subject; but it is 
already clear that if man is not human, then the expression of his essential 
nature cannot be human, and therefore that thought itself could not be 
conceived as an expression of man's being, of man as a human and natural 
subject, with eyes, ears, etc., living in society, in the world and in nature 
(Marx 1992b: 389). 
It is the difficult and painful transition from pure thought to nature (difficult for the 
abstract thinker, that is) which exposes the speculative trick. Because now all the 
logical categories repeat themselves in the movement of nature, that is, not in their 
purity but in the form of externality. Hence, the philosopher involuntarily reveals that 
those abstract logical categories which he sees himself as engendering by himself 
through his pure thinking activity, are in fact specific determinations of nature 
(matter) which he had abstracted from the latter and, by giving them the form of an 
abstract universality, transformed them into pure thought-forms. The subsequent 
necessary return to nature can only produce an inverted image of nature, that is, as a 
dead materiality which has life, movement and meaning only as a mode of existence 
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of the logical concept. In other words, the philosopher does not deal with real nature 
but with a thought-entity. 
But nature too, taken abstractly, for itself, and fixed in its separation from 
man, is nothing for man. It goes without saying that the abstract thinker who 
decides on intuition, intuits nature abstractly. Just as nature lay enclosed in the 
thinker in a shape which even to him was shrouded and mysterious, as an 
absolute idea, a thing of thought, so what he allowed to come forth from 
himself was simply this abstract nature, nature as a thing of thought - but 
with the significance now of being the other-being of thought, real, intuited 
nature as distinct from abstract thought. Or, to put it in human terms, the 
abstract thinker discovers from intuiting nature that the entities which he 
imagined he was creating out of nothing, out of pure abstraction, in a divine 
dialectic, as the pure products of the labour of thought living and moving 
within itself and never looking out into reality, are nothing more than 
abstractions from natural forms. The whole of nature only repeats to him in a 
sensuous, external form the abstractions of logic (Marx 1992b: 398-9). 
Marx's critique of Hegel's Logic in the final section of the Manuscripts, and especially 
the transition from the Logical Idea to Nature, is crucial to grasp Marx's revolution in 
the mode of science. Because in the course of his engagement with Hegel he becomes 
aware of the source of the idealist inversion of which all representational thought 
suffers for being condemned to remain a concrete form of the reproduction of capital 
(i. e. uncritical alienated thought). And the key to this critique does not simply reside, 
as Diamat would have it, in the fact that Hegel sees the Idea as the subject of the 
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dialectic, so that the inversion would consist in leaving his dialectic intact and 
dogmatically claiming that the subject is nature or matter. There is no doubt that all 
that exists (human thought included) is a more or less developed concrete form of 
matter, resulting from the latter's self-movement through a process of differentiation, 
that is, through the production of qualitative differences. The only alternative to this 
would be a creationist view. Now from a communist perspective, that point, however 
valid, is a self-evident truism. Already in Marx's time the atheist standpoint was well- 
established in the workers' movement so that, as he states in the Manuscripts, it 
already constituted a basic presupposition of revolutionary science. 
Atheism, which is the denial of this unreality, no longer has any meaning, for 
atheism is a negation of God, through which negation it asserts the existence of 
man through this negation. But socialism as such no longer needs such 
mediation (Marx 1992b: 357). 
But as this passage also makes clear, proletarian science does not come down to 
atheism. Or, more precisely, the revolutionary science of the working class does not 
even need such a mediation, since 'its starting point is the theoretically and practically 
sensuous consciousness of man and of nature as essential beings' (Marx 1992b: 357). 
Hence, the philosophical quarrels within Russian Marxism over the question of the 
primacy of thought or matter in the process of knowledge, which is nothing but the 
disguised secular form of the classical theological question (Marx 1992b: 381), were 
not only scholastic but peculiarly anachronistic ones. As an expression of the 
backward nature of the Russian process of capital accumulation, those essentially 
ideological forms could not, as German criticism in Marx's time, but 'be preoccupied 
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with the old world' (see also Pannekoek 1948: chapter 7; Marx 1992b: 379). Later, 
when the Stalinist regime completed the dogmatic codification of Marx's 
revolutionary science through its conversion into an official state ideology, that 
anachronistic emphasis on the materialist philosophical world-view as the 
distinguishing mark of proletarian science was taken even further. That distinction 
was used to legitimise the use of state violence against those who personified the 
working class resistance to that absolutely centralised process of exploitation. 
Coming back to our point. The importance of Marx's critique of Hegel's Logic in the 
Paris Manuscripts does not consist in opposing a materialist philosophy to Hegel's 
absolute idealism. The crux of the matter resides in the fact that, through the critique 
of Hegel, Marx came to grips with the essential difference between representational 
thought, as the uncritical form of alienated consciousness, and the reproduction of the 
concrete by means of thought as the form of revolutionary science. Hegel's logic 
exposed without ambiguity the source of the idealist inversion present in logical 
representation in all its expressions, whether scientific or philosophical. In a sense, the 
distinction between the idealist and the materialist standpoints was relevant for Marx. 
However, it did not pertain to two different 'philosophical outlooks' but was embodied 
in the very form of the process of cognition, in the mode of scientific knowledge. The 
point Marx is getting at is that the idealism of logical representation springs from its 
replacement of the determinate movement of nature and history with a mental 
construction, structured on the basis of a logical necessity. The latter, by its own 
nature as a subjective reflection, can only remain external to the particular natural or 
social forms at stake. Behind the need to provide an external mental necessity to put 
real forms into 'theoretical relation' rests the assumption that those forms are 
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incapable of establishing relations by themselves. In other words, that those forms are 
lifeless abstractions which therefore do not embody any qualitative potentiality or 
determinacy whose realisation involves its self-transformation into another, more 
concrete form. As already mentioned, this is what Hegel discovered as the flawed 
procedure of what he called the 'understanding', which represented real forms as a 
universe of indifferent and self-subsistent entities. Devoid of any immanent necessity 
driving them to self-movement, real forms can only be put into external relation by 
means of subjective reflection. Against this view, Hegel opposed the reproduction of 
the immanent movement of real forms or dialectical cognition as the scientifically 
correct method. However, for Hegel this did not involve the transcendence of logical 
thought. On the contrary, it involved the elevation of logic, the science of pure 
thinking, to the status of the science par excellence. For although he claimed the 
correct form of science to be the reproduction of the 'inner life' of the determinate 
object of cognition, the original source of that movement did not lie in those particular 
real forms themselves but in their determination as concrete modes of existence of 
pure logical thought forms. The latter are the ones which posit life into what would 
otherwise be lacking in meaning and inner movement. In the words of Marx, 
In the natural form, superseded Movement as Matter corresponds to 
superseded Becoming as Being. Light is the natural form of Reflection-in- 
itself. Body as Moon and Comet is the natural form of the antithesis which, 
according to the Logic, is the positive grounded on itself and the negative 
grounded upon itself. The Earth is the natural form of the logical ground, as 
the negative unity of the antithesis, etc. 
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Nature as nature, i. e. insofar as it is sensuously distinct from the secret sense 
hidden within it, nature separated and distinct from these abstractions is 
nothing, a nothing proving itself to be nothing, it is devoid of sense, or only 
has the sense of an externality to be superseded (Marx 1992b: 399). 
In discussing Hegel, the issue at stake for Marx was not the philosophical question of 
whether matter determined thought or vice versa, but the distinction between logic, 
which was 'completely indifferent to all real determinateness' (Marx 1992b: 383) and 
the reproduction in thought of that 'real determinateness' as it unfolds in nature and 
history. And here it is important to point to a subtle but crucial difference between the 
critique of Hegel's Logic in the Paris Manuscripts and in the Critique of Hegel's 
Philosophy of Right. At first sight, they seem to come down to the same essential 
point. According to Marx, whether in the case of nature or the state, Hegel inverts 
their specific movement as an instantiation of the logical movement of the concept. 
Whilst this is true enough as far as the negative view of Hegel's idealistic inversion is 
concerned, this similarity of the critique between the two texts overlooks their 
difference regarding Marx's positive view on what was to replace Hegel's 'applied 
metaphysics. ' Indeed, there is a substantial leap in the Paris Manuscripts compared 
with the criticism raised a year before in the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right 
(Ifligo Carrera 2003). In this latter work Marx opposed to Hegel's claim of generality 
for his logical concept ('the matter of logic'), the necessity to develop `the logic of the 
matter' (Marx 1975a: 18). By contrast, in the Manuscripts Marx no longer 
distinguishes between a general ideal necessity and a particular ideal necessity. He 
realises that the relevant distinction is that between the ideal necessity tout court - 
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logic - and the determinate movement of the real. In this way, he criticises 
philosophical representation in all of its forms. In other words, the clear distinction 
between the latter and dialectical cognition was not present in the 1843 critique. So 
much so, that, as we have seen, in 1843 Marx still saw his work as philosophical and 
revolution as the realisation of philosophy. In 1844, he came to see philosophy as the 
epitome of representational thought, as abstract thinking or alienated thought that 
thinks itself. Hence, emancipation cannot be the realisation of philosophy but its 
annihilation. 
On the other hand, in 1844 Marx started to come to grips with (or at least made 
explicit) something which he seemed to have overlooked in the 1843 critique 
regarding the 'rational kernel' to be recovered from the Hegelian dialectic. As we have 
seen, Hegel was aware of what was at stake in the development of the 'scientifically 
correct method', namely, the overcoming of the externality between the ideal 
necessity of thought and the inner life of the object of scientific cognition 
characteristic of the 'understanding'. Notwithstanding the inverted nature of his 
proposed solution, the fact remained that he was the first thinker not only to pose the 
problematic and attempt at a solution explicitly, but also to discover the form of 
scientific cognition with the power to overcome that externality, namely, the 
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dialectic. 26 Many years later, Marx gave recognition to this revolutionary aspect of 
Hegel's thought in the oft-quoted passage from his Postface to the second German 
edition of Capital: 
The mystification which dialectic suffers in Hegel's hands, by no means 
prevents him from being the first to present its general form of working in a 
comprehensive and conscious manner. With him it is standing on its head. It 
must be turned right side up again, if you would discover the rational kernel 
within the mystical shell (Marx 1992b: 103) 
However, our claim is that this rediscovery of the rational kernel in the distinction 
between the representation of reality and the ideal reproduction in thought of the 
movement of the real began to take shape already in 1844, precisely through the 
critique of the inverted solution put forward by Hegel. Against the latter's 
absolutisation of logic by giving it the form of the dialectic, Marx searched for the 
26 The fact that in 1843 Marx did not acknowledge the centrality of the dialectical method for the 
overcoming of the exteriority between thought and the inner movement of the subject matter, can be 
seen from his permanent insistence on the externality between them obtaining from Hegel's dialectical 
mode of presentation. What Marx never mentions is that, although the result of Hegel's attempt at 
developing the concrete determinations of the modern state might have been a failure, at least he was 
aware of the general form that such an enterprise would take. Namely, the dialectical presentation of 
the inner movement of modern political forms. In this sense, it is remarkable that in the 1843 critique 
Marx did not engage with the Preface and the Introduction to the Philosophy of Right, where Hegel 
addresses explicitly the question of the specificity of the dialectical method vis-a-vis the scientific 
representation of reality characteristic of the understanding (Fine 2001: chapter 5). 
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overcoming of logic by giving the revolutionary science of the proletariat precisely 
that general form discovered by Hegel. 
The fact that this was the key issue in, and main result of, Marx's critique of Hegel's 
Logic becomes evident when we analyse the direction that Marx's subsequent work 
took in The Holy Family, The German Ideology and The Poverty of Philosophy. In 
those texts, Marx directed his criticism at the vulgar version of Hegel's thought as 
represented by both the Young Hegelians and Proudhon. As we shall see in the 
following chapter, through the discussion of Marx's critique of Proudhon, the main 
point of his attack, ceaselessly made throughout those pages, was that the latter (as 
much as the Young Hegelians), instead of reconstructing in thought the real 
movement of history and bourgeois society, replaced the latter with an ideal, logical 
necessity. To this question we now turn. 
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Chapter 3. Marx on Proudhon: The critique of dialectical logic and 
the political determination of science as practical criticism 
Introduction 
As much as his critique of the Young Hegelians, the central aim of Marx's critique of 
Proudhon was eminently political. In actual fact, one could say that the latter was 
even "'more' political than the former. This is not just because of the nature of the 
critique but because of its historic-political significance. While, in the last instance, 
the critique of the 'True Socialism' of the Young Hegelians remained within the 
boundaries of a discussion among a small circle of radical 'intellectuals, ' the critique 
of Proudhon involved a political intervention right at the heart of the dominant 
ideological form of the continental workers' movement as a whole. As Shortall notes, 
Proudhonian socialist ideas had a strong grip among the artisans and craftworkers 
who composed the great bulk of the working class at that time in continental Europe 
(Shortall 1994: 36-8). On the other hand, by that time Marx and Engels had already 
made their first contacts with the existing forms of socialist activism and politics in 
London and Paris and were attempting to get involved in the organisational aspects of 
the immediate political action of the working class of their time (Shortall 1994: 36-8). 
Hence the political urgency of Marx's text. 
However, from the perspective of Marx's scientific development, the significance of 
that polemic against Proudhon went beyond his immediate political concerns. As we 
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shall see, three main interrelated questions emerge from Marx's critical engagement 
with Proudhon's works. First, Marx made explicit that the materialist inversion of the 
Hegelian dialectic entailed more than the overcoming of its speculative nature, 
through its application to the 'material questions' of political economy. This approach 
can only lead to the conversion of the dialectic into a logic and, therefore, remains 
within the uncritical alienated realm of representational thought. Thus we encounter 
again the crucial methodological significance of Marx's text. Secondly, in The Poverty 
of Philosophy Marx attempted for the first time positively to unfold the reproduction 
in thought of the real movement of capitalist economic forms. Albeit in a rudimentary 
form, this represents Marx's first attempt at a dialectical critique of political economy. 
In turn, the latter is revealed as the necessary scientific form of the proletarian 
consciousness that gives course to the practical critique of capital. Thirdly, as a 
necessary corollary of this, science ceases to be an abstractly contemplative 
enterprise. Marx's critique of political economy is not meant to provide another 
economic theory of bourgeois society, albeit from the perspective of the working 
class. From that very moment, Marx's scientific endeavour constituted an attempt at 
the positive investigation of the social determinations - and hence necessity - of the 
different forms of the political action of the workers aiming at the radical 
transformation of the capitalist mode of production. In brief, we shall see that the 
question of the 'scientifically correct method' turns out to be not of an abstractly 
epistemological interest but is of a directly political nature. Let us now turn to the 
discussion of each of these aspects of Marx's polemic against Proudhon. 
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The dialectical method as logic in Proudhon 
The first two sections of Marx's text comprise a reconstruction of Proudhon's 
arguments about the basic economic categories such as use-value, exchange-value and 
money. The gist of Marx's critique comes down to the following two aspects. In the 
first place, he demonstrates a lack of originality of Proudhon's ideas. In order to 
counter the latter's self-proclaimed originality, Marx resorts to some quotes from the 
classical political economists, particularly from Ricardo, and demonstrates that the 
assertion that economists failed to deal properly with the 'opposition' between use- 
value and exchange-value is plainly false. In all this there is nothing particularly 
original in Marx's development itself and, fundamentally, he bases his economic 
analysis on the theories of the Ricardian school. 
In the second place, Marx criticises Proudhon's absurdities about the opposition 
between an allegedly ethically ideal determination of value in labour-time and its 
empirical determination through the contending wills of buyer and seller, which 
would lead to the deviation from the former due to the social power of direct 
exchangeability monopolised by money. According to Proudhon, it is not the 
exchange of commodities as such which lies at the basis of the capitalist exploitation 
of labour but only its distorted concrete form of operation leading to unequal 
exchange. Therefore, Marx points out, Proudhon's deficient critical engagement with 
political economy actually justifies his ideological view of socialism as the realisation 
of the ideas of justice and equality springing from the determinations of the 
commodity-form itself. Again, in order to refute Proudhon's assertions Marx does not 
offer any original analysis and limits himself to the claim that, far from being the law 
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regulating the negation of present-day society, the 'law of value' actually is the 
adequate expression of the movement of social labour in its capitalist form. 
Ricardo shows us the real movement of bourgeois production, which 
constitutes value. M. Proudhon, leaving the real movement out of account, 
"fumes and frets" in order to invent new processes and to achieve the 
reorganization of the world on a would-be new formula, which formula is no 
more than the theoretical expression of the real movement which exists and 
which is so well described by Ricardo (... ) Ricardo's theory of values is the 
scientific interpretation of actual economic life; M. Proudhon's theory of 
values is the utopian interpretation of Ricardo's theory (Marx 1976c: 123-4). 
In this judgement, he basically cites approvingly the political economists, only adding 
the critical insight that these social forms do not represent the absolute realisation of 
human individuality but its enslavement in alienated forms. In this sense, the 
realisation of the determinations of the 'law of value' can hardly be the basis of the 
emancipation of the workers. 
Thus relative value, measured by labor time, is inevitably the formula of the 
present enslavement of the worker, instead of being, as M. Proudhon would 
have it, the "revolutionary theory" of the emancipation of the proletariat (Marx 
1976c: 125). 
In brief, in these first pages we find nothing significantly novel in Marx's critique of 
Proudhon. The interesting insights emerge when Marx turns to the discussion of the 
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scientific source of the limitations suffered by Proudhon's critical approach to political 
economy. This source, Marx argues, is to be found in the defective way in which 
Proudhon tried to appropriate Hegel's dialectic in order to deal with the subject matter 
of political economy. The gist of Marx's attack against Proudhon is that far from 
developing a dialectical critique of political economy, the latter offers merely an 
idealist reconsideration of economic categories by subjecting them to an extrinsic 
application of the categories of Hegel's Science of Logic. According to Marx, then, the 
source of Proudhon's idealism lies in his reduction of the dialectic to another logical 
method, a ready-made set of formal rules of thinking to be applied to the object of 
cognition at stake or, more precisely, to the theoretical representations of it. Marx 
characterises Proudhon's account in the following way: 
Economists explain how production takes place in the above-mentioned 
relations, but what they do not explain is how these relations themselves are 
produced, that is, the historical movement which gave them birth. M. 
Proudhon, taking these relations for principles, categories, abstract thoughts, 
has merely to put into order these thoughts, which are to be found 
alphabetically arranged at the end of every treatise on political economy. The 
economists' material is the active, energetic life of man; M. Proudhon's 
material is the dogmas of the economists (Marx 1976c: 162). 
Note how Marx emphasises the importance of reproducing in thought the real 
movement of production relations instead of dealing with the 'categories' of political 
economy in an allegedly 'dialectical' fashion. According to Marx, the economists at 
least take as their starting point the confrontation of the real movement of economic 
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forms, that is, they face the 'active, energetic life of man. ' Yet they do so not to ideally 
reproduce the real movement but to construct a theoretical representation of it. In 
other words, what the political economists lack is a grasp of the 'inner connections' 
between the different forms of social relations. This because they lack the 'genetic' 
approach of the dialectical method that is needed to account for the movement 
through which 'these [social] relations themselves are produced. ' 
It is precisely this genetic approach that Proudhon claimed to be developing regarding 
the subject matter of political economy. But Marx's point is that that was far from 
being the case. The reason for this is that Proudhon did not take the necessary starting 
point of any dialectical investigation, namely, the confrontation of the concrete forms 
of social reality themselves. Instead, Proudhon's 'dialectical' critique took as its 
starting point the 'dogmas of the economists. ' And what he then did was simply to 
reorder those 'categories' according to allegedly dialectical criteria and relations, 
giving the appearance of a dialectical presentation. In other words, Proudhon 
uncritically took the economic categories, 'which are to be found alphabetically 
arranged at the end of every treatise on political economy', and reorganised them 
according to a 'dialectical logic' (Marx 1976c: 162). What in Hegel was developed 
with the profundity characteristic of great thinkers making real discoveries (namely, 
the general form of motion of the dialectical method), in Proudhon led to an unhappy 
marriage of 'bad philosophy' and 'bad political economy' (Marx 1976c: 162: 109). 
Moreover, what in Hegel was justified in its own terms (that is, his engagement with 
pure thought-forms or categories) given an explicit idealism which saw logical forms 
as the essentialities of things, led Proudhon to antinomies and absurd conclusions. In 
other words, the problem with Proudhon is not the construction of an idealist 
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speculative dialectic, but the fact that he did not offer even that. He just provided a 
reformulation of theses already formulated by the political economists in a dialectical 
jargon, utilising logical categories and forms of argument taken from Hegel's Logic. 
Marx's point is that, instead of a critique of political economy, Proudhon develops just 
another form of 'applied metaphysics, ' in which the specific movement of economic 
relations is seen as an immediate expression of the abstract form of the logical 
movement. 
It is important to highlight that Marx did not object to the emphasis on the self- 
movement of real forms as the lesson to be drawn from Hegel. As evidenced by the 
following passage, Marx accepted that the most general determination of all reality is 
that it moves. 
All that exists, all that lives on land and under water, exists and lives only by 
some kind of movement. Thus, the movement of history produces social 
relations; industrial movement gives us industrial products, etc. (Marx 1976c: 
163). 
Understood dialectically this can only mean that reality is contradictory, the 
movement of contradiction. In turn, we would like to argue that, for Marx, this can 
only mean that, in its simplest form, it is the affirming through self-negation of real 
forms. Still, it is true that in the above passage Marx just argues that real forms exist 
through some kind of movement but does not explicitly say the general form that that 
movement takes. However, in another text of the same year Marx reiterated that 
insight about all real forms realising their determination through movement (or what 
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he in this case called 'development'), but now specifying its general form, namely, the 
affirming through self-negation. Hence he states in Moralising Criticism and Critical 
Morality. 
Any development, whatever its substance may be, can be represented as a 
series of different stages of development that are connected in such a way that 
one forms the negation of the other. If, for example, a people develops from 
absolute monarchy to constitutional monarchy, it negates its former political 
being. In no sphere can one undergo a development without negating one's 
previous mode of existence (Marx 1976b: 317). 
But if the movement of contradiction is the 'rational kernel' that Hegel had discovered, 
what is wrong with the 'application' of this insight to the 'categories' of political 
economy? Precisely, the idea that we are before an absolute logical principle that 
needs to be applied to theoretical categories, instead of the general form of motion of 
the real which we ideally grasp in the specificity of the particular different forms of 
'all that exists. ' In other words, what Marx criticises is the conversion of that simple 
truth regarding the general form of motion of reality into a logical category, in order 
to then account for every specific movement by recourse to this most abstract 
determination. This means that there are no basic or general principles of thought (the 
unity of opposites, the negation of the negation, the transformation of quantity into 
quality and so on) to be followed in order to represent reality more accurately than 
through formal logic. Contradiction simply means that every real form (whether 
natural or social) realises its qualitative determination by transforming itself into a 
more concrete form, that the process of determination is a process of becoming 
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another. As the form of movement, the `inner life', of the concrete object that we want 
to appropriate by means of thought, it has to be followed in its specific modes of 
existence and development. This is why, for instance, Marx's Capital, as a critique of 
political economy, is not (pace Engels) an application of dialectical logic to political 
economy, but the ideal reproduction of the real determinations of capital as the 
alienated social subject of bourgeois society, starting with its simplest mode of 
existence, i. e. the commodity. In short, although contradiction is the general form of 
movement of reality, this is not a general axiomatic principle which is unmediatedly 
`applied' to whatever concrete form we are facing. In fact, and despite Marx's own 
usage, we think that the very term 'application' should be dispensed with altogether 
when referring to the development of dialectical cognition. The dialectical method is 
concretely set into motion on each occasion we want to appropriate in thought the 
determinations of a concrete subject matter, in order to realise through our own 
transformative action the potencies immanent in the object of cognition at stake. 
Dispensing with the mediation of the latter in the name of correct methodological 
rules is precisely what reduces everything to applied metaphysics. 27 According to 
Marx, that is what Hegel and Proudhon did. 
27 An attentive reader should have already realised that the champion of that inversion is Diamat. In it, 
all the elements of the idealist inversion just discussed are present. First, the transformation of 
dialectics into logic, that is, a collection of rules of thought -a mental necessity - that differs from 
formal logic by its acceptance of the existence of contradiction. Secondly, the conversion of these 
abstract and basic rules of thought into metaphysics, by dogmatically asserting that they are a reflection 
of the determinations of matter. This is the line of thought that claims that the Marxian inversion of the 
Hegelian dialectic consists in the mere replacement of the Hegelian Idea with the category of Matter. 
Against Hegel's idealist philosophical world view, Dianzat puts forward a materialist philosophical 
world view. Therefore, by transforming dialectics into logic, Diamat then unmediatedly applies its 
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Just as by means of abstraction we have transformed everything into a logical 
category, so one has only to make an abstraction of every characteristic 
distinctive of different movements to attain movement in its abstract condition 
- purely formal movement, the purely logical formula of movement. 
If one 
finds in logical categories the substance of all things, one imagines one has 
found in the logical formula of movement the absolute method, which not only 
explains all things, but also implies the movement of things (... ) All things 
being reduced to a logical category, and every movement, every act of 
production, to method, it follows naturally that every aggregate of products 
and, production, of objects and of movement, can be reduced to a form of 
applied metaphysics. What Hegel has done for religion, law, etc., M. 
Proudhon seeks to do for political economy (Marx 1976c: 163-4). 
representation of the more abstract determinations of matter into its more concrete forms of existence. 
This instead of reproducing in thought the way in which the abstract forms of matter develop into more 
concrete forms precisely by transforming themselves, i. e. by a process involving several mediations. 
Hence Diamat's objectivism and naturalisation of the social world. Yet, the critique of this vulgar 
materialism should not take the form, as happens with Western Marxists, of a severing of the link 
between natural and social forms, by declaring that contradiction, the affirming through self-negation 
or self-movement only belongs to the latter. All this raises a question, namely: how the most abstract 
determination of reality as the movement of contradiction is discovered. In other words, we still need to 
address the question of the necessity of determination itself. We cannot address this issue here. But we 
shall only point out that it can never be a dogmatic metaphysical starting point but the result of the 
process of analysis which constitutes the first stage of a dialectical investigation which always has the 
question of the conscious organisation of human action as its starting point. On this see Inigo Carrera 
(2003). 
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In this idealist reduction of concrete movements to the logical form of movement, the 
transitions and relations between forms are justified by recourse to the logical 
necessity of the abstract form of movement, thus replacing the specific real necessity 
with general ideal ones. From its determination as the reproduction in thought of the 
real movement of things, method becomes, firstly, transformed into a logic. Secondly, 
if we are to be consistent to eliminate the exteriority between form and content of 
knowledge, method becomes hypostatised as the force which insuflates movement to 
things (as, according to Marx, happened with Hegel). 
But this is not all. In a sense, here Marx seems to be just repeating the critique of 
logical representation we have already discussed. And yet we think that this further 
formulation throws new light on the methodological question. First, because, as we 
have shown above, these passages make clear the all-important centrality of both 
Marx's insight that dialectical cognition consists in the ideal reproduction of the real 
movement of contradiction and his awareness of the risks of transforming the latter 
into another logical principle. This awareness, and the difficulties involved in their 
avoidance, would accompany Marx throughout the rest of his intellectual 
development of the critique of political economy. This is revealed, we think, by the 
explicit (albeit occasional) remarks he made about it, the reworking to which he 
subjected the crucial chapter one of Capital, and his eventual refrain from the 
publication of some pages with a summary of the general form of his method (Murray 
1988: 109). Furthermore, we think that Marx had then no doubts about the source of 
the risk of relapsing into a logical representation. Namely, the reduction of the 
dialectical method to the formal way in which we deal with the theoretical categories 
through which representational science grasps real forms or, alternatively, which the 
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dialectical logician constructs in the manner of representational thinking. In the case 
of Hegel, this was not really a problem, since he self-consciously considered that 
dialectical cognition should tackle the movement of pure thought-forms as the prelude 
and source of movement of real forms. But in the case of Proudhon, who attempted to 
develop a materialist account of the genesis and movement of economic forms of 
bourgeois society, it turned out to be quite problematic and actually led him to the 
most absurd contradictions and, eventually, to the most idealist of inversions. 
Economic categories are only the theoretical expressions, the abstractions of 
the social relations of production, M. Proudhon, holding this upside down like 
a true philosopher, sees in actual relations nothing but the incarnation of the 
principles, of these categories, which were slumbering - so M. Proudhon the 
philosopher tells us - in the bosom of the "impersonal reason of humanity" 
(Marx 1976c: 165). 
The central objection that Marx is raising against Proudhon is that he does not deal 
with the forms of capital themselves - i. e. 'the social relations of production' - but with 
the 'economic categories' through which political economy represents them - i. e. 'the 
theoretical expressions. ' Interestingly, as we have already pointed out in a previous 
chapter, that was precisely the methodological limitation of the Paris Manuscripts. 
But here Marx is unambiguous about the lesson he had drawn from those 
shortcomings of the 1844 text. The dialectical critique of political economy could not 
take the categories of political economy as ready-made, given presuppositions to 
constitute the starting point of an investigation. In other words, the critique of political 
economy does not consist in an allegedly more sophisticated logical treatment of 
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categories, definitions, etc., found in previous theories, the greater sophistication 
springing from the use of a dialectical logic instead of a traditional one. Quite to the 
contrary, it entails the confrontation of economic forms by oneself in order to provide 
a fresh new ideal reproduction of the determinations immanent in them with the 
28 
purpose of consciously acting upon them and thereby effecting their transformation. 
28 Needless to say, this does not exclude the critical study of other authors as part of the process of 
tracing out the inner connections between economic forms, as a question of self-clarification in the 
process of inquiry. But our point is that the aim guiding the dialectical investigation of bourgeois 
economic forms is not the solution of the antinomies of the science of economics (Althusser and 
Balibar 1968) but the production of a novel science, the critique of political economy, which, 
additionally, 'solves' the scientific questions left unresolved by the former. The so-called 
'transformation problem' is a typical case in point. With respect to this question, Marx did not try to 
solve the theoretical conundrum of classical political economy, namely, the relation between 'value' 
and 'price. ' In the same vein, the problem for contemporary critics of political economy is not to prove 
that Marx was right or to correct him by providing an alternative, 'logically-consistent' solution to the 
'theoretical problem' of the relation between value and price. The point is to develop the totality of the 
determinations of the forms of capital as the alienated subject of social life in order to find our 
revolutionary action as the necessary form in which capital produces its own annihilation. In this 
process we would certainly find that the law regulating the exchange of commodities when seen in 
their most abstract determination as simple products of (privately performed) labour, negates itself as 
such when their most concrete determination as products of capital is discovered and followed into its 
further concrete forms. This would reveal that the law regulating the exchange of commodities takes 
on, as its own immanent necessity, a different concrete form when the latter is discovered in its 
concrete existence as an exchange of products of equally valorised individual capitals (lnigo Carrera 
1995). That is, of individual capitals affirming their unity as aliquot parts of total social capital - as a 
class vis-ä-vis the workers (Inigo Carrera 1995; Arthur 2002a). As a necessary moment of its 
development, this process of dialectical cognition would lay bare the real relations between the value of 
commodities and its concrete form of existence as price of production beyond the antinomies at which 
political economy arrives through its representation of those relations. However, this would not be the 
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We think that the crucial point Marx is getting at is exactly the same as the one made 
many years later in his last economic writing, the Notes on Adolph Wagner's 
"Lehrbuch der politischen Ökonomie ". 
4 
In the first place [De prime abord] I do not start out from `concepts', hence I 
do not start out from the `concept of value', and do not have to `divide' these 
in any way. What I start out from is the simplest social form in which the 
labour-product is presented in contemporary society, and this is the 
commodity' (Marx 1975b: 198). 
In opposition to this standpoint, Proudhon did proceed from 'concepts' or 'categories' 
and, therefore, inevitably reduced the dialectic to another empty formal methodology, 
used to give the appearance of a dialectical movement to the former, in turn 
uncritically taken from the political economists. Marx's later judgement about 
Lasalle's similar attempt at expounding political economy in the manner of Hegel is 
perfectly applicable to Proudhon as well. That is, the latter did not realise either that 'it 
is one thing for a critique to take a science to the point at which it admits of a 
dialectical presentation, and quite another to apply an abstract, ready-made system of 
logic to vague presentiments of just such a system' (Marx 1983: 261). 
In addition to this first aspect of Marx's critique of dialectical logic, which, as it were, 
deals with the 'logical' bit of the expression, we can find in the Poverty of Philosophy 
aim of that development but, as it were, a secondary 'by-product. ' As a 'theoretical problem, ' the so- 
called transformation of value into prices of production is a scholastic abstraction of representational 
science. 
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another crucial aspect of the question related to the 'dialectical' bit. Whilst the first one 
has been occasionally highlighted by the most elaborated commentaries on Marx's 
scientific method, 29 the latter has been generally overlooked. 30 We are referring to the 
transformation that the real movement of contradiction suffers when represented 
through a dialectical logic. In the case of those forms of representational thinking 
which structure themselves following a traditional formal logic, the problem does not 
even arise. That is, since they start by excluding the contradictory character of reality 
as the elemental rule guiding their representations, the conscious attempt to ideally 
appropriate its movement does not even form part of its agenda. But quite different is 
the case of those forms of thought explicitly accepting the reality of contradiction and 
29 The works by Murray (Murray 1988) and Meikle (Meikle 1985) are perhaps the most sophisticated 
in this respect, although we part company with the idiosyncratic conclusions developed by them from 
that correct initial insight about Marx's rejection of formalistic methodologies. For instance, we cannot 
agree that what follows from that insight is the conception of Marx's novel mode of scientific 
knowledge as involving a new relation between science and morality (Murray), or as involving a 
philosophy that prioritises ontology over epistemology (Meikle). Marx's revolution in the mode of 
cognition transcends both morality and philosophy in all of its forms. Still, among its merits Meikle 
makes a crucial point rarely found among Marxists, namely: that in Marx there is no such a thing as 
'dialectical logic'. See especially Meikle (1979). Precisely for this reason, and in spite of its otherwise 
thought-provoking quality, we find unsatisfactory much of the recent literature on the dialectical 
method coming from that broad current within Marxism grouped under the name 'new dialectics' and 
which makes use of Hegel's Logic to make sense of the dialectical exposition in capital. Despite their 
own recognition of the inseparability of content and form of knowledge, one could argue that these 
authors run precisely the risk we have highlighted of turning the dialectical method into a general logic 
to be applied to an external content. See, among others, Arthur (2002b), Reuten and Williams (1989), 
Tony Smith (1990a; 1993), Uchida (1988) - although not formally associated with the others - and, 
from the Uno School, Albritton (1999) and Sekine (1997). 
30 On the following point I am indebted to Inigo Carrera (1992; 2003: 222-3) 
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which therefore try to gasp its movement. And it is of this perspective that Proudhon 
is a case in point. For what he attempted to develop is precisely the 'system of 
economic contradictions. ' Yet we would like to argue that the relevance of Marx's 
critique of this aspect of Proudhon's thought goes beyond this specific author. For the 
claim that the superiority of dialectics consists in its ability to deal conceptually with 
the contradictory nature of reality (natural and social for some, only social for others) 
has been a trademark of most currents of Marxist thought since its inception. The 
question is what do these authors understand by reality being 'contradictory. ' And the 
point we want to make is that Marx's critique of Proudhon throws light on the way in 
which, when dialectic is reduced to a form of logic, contradiction and its movement 
are grasped through a representation of them. In what does, according to Marx's 
critique of Proudhon's 'metaphysics of political economy, ' the representation of the 
movement of contradiction by dialectical logic consist? In order to answer this 
question, let us take a look at the way in which Marx characterises the depiction of 
contradiction by Proudhon. 
Let us see now to what modifications M. Proudhon subjects Hegel's dialectics 
when he applies it to political economy. 
For him, M. Proudhon, every economic category has two sides - one good, 
the other bad. He looks upon these categories as the petty bourgeois looks 
upon the great men of history: Napoleon was a great man; he did a lot of good; 
he also did a lot of harm. 
The good side and the bad side, the advantages and drawbacks, taken together 
form for M. Proudhon the contradiction in every economic category. 
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The problem to be solved: to keep the good side, while eliminating the bad 
(Marx 1976c: 167). 
If we set aside the specificities of Proudhon's particularly crude conception, consisting 
in the mere enunciation of a good side and a bad side in each economic category, we 
can get a more general point regarding the representation of contradiction by 
dialectical logic. In a nutshell, the latter grasps the contradictory nature of things as 
consisting in being the unity or interpenetration of opposites. In this sense, it claims to 
go beyond formal logic since it accepts that the real determinations of things cannot 
be grasped through a single attribute since they are the embodiment of antithetical 
determinations. But does it? In other words, is it in this form that we can appropriate 
in thought the inner life of the subject matter at stake, overcoming the appearance of 
externality through which the relation between real forms presents itself? In order to 
answer this question, let us recall the objective basis for the appearance of externality 
between real forms. 
In its immediate manifestation, reality appears as a universe of unconnected real 
forms. In this sense, every real form appears as a self-subsistent entity, and the 
realisation of its determination as an immediate affirmation. This appearance is not a 
subjective misconception but the necessary form in which the inner connections 
between real forms appear when the process of determination is externally grasped in 
its immediacy. That is, when we obviate the mediations that make a real form a 
concrete mode of existence of the necessity of another, more abstract form. Since, as 
Marx stated regarding the relation between commodities and money, 'the intermediate 
steps of the process vanish in the result and leave no trace behind' (Marx 1976a: 187), 
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the objective illusion arises that 'those intermediate steps' do not exist at all. Hence, 
real forms of different degrees of concreteness appear as co-existing side by side 
without any real necessity linking them in a determinate fashion. In brief, the 
representation of the world through formal logic grasps the movement of affirmation 
through self-negation that constitutes the determination of real forms only in its result, 
sticking to the appearance of externality between an abstract form and its necessary 
concrete mode of existence (Inigo Carrera 2003: 247-8). 
Now, the following question arises. Does the representation of real forms as a unity of 
opposites characteristic of dialectical logic overcome that manifestation of exteriority 
between them? It is our claim that it does not. For the difference between dialectical 
logic and formal logic actually comes down to the fact that the former does not 
represent real forms as isolated entities but always finds each of them as 'necessarily' 
associated with another one which, it claims, is its 'contrary'. However, this does not 
mean that the indifference between them has disappeared. Because the fact that each 
form is represented as coexistent with its opposite does not change the fact that each 
real form still continues to be seen as an immediate affirmation and so does their 
unity. But the specific movement that mediates the existence of 'all that exists on land 
or under water', and which constitutes the immanent connection between different real 
forms, continues to be beyond the comprehension of this alternative form of logical 
representation. The unity that is thereby grasped continues to be completely extrinsic. 
It is a unity between two opposing immediate affirmations which, at most, 
'interpenetrate in a relation of struggle'. But each of the poles of that unity does not 
carry within itself the necessity of its own self-transformation. That is why, again, 
movement is not seen as the immanent necessity characterising every real form but 
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needs to be insuflated by the ideal necessity of logic. Hence, it is only the subjective 
reflection of the dialectical logician that leaps from one pole to the other generating 
only the 'shadow of movement' which pushes cognition forward. As much as formal 
logic, dialectical logic is therefore impotent to reproduce the real movement in 
thought and represents real forms as motionless abstractions. 
It is important to emphasise that we are not rooting for the replacement of one 
absolute logical principle (unity of opposites) with another, allegedly superior one 
(affirmation through self-negation). And yet we are aware that, confined to this 
abstract level, our discussion might give the false impression that this is the case. But 
our point is just that when cognition fails to reproduce in thought the specific 
necessity for self-negation immanent in a determinate real form it inevitably ends up 
representing the former movement as a unity of opposites. 31 Hence, in order to 
demonstrate this point fully, the general discussion of how dialectical logic represents 
the movement of contradiction through the unity of opposites remains insufficient. 
We should therefore proceed by showing concretely how this inversion takes place in 
the case of the determinations of a specific concrete form. However, that is not the 
path that we shall follow in the rest of this chapter. The reason for this is that a 
satisfactory way of addressing the question would require that we run too much ahead 
in the main argument of this thesis concerning Marx's discovery of the determinations 
of revolutionary subjectivity. We shall therefore deal with that issue in the following 
31 It is important to remark that this reduction of dialectics to logic is not restricted to those Marxists 
who explicitly treat the former as a formalistic methodology or who self-consciously refer to their or 
Marx's method as involving a dialectical logic (even if this is understood in a non-formalistic way). No 
matter the stated intentions of the author, that inversion results once the ideal reproduction of the 
specific contradictory movement of the object of cognition at stake is abandoned. 
chapters, in which we will illustrate our critique of dialectical logic by taking a look at 
the different social forms taken by the modern alienated social subject. Moreover, and 
in order to show the political nature of what at first sight might seem a purely 
scholastic question, we shall also deal with the relevance of all this for the 
comprehension of the social determinations of the revolutionary consciousness of the 
proletariat. 
We prefer for the moment to leave the discussion at this abstract level and move on 
with our reconstruction of the way Marx advanced in his revolution in the mode of 
scientific cognition. And we think that the next crucial step Marx made in that 
direction through the criticism of Proudhon was making explicit the practical 
character of a truly dialectical critique. That is, in discussing the question of workers' 
strikes and combinations Marx showed very clearly that the new science that he was 
in the process of developing was of an eminently political nature. In short, what was 
at stake in his investigation was the conscious organisation, i. e. the discovery of the 
social necessity, of the political action of the working class. 
Marx on Proudhon II: Dialectical knowledge and political action 
In the previous section we dealt with the methodological significance of Marx's 
critique of Proudhon as a critique of dialectical logic from the perspective of a 
materialist dialectical method. However, we have already mentioned that this 
engagement with Proudhonian socialism entailed other aspects that we regard as 
crucial in the development of Marx's thought. These additional aspects, which also 
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pertain to the specific mode of Marx's scientific thinking, and which expose without 
ambiguity the inherently political character of the methodological question, we find 
synthesised in Marx's discussion of workers' strikes and combinations. This question, 
together with Marx's insights on the adequate way of tackling it, illustrates very 
clearly the distinctive features of dialectical scientific thought as practical criticism. 
On the other hand, we shall see that Marx's own treatment of the question at that time 
was rather rudimentary and, in this sense, unsatisfactory as a way of displaying the 
plenitude of the critical and revolutionary powers of the critique of political economy. 
And yet we will show that those very limitations of Marx's scientific development 
also prove to be illuminating (albeit in a negative way) of the immediately practical 
nature of science in its dialectical form. Moreover, those limitations also provide an 
indication of the direction that Marx's thought subsequently took. That is, we can read 
the incompleteness of Marx's critique of political economy as programmatic for his 
mature works. 
What triggered Marx's polemic against Proudhon was the latter's `political 
indifferentism' concerning industrial action over wages and revolutionary action in 
general. Regarding the former, and as an expression of his economic analysis which 
denied the practical operation of the determination of value by labour-time in 
capitalist society, Proudhon saw it as completely useless. This because he concluded 
that the only result of an increase in the nominal wage would be an increase in the 
price of the means of subsistence of the labourers, thereby leaving the real wage (i. e. 
the conditions of reproduction of the workers) intact. Regarding revolutionary action 
aimed at obtaining `political supremacy, ' Proudhon rejected it too, preferring `to burn 
property by a slow fire, rather than give it new strength by making a St 
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Bartholomew's Night of the property owners' (cited in McLellan 1973: 160). For him, 
the most potent form of political activity available to workers was not their 
revolutionary action upon the alienated forms of their social being in order to effect 
their transformation in the direction of their self-annihilation. According to Proudhon, 
those social forms should be left alone. Conversely, the energies of the workers had to 
concentrate on building the alternative socialist schemes devised by socialist 
theoreticians. Hence Marx's sarcastic comment, 
The Socialists want the workers to leave the old society alone, the better to be able 
to enter the new society which they have prepared for them with so much foresight 
(Marx 1976c: 210) 
That is, Marx criticised Proudhon for thinking that workers could escape their general 
social relation and implement alternative socialist schemes of mutual aid in the 
`interstices' of this society. The abolition of capital would then be the result of the 
slow but progressive spread of these schemes `by example' (Shortall 1994: 36). 32 
The aim guiding Marx's polemic was, therefore, the nature of the political action of 
the working class. The question at stake was the provision of scientific grounds for his 
political position concerning the content and form of proletarian action antagonistic to 
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capital. In other words, what this controversy shows is that for Marx the starting point 
of his scientific development was not an abstractly theoretical discussion of economic 
categories (for instance, the wage) but the transformative action of the working class. 
Thus, this specific controversy exposes a more general feature of the dialectical 
method. Namely, what sets into motion the dialectical investigation is the answer to 
the question of the form that we must give our transformative action in order to 
`change the world'. As practical criticism, science thereby consists in giving that 
transformative action a fully conscious form. This means that what draws our 
attention to a particular concrete form is not an abstract desire for knowledge. If we 
face a concrete form of reality as an object of scientific cognition it is because it can 
affect us when realising its own determinations or, more importantly, because we can 
realise the potentialities it embodies through the actualisation of the potentialities of 
our action. The discovery of the relation between those two potencies in the totality 
of its determinations (i. e. the real necessity of transformative action beyond any 
appearance) is the generic aim of dialectical cognition (Ifligo Carrera 1992). In brief, 
to transform or to be transformed; that is the question. 
In the concrete case Marx was facing, the relevance of the first concrete form at stake 
in the discussion with Proudhon (the wage-form) was almost self-evident. That is, 
even a superficial observation of the movement of wages revealed the way in which it 
32 One could argue that there is a striking similarity between the Proudhonian understanding of the 
abolition of capital and the contemporary Autonomist Marxist view - widespread among some social 
movements associated with, for example, `Social Centres' in Italy - that revolutionary activity is about 
the micro or molecular politics of experimental construction of `autonomous spaces of freedom' 
(Wright 1995/1996; Krasivyj 1996; Negri and Guattari 1999: 73-80) or, alternatively, about `exodus' 
from capital, i. e. from the alienated general social relation of present-day society (Virno 1996). 
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could affect (i. e. transform) the social existence of the workers. The question to 
answer was, therefore, what is to be consciously done in relation to wages? What 
form should workers give to their action to transform a determinate concrete form 
they were facing (to begin with, the quantitative transformation of the wage). Should 
they struggle? Should they co-operate in that struggle, i. e. organise themselves? Or 
should they refrain from political action and harmoniously and unconditionally submit 
their will to that of the capitalist since wages are not determined by their political 
action or the will of the capitalist, but through the operation of the laws of political 
economy? Or should they not combine since at any rate any real rise in wages 
eventually dissolves as an effect of a correspondent increase in prices? Furthermore, 
assuming that they definitely need to form combinations, should their conscious 
association stop at the level of an individual capitalist firm or at the level of a branch 
of production? Or should the struggle against the capitalists become general and, 
therefore, take the form of a class action and, therefore, a general political action? 
The need to tackle these questions in a fully conscious manner (i. e. dialectically) is 
evidenced by the reactionary political conclusions that emerge when they are 
addressed by a form of scientific consciousness, such as that of economists and 
utopian socialists, that stops at the immediate appearances of real relations. In 
particular, the appearance of externality between the laws that regulate the `regular 
process of industry' and the struggles of workers through the formation of 
`combinations'. 
According to the economists, wages are determined by the eternal laws of political 
economy and, among them, by its most sacred, i. e. the law of supply and demand. 
Moreover, combinations breach the main condition under which those laws can 
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harmoniously operate in their purity, i. e. `competition', and therefore act as an 
external disruption of the otherwise smooth workings of the economic process, thus 
leading to crises, the introduction of machinery and a further reduction in wages. 
Hence, the economists conclude, workers' struggles are not only ridiculous but also 
dangerous for the preservation of their own living conditions (Marx 1976c: 209). 
Thus was the advice of the spokespersons of the bourgeoisie. 
For his part, Proudhon not only followed the economists in the rejection of 
combination for its lack of actual influence on the real wage, but also for its 
impotence to substantially alter the form of social relations. No matter how much they 
struggle, Proudhon's argument went, `workers will continue nonetheless to be 
workers, and the masters will continue to be masters, just as before' (Marx 1976c: 
210). Hence, instead of futilely wasting their energies in organising their struggle 
against capitalists, workers should devote themselves to the peaceful implementation 
of fair utopias based on the eternal principles of human reason, leaving the movement 
of the wage to the unjust laws of political economy. 
As stated above, Marx's reply to the objection to working class `combinations' by 
both Proudhon and the economists shows at the same time the insights he was 
developing regarding the role of science as the conscious organisation of proletarian 
political action, and the limitations of his approach, given the preliminary stage at 
which his development of the critique of political economy was. 
Regarding the former, it is interesting to note how Marx tackled the question by 
attempting to overcome, through the conscious reproduction of the relevant 
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determinations at stake, the appearance of externality between `the laws of political 
economy' (i. e. the movement of capital accumulation) and the political action of 
workers (i. e. the class struggle). This involved, in the first place, the dialectical 
sensitivity to grasp the inner connection between what to the ideological 
consciousness appeared as absolute opposites, namely: competition and direct 
association in the relation among workers. For the logical representation of both the 
economists and Proudhon either one or the other operated in capitalist society. For the 
former, the atomistic relations of competition between commodity-owners were the 
essence of the `pure' laws of capital accumulation, whose smooth operation could not 
but be disrupted by what was a clear attempt to impose some sort of `monopsonic' 
conditions in the sale of labour-power. For his part, Proudhon agreed with the 
economists on the natural character of competition, since, as an `economic category, ' 
it must be just another incarnation of the `impersonal reason of humanity. ' The 
problem resided, according to him, in the distorted way in which it operated in 
bourgeois society and which brings about the `bad side' of competition. Far from 
attempting to negate through their political action the atomistic relations in which they 
find themselves, workers should try to recreate them but in pure form, through the 
implementation of alternative schemes `outside' bourgeois society. The establishment 
of relations of direct solidarity between workers in their struggle over the wage was 
seen by Proudhon not only as impotent to really affect the level of wages, but as 
playing no role in the radical transformation of bourgeois society. 
Against these two views, Marx came up with the discovery that far from being 
absolute opposites, competition and association were necessary forms that the 
relations among workers took as concrete forms of the movement of their alienated 
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general social relation, i. e. the accumulation of capital. That is why, `in spite of both 
of them, in spite of manuals and utopias, combination has not yet ceased for an instant 
to go forward and grow with the development and growth of modern industry' (Marx 
1976c: 210). In other words, what Marx is getting at is that the relations of solidarity 
among workers are not the abstract negation of their competitive relations but the 
concrete form in which the latter develop as a result of their own movement. On the 
one hand, competition is actually the most general social relation characteristic of the 
mercantile nature of bourgeois society, `which is association founded on competition' 
(Marx 1976c: 194). On the other hand, inasmuch as it develops large-scale industry, it 
is the very result of the movement of competition to produce the necessity of its own 
negation, namely, `combination'. 
Large-scale industry concentrates in one place a crowd of people unknown to 
one another. Competition divides their interests. But the maintenance of 
wages, this common interest which they have against their boss, unites them in 
a common thought of resistance - combination (Marx 1976c: 210) 
On the other hand, the direct association between workers does not represent the 
elimination of relations of competition between commodity owners. It just polarises 
the latter into two antagonistic classes of commodity owners, capitalists and workers. 
Thus combination always has a double aim, that of stopping competition 
among the workers, so that they can carry on general competition with the 
capitalist. If the first aim of resistance was merely the maintenance of wages, 
combinations, at first isolated, constitute themselves into groups as the 
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capitalists in their turn unite for the purpose of repression, and in the face of 
always united capital, the maintenance of the association becomes more 
necessary to them than that of wages (Marx 1976c: 210-1). 
In brief, what Marx is getting at is that it is in the nature of the laws of motion of the 
present form of social being (and not a distortion of it) to engender the necessity of 
the collective political action of workers through the formation of associations. In this 
sense, workers cannot abstractly choose not to do it. As personifications of their 
alienated social being, they are compelled to associate by the very conditions in which 
they are reproduced and, as Marx continues, they will eventually and inevitably 
expand the scope and transform the aim of their association. 33 Furthermore, he makes 
clear that the objective potency to succeed in that struggle does not spring from the 
abstractly self-determining will of the proletariat but from the objective 
determinations of the reproduction of the specifically capitalist social relations of 
production (`competition'). So much so that the result of its struggle eventually 
crystallises in the only form in which the general conditions of social reproduction 
can impose themselves as an alienated attribute of capital, namely, as a legal 
regulation by the capitalist state. 
In England, combination is authorized by an Act of Parliament, and it is the 
economic system which has forced Parliament to grant this legal authorization. 
In 1825, when, under the Minister Huskisson, Parliament had to modify the 
33 And yet, as we shall see in the second part of the thesis, that alienated social necessity to establish 
relations of solidarity in the sale of labour-power, which the workers must personify, is mediated by 
their apparently free will. 
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law in order to bring it more and more into line with the conditions resulting 
from free competition, it had of necessity to abolish all laws forbidding 
combinations of workers. The more modern industry and competition develop, 
the more elements there are which call forth and strength combination, and as 
soon as combination becomes an economic fact, daily gaining in solidity, it is 
bound before long to become a legal fact (Marx 1976c: 209). 
Thus far, we have reconstructed the way Marx replied to the objections of the 
economists and Proudhon to the collective industrial action of the workers. From the 
point of view of method, the important point to highlight is that the form of his reply 
was to develop (albeit in a rudimentary and insufficient way) the scientific 
consciousness of the real determinations of the workers' trade-union struggles so as to 
become aware of their necessity. 
Now, even if necessary as a form of political action, the question remains as to 
whether it has any role to play in the overcoming of capitalist society. In this sense, it 
is important to remember that Proudhon's opposition to that form of political action 
did not only come down to its futility regarding the quantitative movement of wages 
but also, and more importantly, involved its rejection as a valid form of attempting to 
go beyond capital. 
Again, we see Marx's way of putting the question as exemplary of the dialectical 
form of tackling any concrete form as an issue concerning the political action of the 
class. For although Marx grasped the social necessity of trade-union action, he also 
realised that it was limited in its immediate transformative potency: in its simplest 
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determination, it can only produce a quantitative change of the wage-form but not a 
substantial qualitative transformation of it, i. e. its abolition. Hence the need for 
workers' political action to transcend that limited form and Marx's subsequent 
'phenomenology of class struggle' leading to the revolutionary conquest of political 
power in the rest of the text. However, Marx did not just extrinsically counterpose the 
different forms of political action of the proletariat, confining trade-union action to 
the realm of reformism, in turn seen as the abstract opposite of revolutionary action. 
As we mentioned above, dialectical cognition must provide the necessity of the 
transformative action of the workers in the totality of its determinations. And seen 
from a `world-historical' perspective, the political action of the proletariat is the unity 
of its different necessary moments until becoming produced as a fully conscious 
revolutionary action with the power to abolish capital through the construction of the 
free association of individuals. 34 In this sense, the struggle over wages and working 
conditions, along with the formation of trade-unions as its adequate organisational 
form, is seen by Marx as one of those necessary moments in the historical production 
of the fully developed revolutionary subjectivity of the proletariat (Marx 1976c: 210- 
2). On the other hand, we shall see that it is precisely on that point that the 
insufficiency of Marx's positive development of the critique of political economy at 
that stage was more strongly felt. For, in actual fact, in this text Marx did not provide 
a dialectical exposition of all the determinations involved in the different forms of 
34 Thus the traditional opposition between reform and revolution misses the point. The common 
understanding of those two terms is the ideological representation of different moments of the 
progressive transformations of capitalism towards the free association of individuals personified by distinct forms of the political action of the working class, which emerges when we abstract those transitions from its concrete determinations. From a dialectical standpoint, what is always at stake is 
precisely the recognition of the necessity of a determinate form of political action as a concrete form in 
which capital develops and, therefore, moves towards its dissolution through the conscious 
revolutionary activity of the proletariat. This recognition involves the discovery of the concrete determinations of each form of political action, which would show their respective transformative 
power in its determinacy, that is, both in its potentiality and the limitations to that potentiality. 
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political action of the workers necessary for its production as fully conscious 
revolutionary action. Quite to the contrary, he just offered no more than an 
impressionistic description of the concrete history of the workers' movement in 
England, which he extrapolated and generalised as the historical tendency of the 
working class as a whole. 
However, in all fairness to Marx, it is important to point out that his insights into the 
determinations of proletarian action went a little further. For, in relation to the 
particular case of trade-union action, Marx was already aware that its determinations 
were not exhausted in being an active force in the quantitative transformation of the 
wage-form. As we can see from the following passage, the former's transformative 
power exceeded the mere quantitative change in the wage-form: 
In England, strikes have regularly given rise to the invention and application 
of new machines. Machines were, it may be said, the weapon employed by the 
capitalist to quell the revolt of specialized labor. The self-acting mule, the 
greatest invention of modern industry, put out of action the spinners who were 
in revolt. If combinations and strikes had no other effect than that of making 
the efforts of mechanical genius react against them, they would still exercise 
an immense influence on the development of industry (Marx 1976c: 207). 
That is, even if in its simplest determination the result of trade-union action is limited 
in its transformative power to quantitative variations of the wage, Marx was already 
aware that it also carried within itself a further mediated potentiality. Namely, the 
determination of strikes as `triggers' of technical innovations such as the introduction 
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of machinery or, to put it differently, the determination of the class struggle as a 
progressive active force in the development of the material productive forces of 
society. In this sense, the transformative powers of proletarian struggle also entailed 
the transformation of the wage-form through the qualitative mutation of the material 
conditions of social labour and, therefore, in the social form of existence of the 
productive subjectivity of the workers themselves. But this determination as such did 
not involve the immediate production of the conditions for the social constitution of 
the fully conscious revolutionary subjectivity. However, Marx already knew that it 
was in the very nature of capital constantly to revolutionise the material conditions of 
social labour. And if we take those two insights together, a necessary conclusion 
follows which reinforces the social necessity of proletarian struggle. In short, the 
latter is not only the way in which they can put a limit to the fall of wages below 
subsistence level (and in this unsatisfactory way Marx saw the determination of wages 
at that time - more on this below), but also the form in which they force capital to 
produce the conditions for its supersession, i. e. the development of the material 
productive forces of society. 
An oppressed class is the vital condition for every society founded on the 
antagonism of classes. The emancipation of the oppressed class thus implies 
necessarily the creation of a new society. For the oppressed class to be able to 
emancipate itself, it is necessary that the productive powers already acquired 
and the existing social relations should no longer be capable of existing side 
by side. Of all the instruments of production, the greatest productive power is 
the revolutionary class itself. The organization of revolutionary elements as a 
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class supposes the existence of all the productive forces which could be 
engendered in the bosom of the old society (Marx 1976c: 211). 
We can see how Marx's science as practical criticism allowed him to discover how 
the class struggle is also determined as an active force in the production of the 
material conditions under which it will be produced as the personification of the 
historical necessity to abolish capital. Moreover, Marx insists against Proudhon that 
this transformation can only take place in the determinate concrete form which the 
latter rejected, namely: `through the organisation of the revolutionary elements as a 
class'. 
Thus far we have focused on the advances made by Marx in his development of the 
dialectical cognition as the most potent form of organisation of the political action of 
the working class. However, it should be obvious that at that time that development 
was still rudimentary, in its very early stages. Therefore, Marx was very far from 
accomplishing what we claimed he had become aware needed to be done: the positive 
conscious development of the determinations of capital. Certainly, as we tried to show 
with our previous discussion, Marx had produced certain discoveries that allowed him 
to go beyond the `utopianism' of Proudhon. But it should be noted that these were 
actually more like discrete insights whose real determinations and inner connections 
were still beyond Marx's horizon. Thus it would be more accurate to say that Marx 
only hinted at the discovery of the social necessity of the different forms of political 
action of the workers which aim at revolutionising capitalist society. 
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That this is the case is revealed by Marx's subsequent intellectual development 
immediately after The Poverty of Philosophy. The next scientific endeavour on which 
Marx embarked was an attempt to deepen his understanding of the determinations of 
wages and the necessary connection between their movement and the struggles of the 
workers through the formation of associations. This materialised in the manuscript 
edited as `Wages', which formed the basis of Marx's lectures on the subject in 
Brussels published in 1849 as Wage-Labour and Capital. This betrays the fact that 
Marx himself was aware of the limits of the analysis he had provided in those years. 
In fact, in the preliminary words to Wage-Labour and Capital Marx explicitly 
acknowledges his deficit and states that it is the purpose of that work to cover it. 
From various quarters we have been reproached for neglecting to portray the 
economic conditions which form the material basis of the present struggles 
between classes and nations. With set purpose we have hitherto touched upon 
these conditions only when they forced themselves upon the surface of the 
political conflicts.. . But now, after our readers have seen the class struggle of 
the year 1848 develop into colossal political proportions, it is time to examine 
more closely the economic conditions themselves upon which is founded the 
existence of the capitalist class and its class rule, as well as the slavery of the 
workers (Marx 1977: 197). 
Marx then states he attempts to explain the economic conditions upon which the class 
struggle, already 'proved' empirically in 1848, is based. And we take him to mean that 
he was going to develop the concrete determinations behind the necessity of the class 
struggle, the task that he had begun in The Poverty of Philosophy. And yet this first 
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conscious attempt at a systematic presentation of the determinations of capital as the 
adequate form of the critique of political economy would also prove insufficient. In a 
nutshell, the conclusion that Marx draws regarding his analysis of the determinations 
of wages is that they have a tendency to fall as the result of the movement of the 
accumulation of capital. This he grounds in terms of the effect of the detail division of 
labour on the value of labour(-power), the displacement of labour brought about by 
the introduction of machinery and the inclusion of female and child labour which, in 
turn, increases the competition among labourers (Marx 1977: 227). He then moves to 
another effect of the movement of capital accumulation which is to intensify its crisis 
tendencies. In turn, crises result in the further degradation of the living conditions of 
workers since they increase the competition among them, thus putting the burden of 
their consequences upon the shoulders of the workers (Marx 1977: 228). Certainly, 
when seen from the perspective of the analysis offered in Capital, this appears as a 
completely one-sided account which centres on workers whose productive 
subjectivity becomes degraded through capital's development of the system of 
machinery. As an account of the necessity of class struggle this work is still 
unsatisfactory. Marx seems more concerned to show the negative impact of capitalist 
development upon the living conditions of the working class than to provide a 
thorough analysis of the concrete determinations of the movement of wages and the 
role of the class struggle in that movement. Marx seems eager to provide a stronger 
foundation for the direct confrontation with those who claimed that there was some 
sort of harmony of interests between workers and employers. If the unchecked 
imposition of the will of the capitalist class leads to those degraded conditions, the 
working class cannot submit itself unconditionally to the interests of the capitalists but 
must affirm its own, antagonistic interests. The necessity of the struggle and the 
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formation of associations is seen just as a way of preventing wages from falling even 
below the ever decreasing 'minimum' or, when possible, to temporarily raise them 
above it. This account was still miles away from the one offered in Capital, where the 
question entails the distinction between labour and labour-power, between the price 
and the value of labour-power, the determination of the latter as an expression of the 
concrete materiality of the productive subjectivity of the labourers determined by the 
forms of production of relative surplus-value, and so on. 
These shortcomings are even more marked when considered in relation not just to the 
necessity of that limited form of the class struggle but to the development of the 
conscious revolutionary subjectivity of the workers. According to Marx, the 
associations are not just a means for the struggle over wages. More generally, they 
also serve to bring workers together and to constitute themselves as a class against the 
bourgeoisie. That is, it is the way in which their competition turns into its opposite, 
direct or conscious association. And this conscious collective action is the form that 
the revolutionary activity of the working class must take. Therefore, Marx sees these 
associations as a necessary 'training ground' for the revolutionary struggle of the class 
which would emerge under determinate material conditions (which capitalist 
development itself brings about, as he notes in the section that follows called 'Positive 
aspect of wage labour'). 
If in the associations it really were a matter only of what it appears to be, 
namely the fixing of wages, if the relationship between labour and capital 
were eternal, these combinations would be wrecked on the necessity of things. 
But they are the means of uniting the working class, of preparing for the 
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overthrow of the entire old society with its class contradictions (... ) And if in 
their moments of philanthropy Messrs the bourgeois and their economists are 
so gracious as to allow in the minimum wage, that is, in the minimum life, a 
little tea, or rum, or sugar and meat, it must by contrast appear to them as 
shameful as incomprehensible that the workers reckon in this minimum a little 
of the costs of war against the bourgeoisie and that out of their revolutionary 
activity they even make the maximum of their enjoyment of life (Marx 1976g: 
435). 
It is to be noted that implicit in this account is the rather simplistic view that the 
revolutionary subjectivity of the workers is the result of the 'accumulation of 
experience of struggle, ' a kind of quantitative extension of the trade-union struggle. 
Marx does not offer here a proper ground for this view. He just wants to say 
something about the transition between non-revolutionary and revolutionary forms of 
working-class subjectivity in order to show the transitory nature of capital. But in 
light of the lack of a proper account of the concrete determinations of the latter, he 
can only offer a general statement based on the abstract self-development of the 
consciousness of the workers which is indifferent to the social determinations 
producing the different forms of working class subjectivity. 
In this sense, Marx did not advance much from the `phenomenology' of 
organisational forms of the class struggle he had already offered in The Poverty of 
Philosophy. Initially, workers organise just in the form of combinations. But then, this 
merely 'economic' form of the class struggle takes increasingly political forms. In a 
passage we have already quoted, Marx states: 
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But the maintenance of wages, this common interest which they have against 
their boss, unites them in a common thought of resistance - combination (... ) 
If the first aim of resistance was merely the maintenance of wages, 
combinations, at first isolated, constitute themselves into groups as the 
capitalists in their turn unite for the purpose of repression, and in the face of 
always united capital, the maintenance of the association becomes more 
necessary to them than that of wages (... ) In this struggle -a veritable civil 
war - all the elements necessary for a coming battle unite and develop. Once 
it has reached this point, association takes on a political character. 
Economic conditions had first transformed the mass of the people of the 
country into workers. The combination of capital has created for this mass a 
common situation, common interests. This mass is thus already a class as 
against capital, but not yet for itself. In the struggle, of which we have noted 
only a few phases, this mass becomes united, and constitutes itself as a class 
for itself. The interests it defends become class interests. But the struggle of 
class against class is a political struggle (Marx 1976c: 210-1). 
The first remarkable point of this passage is the presence of the distinction between 
`class in itself' and `class for itself. ' But note as well that this distinction does not 
refer, as is generally interpreted, to the fully conscious revolutionary forms of the 
class struggle, but to the class struggle in general. The class constituted as a class 'for 
itself just means the class affirming its essential antagonistic relation to the 
bourgeoisie through the political action of its members, whatever the form the latter 
takes. So it does not necessarily imply a fully developed revolutionary proletariat 
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consciously transforming capitalist society into the free association of individuals 
through its self-abolition as a class. Secondly, it is true that Marx makes a distinction 
between forms of the class struggle that do not take a political form and political 
struggles. But note that not only does he not refer to the former as merely 'economic' 
but he also makes clear how class struggle in a political form is a necessary form 
towards which the embryonic non-political forms of struggle tend. Thus these 
passages clearly go against the Leninist rigid separation between economic struggles 
and political struggles, the former developing spontaneously but the latter needing the 
external intervention of a revolutionary vanguard. That is why that quote has often 
been used by defenders of so-called 'spontaneist' accounts of the development of 
revolutionary subjectivity (along the lines of Luxemburg) to make a case for their 
anti-Leninist position (Müller and Neusüss 1975). However, although those 
approaches are right in their criticism of the Leninist separation between economic 
and political struggles, they are wrong in identifying Marx's reference to the political 
character of the struggle with its revolutionary form. When Marx refers to the 
'political struggle' between the two classes he refers to the class struggle in general, 
not just to its revolutionary form. Its political character derives from the following 
interrelated points. Firstly, it objectively reaches the universality of the members of 
the class. Secondly, it transcends the confrontation with capitalists within the 
boundaries of individual capitals or restricted groups of them within branches of 
production, to become directly centred on the struggle over the form of political 
representative of social capital, i. e. the state. In this way it becomes determined as the 
form through which the directly general conditions of social reproduction are 
established (Marx 1965). 'Non-political' forms of the class struggle are, for Marx, 
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those first manifestations of the class struggle in which the proletariat had not 
affirmed itself yet as a class with an independent political representation. 
Be that as it may, it is clear that the inadequacy of this early formulation of the 
question by Marx paves the way for all this confusion. In particular, taken at face 
value Marx's formulation can certainly be read as a kind of 'Luxemburgist' approach 
based on an 'accumulation-of-experience-through-struggle' theory of revolutionary 
subjectivity. Briefly put, for that approach revolutionary subjectivity is the product of 
the 'self-development' of class consciousness in the course of the struggle against 
capital, a potentiality which is carried by any form of the class struggle. While it is 
evident that the different (antagonistic) forms of class consciousness can only develop 
through the political actions of the workers against capital, this does not mean that 
class struggle as such is the self-determining ground for the production of 
revolutionary subjectivity. In fact, the picture of working class consciousness as set 
into motion by itself, now growing, now retreating, - that is, as essentially self- 
moving - is the one we get when externally grasped in its apparent concrete forms. 
Only as an expression of determinate material conditions does proletarian struggle 
acquire a conscious revolutionary form. This is what Marx makes clear immediately 
after the quoted passage when he states that `the organization of revolutionary 
elements as a class supposes the existence of all the productive forces which could be 
engendered in the bosom of the old society'. However, this is no more than a very 
general statement, which does not do much as an account of the qualitatively specific 
form that those productive forces must acquire, or of the historical process that begets 
them, including the role of the different forms of proletarian political action in it. 
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Clearly, then, Marx's investigation of the concrete determinations of the political 
action of the working class, i. e. the critique of political economy, was at that time in a 
very embryonic stage. Therefore, Marx could not but eventually represent the 
qualitatively different forms of the class struggle in terms of the quantitative 
difference of their respective scope. That is why, when read as a self-contained 
account, it could be read in a simplistic and mechanistic fashion, as involving a linear 
and continuous expansion of working class organisation until reaching its truly 
revolutionary form. Or, alternatively, as a `contradictory learning process', with steps 
forward and setbacks, but always potentially self-developing into revolutionary 
subjectivity. However, when read from the vantage point of Marx's more developed 
dialectical account in Capital, a different picture emerges. On the one hand, it is clear 
that Marx was (becoming) aware of the need to grasp the specific qualitative 
determination immanent in each of the forms of the class struggle in order to discover 
their necessity. On the other hand, Marx's insufficient development of the critique of 
political economy allowed him to offer just a glimpse of the concrete determinations 
involved in those social forms. The result of this is that when, however deficiently, 
those determinations do appear in Marx's analysis (for instance, regarding the relation 
between `associations' and the movement of the wage), they give the impression of 
being just `objective conditions' for proletarian action. In turn, those conditions 
appear as `moulding', `limiting' or `constraining' the deployment of the otherwise 
self-determining potentiality of the `subjective factor'. In a nutshell, when externally 
grasped, the social determinations of working class consciousness and action become 
reduced to a `context' in which the latter freely develops (maybe as a `response' to the 
latter). 35 
35 In fact, it could be argued that the whole history of Marxism revolves around the attempt to solve this 
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We would like to argue that in both their merits and shortcomings, these texts embody 
a wider significance beyond the concrete questions they address and the specific (and 
limited) answers they give. For, when seen from the perspective of the direction that 
Marx's subsequent scientific development took, we can see those texts as embodying 
a programmatic significance regarding the specific form of dialectical cognition in its 
immediate condition of conscious organisation of human transformative action. The 
starting point of Marx's investigation, the very form in which he attempted to address 
the questions to be answered and the limitations he encountered; all this, we would 
like to argue, reveals the general form of motion of scientific knowledge determined as 
practical criticism. This we think, is the lesson that Marx drew from his polemic 
against Proudhon and, a little bit later, from the defeat of the 1848 revolutions. 
It is our claim that, aware of all this, it became clear for Marx that only through the 
positive reproduction in thought of the determinations of capital and its form of 
movement could the working class develop its revolutionary consciousness. Science, 
as Alfred Schmidt puts it, becomes determined as the `conscious product of historical 
movement' (Schmidt 1983: 29). Moving forward in its production and giving it a 
socially reproducible form - i. e. a book - thereby turned out to be a most urgent 
(false) antinomy between the forms of objectivity and subjectivity of the capital relation. This illusion 
arises because, as we have seen, when the inner connections between social forms is broken by logical 
representation, abstract and concrete forms appear side by side as self-subsistent entities, which, at 
most, interpenetrate. And this applies to the relation between the objective and the subjective forms of 
the alienated social being as well. For excellent historical accounts of this problematic and thought- 
provoking reflections, see Aufheben Collective (1993; 1994; 1995), Marramao (1975/6; 1982) and 
Jacoby (1971; 1975). 
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political task. In a letter to Meyer from 1867 in which he apologises for the tardiness 
of his reply, Marx speaks in this way about his activities of the previous years, 
Why then did I not answer you? Because I was the whole time at death's door. 
I thus had to make use of every moment when I was capable of work to 
complete my book [Capital] to which I have sacrificed my health, happiness, 
and family. I hope this explanation suffices. I laugh at the so-called `practical' 
men and their wisdom. If one wanted to be an ox, one could, of course, turn 
one's back on the sufferings of humanity and look after one's own hide. But I 
should really have thought myself unpractical if I had pegged out without 
finally completing my book, at least in manuscript (Marx 1987b: 366). 
That book, Capital, turned out to be Marx's most developed attempt to concretise the 
general form of motion of dialectical cognition determined as revolutionary science 
and outlined in this first part of the thesis through the discussion of Marx's early 
works. In the second part, we shall attempt to demonstrate this through a critical 
reconstruction of Marx's mature critique of political economy. The latter, we shall 
argue, is but the scientific development of the revolutionary consciousness of the 
proletariat becoming aware of its own social determinations in their unity and, 
therefore, of the historical task which, by virtue of them, it will be compelled to do: 
the conscious production of communism as the most developed form of the critique of 
capital. To this we now turn. 
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Part II 
Dialectical Knowledge in Motion: Revolutionary 
Subjectivity in Marx's Mature Critique of 
Political Economy 
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Chapter 4. The commodity-form and the dialectical method 
Introduction 
In the Preface to the First Edition of Capital Marx makes evident that he was very 
well aware of the complexity entailed by the first steps in the critique of political 
economy. Thus he states: 
Beginnings are always difficult in all science. The understanding of the first 
chapter, especially the section that contains the analysis of commodities, will 
therefore present the greatest difficulty (Marx 1976a: 89). 
Indeed, the endless debates over the real meaning and implications of Marx's analysis 
of the commodity-form among those who claim to be his disciples seem to suggest 
that, if anything, Marx's warning actually fell short of the real difficulties at stake. On 
the other hand, whether it is explicitly acknowledged or not, it is clear that those 
diverse readings of Marx's critique of political economy entail different political 
implications to be drawn from it (Dimoulis and Milios 2004). In fact, it could be 
argued - and, hopefully, this chapter and the ones that follow will substantiate this 
claim - that the analysis of those 'minutiae' which the discussion of the determinations 
of the commodity-form 'appear to turn upon' (Marx 1976a: 90), are of paramount 
importance for what should be the only immediate aim of any dialectical investigation 
of capitalist social forms, namely, the conscious organisation of the revolutionary 
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action of the proletariat. This is shown not only in Marx's insistence on the 
impossibility of correctly grasping the determinations of those more abstract social 
forms from the bourgeois standpoint of political economy (Marx 1976a: 174), but also 
in the central role they played in his critique of the ideological representations of them 
coming from the working class movement itself, e. g. Proudhonian socialism. 36 
It is our view that this diversity in the way Marx's followers have read the ideal 
reproduction of the determinations of the commodity-form contained in Capital is 
closely connected to the varied methodological perspectives from which those authors 
have attempted to grasp the former. In other words, those different interpretations of 
the actual content of the first section of Capital express different understandings of 
the very form of scientific knowledge unfolded in that book. Seen the other way 
round, and this is the fundamental issue to be discussed in this chapter, we would like 
to argue that only on the basis of a sound comprehension of the dialectical method can 
the implications of Marx's analysis of the commodity-form be uncovered in all their 
plenitude. Thus, the aim of this chapter is to see how Marx's dialectical method as 
broadly reconstructed in the first part of the thesis sheds light on crucial aspects of the 
determinations of the commodity-form, which are rarely addressed - or simply 
overlooked - by most contemporary commentators on his mature works. This will 
involve not only a methodologically-minded textual reconstruction of Marx's 
argument in the first chapters of Capital, but also a further elaboration, on the basis of 
that very same method, of determinations which necessarily follow from his own 
36 See Clarke (1994) and Shortall (1994) for good reconstructions of Marx's critique of Proudhonian 
socialism based on the latter's misunderstanding of the nature of the commodity and money-forms. 
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argument but which, we think, Marx himself did not explicitly (or sufficiently) 
develop there. 
In particular, we shall focus our discussion on two main aspects. First, we shall 
critically reconstruct Marx's argument about the determinations of the value-form of 
the product of labour in the first chapter of Capital. Through this reconstruction, we 
will show that many of the confusions and misunderstandings among his followers 
and critics alike spring from an inadequate grasp of the dialectical structure of Marx's 
exposition. In the second place, we will discuss the dialectical investigation of the 
commodity-form as the basis for a scientific comprehension of both the most general 
forms of objectivity and subjectivity of the capitalist form of human productive 
practice. This we shall do mainly through a discussion of Marx's presentation of the 
fetishism of commodities. Finally, we shall attempt to draw the implications of all this 
for the notion of dialectical knowledge as practical criticism, that is, as the conscious 
organisation of the revolutionary action of the working class. 
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The dialectical method and the structure of Marx's exposition of the 
determinations of the commodity 
Inquiry and Presentation, Analysis and Synthesis: on some controversies over the 
initial passages of Marx's argument in Capital 
In Capital Marx puts into motion the discoveries which allowed him to overcome the 
limitations of his early account of alienated labour and its supersession. In 
contradistinction with the Paris Manuscripts, and as he clearly states in the Marginal 
Notes on Adolf Wagner, he takes as a point of departure neither the concepts of 
political economy nor any concept whatsoever (Marx 1975b: 198), in order thereby to 
discover alienated labour as their presupposition. As the title of his most important 
work denotes, the subject whose determinations the dialectical investigation proceeds 
to discover and present is capital, which, as the alienated subject of social life 
becomes 'the all-dominating economic power of bourgeois society' and must therefore 
'form the starting-point as well as the finishing-point' of the ideal reproduction of the 
concrete (Marx 1993: 107). In this sense, Marx's exposition in Capital does not 
advance towards the discovery of alienation but starts from what the analytic stage of 
the dialectical inquiry revealed as its most abstract and general form (Meikle 1985: 
71-2). He starts with the immediate observation of the simplest concretum in which 
the alienation of labour is expressed in order to develop the real determinations 
specific to this social form (Marx 1975b: 198). As has now been widely 
acknowledged, this starting point is not an ideal-typical - or worse, historically 
existent - simple commodity-producing society, as in the orthodoxy derived from 
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Engels (1980) and popularised by authors such as Sweezy (1968) and Meek (1973). 
7 
In Marx's own words, he starts with the commodity as the `economic cell-form of 
bourgeois society' (Marx 1976a: 90): 
We begin with the commodity, with this specific social form of the product - 
for it is the foundation and premise of capitalist production. We take the 
individual product in our hand and analyse the formal determinants that it 
contains as a commodity and which stamp it as a commodity (Marx 1976d: 
1059). 
However, Marx's presentation does not directly start with the essential determinations 
of the commodity-form but starts from the immediate observation of an individual 
37 For a critique of the Engelsian orthodoxy on this question see Arthur (1996; 1997; 1998a), Robles 
Baez (2000), Reichelt (1995) and Weeks (1981). 
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commodity in its outward appearance. 8 In a presentation which will prove full of 
`metaphysical subtleties and theological niceties' (Marx 1976a: 163), Marx shows 
that what determines the commodity as a form of social wealth is not only that, as any 
product of labour, it possesses a use-value, but that the latter acts as the material 
bearer of a second attribute, namely: exchange-value. The further analysis of the 
commodity reveals that exchange-value is actually the form of expression of a content 
distinguishable from it - the value-form, or the attribute of general exchangeability of 
the commodity - the substance of which resides in the abstract labour congealed 
in it, 
and whose magnitude is consequently determined by the socially necessary abstract 
labour-time required for its production. 
As we can see, instead of immediately following the synthetic realisation of the 
determinations of the commodity, Marx firstly and very briefly presents, in a 'stylised' 
38 Properly speaking, there is a previous step in Marx's presentation. He first starts with the form in 
which social wealth appears in capitalist society, namely, an 'immense collection of commodities' 
(Marx 1976a: 125), the individual commodity being its elementary form. The unfolding of the 
determinations behind this appearance is not completed until Volume 2, where the unity of the 
movement of social capital itself, in the form of the circuit of commodity-capital, is revealed as 
positing social wealth in the form of an immense collection of commodities (Marx 1978: 174-177). The 
secondary literature on Volume 2 is remarkably limited compared with what has been written on 
Volumes 1 and 3. Certainly, there has been a lot of discussion of the final part on the schemes of 
reproduction, misguidedly revolving around the notion of a mechanical impossibility of capitalist 
reproduction as constituting the limit to capital. See Rosdolsky (1986) for a survey of the early classical 
debates on that question. But the first part of Volume 2 has been generally neglected. Some of the few 
works available that deal in some detail with aspects of the former include: Fine (1975), Shortall 
(1994), Fine and Saad-Filho (2003), Arthur and Reuten (1998). On the circuit of capital, see especially 
the contribution by Arthur (1998b) in the latter book. 
MO 
form, the analytic movement from the concrete to the abstract through which those 
inner or essential determinations were discovered in the process of inquiry. 
The italics in the previous sentence have not been randomly chosen. 
39 They are meant 
to highlight the crucial distinction between the different moments of Marx's 
dialectical investigation, the confusion over which, we think, lies at the basis of 
widespread critiques of Marx's line of argument about the determinations of the 
commodity-form; not only by its well-known bourgeois critics such as Boehm- 
Bawerk (1975), but also among some of his disciples 40 In brief, the general thrust of 
those objections goes, Marx did not provide in Capital an adequate 'logical proof that 
commodities have a 'something' in common and that that 'something' is congealed 
abstract labour. 4' 
The first point to note concerns the difference between the process of inquiry and that 
of presentation. Put simply, Marx is not attempting 'logically' to prove anything 
(whether dialectically or otherwise), be it the 'concept' of value or that of abstract 
labour or their relation. The identification of the different forms taken by the subject 
whose movement the process of dialectical cognition attempts to reproduce in thought 
- i. e. the analytical separation between forms according to their relative degree of 
39 These different aspects of the materialist dialectical investigation have been insightfully explored by 
Schmidt (1983). 
40 Thus both Reuten (1993: 107) and Arthur (1993: 76) agree that Boehm-Bawerk's objections to 
Marx's line of reasoning about abstract labour as the substance of value are justified; not because Marx 
is wrong in seeing abstract labour as the substance of value, but because his grounding of that point is 
defective from a `systematic-dialectical' perspective. 
41 A good and concise account of the essence of this critique can be found in Kay (1979: 48-58) 
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concreteness - and the 'tracking down of their inner connection' - the synthetic 
discovery of the immanent real necessity linking those different forms - do not belong 
to the dialectical presentation but to the process of inquiry. The actual discovery of 
the real relations between social forms is not something we shall find in Marx's 
Capital, i. e. in the definitive exposition of the results of the dialectical inquiry. If 
anything, those discoveries might appear in the different manuscripts and reading 
notes that led to the writing of Capital. The dialectical exposition only shows those 
discoveries by ideally unfolding the real movement of the different social forms. Yet 
Marx warns his readers in the Postface to the Second Edition, if that presentation is 
successful in ideally reproducing the real movement 'it may appear as if we have 
before us an a priori construction' (Marx 1976a: 102). In other words, that what is at 
stake is a purely deductive process of 'logical proof. 2 And a faulty one for that 
matter, Boehm-Bawerk would claim, since, for instance, Marx did not take into 
consideration common properties other than being products of labour - e. g. utility, 
scarcity, and so on - as possible determinants of exchange-value (Boehm-Bawerk 
1975: 74-5). Leaving aside Boehm-Bawerk's and other critics' complete confusion 
about the actual object of Marx's presentation in chapter 1-i. e. the commodity, and 
not the causal determination of exchange ratios (Kliman 2000: 104) - it is to be noted 
that Marx's exclusion of other possibilities derives from the fact that, inasmuch as the 
dialectical researcher presenting his/her results already knows where the movement is 
heading, the exposition acquires a fluidity that does not reflect the laboriousness 
involved in the two stages of the inquiry - analysis and synthesis - and thereby 
42 As Sayer notes (1979: 94-5), Althusser (Althusser and Balibar 1968) and his British followers 
(Hindess and Hirst 1975; 1977), fell prey to this appearance. 
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excludes all false starts and paths that he/she may have encountered in 
his/her 
research, especially when producing an original process of cognition. 
The second aspect of Marx's presentation which is generally overlooked by many 
critics concerns the distinction between the other pair of terms italicised above, 
namely: the analytic and the synthetic stages. For the point here is that the exposition 
of the explanation proper of the necessity underlying the relations between different 
social forms - what would amount to a 'logical proof in the 
inverted language of 
representational thought - is not to be found in the dialectical analysis, 
but in the 
synthetic movement of the presentation. 3 Since it is only in the latter that the 
unfolding of the real movement of determination - hence the explanation - actually 
takes place, the presentation of those findings should take, in principle, a fully 
synthetic form. However, this is not the way Marx structured his dialectical exposition 
43 Thus it is the dialectical synthesis that reveals the 'why' of real relations. The analytic stage only 
separates a concrete form from the abstract form whose realised necessity it carries within itself in the 
form of its own immanent potentiality. In this sense, the analytic stage is not about the why but about 
the what. Evidently, since the separation of real forms according to their relative degree of 
abstractness/concretness ideally expresses the objective necessity (the real relations) residing in the 
object and are not the product of the subjective caprice or imagination of the scientist, the mere 
reference to the 'what' carries implicitly some hint of the 'why'. Thus, if the dialectical analysis reveals 
that the value-form is the concrete form in which the objectification of the abstract character of private 
labour affirms itself as an abstract form, the separation between the two already says something about 
the real relation involved. But this something is no more than, as it were, a 'pointing out', an 
observation. The actual ideal reproduction of that inner connection - the explanation - takes place 
in the 
synthetic movement. In his Science of Logic, Hegel refers to this distinction between the role of 
analysis and synthesis as the difference between the apprehension of what is and its comprehension 
(Hegel 1999: 793-4). 
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in Volume 1 of Capital (the only one he edited for publication himself); this 
exposition tends to include, in a stylised form, brief presentations of the analytic 
process. 44 Since this peculiar structure of Marx's presentation of the determinations of 
the commodity-form actually recurs throughout most of Volume 1 of Capital and its 
misunderstanding has caused so many controversies among critics and followers 
alike, it might be worth shortly describing its general form. 
In a nutshell, this structure of the dialectical presentation consists in taking the 
immediate concrete appearance of the determinate social form at stake in order to, 
after a brief analytic movement, uncover its inner determination. The exposition then 
proceeds by synthetically unfolding the realisation of that (more abstract) 
determination. This stage goes on until the specific potentiality defining the 
determination of the social form under scrutiny, and whose realisation the exposition 
is ideally reproducing, negates itself as immediately carried by that abstract social 
as On the role and the pros and cons of this analytic moment in the peculiar structure of the dialectical 
exposition in Volume 1 of Capital, organised around presentational 'nodes', see Inigo Carrera (1992). 
Regarding Chapter 1 in particular, this structure has been recognised by Banaji (1979) and Elson 
(1979a).. Murray (1988: 148-9) rightly sees the structure of Chapter 1 as comprising a 'double 
movement' of form to content and then from content to form. However, presumably reducing the 
dialectical movement to the synthetic stage, he sees nothing particularly dialectical in the first 
movement. In reality, the general point about the two-fold movement of analysis and synthesis in 
Marx's exposition had already been made by Rubin in his seminal work on the theory of value (Rubin 
1972: 113). However, as we shall discuss below, his understanding of the way they structure the 
exposition is, we think, incorrect. Furthermore, although Rubin does distinguish between the analytic 
and the synthetic (genetic, as he calls it) stages of the presentation, he seems to restrict the dialectical 
method to the latter (Rubin 1978: 110). In this way, the specific form of the dialectical analysis vis-ä- 
vis the analysis of representational scientific thought is overlooked. 
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form to become affirmed as immediately pertaining to the more concrete form 
into 
which it has metamorphosed. This signals that the first presentational node has 
been 
exhausted. A new one thereby begins, but now with the more concrete form whose 
genesis has been traced in the former as the subject of the movement to be ideally 
reproduced. However, the new node does not directly start with the inner 
determinations of this more concrete social form but, again, with its immediate 
manifestation. A brief analytic movement therefore precedes the former. 
45 
With this in mind, it is easy to understand the main reason why the criticisms levelled 
at Marx about his inadequate explanation of abstract labour as the substance of value 
in the first pages of Capital are not simply based on a misunderstanding about the 
particularities of his argument, but are completely off the mark. To put it simply, 
those critiques search for an explanation in the wrong place, that is, in the pages 
where Marx is just presenting the analytic separation of real forms, which comprise 
the first two sections of Chapter 1. Marx's alleged explanation of why abstract labour 
is the substance of value in those pages sounds unconvincing simply because it is not 
there. As we shall briefly see, the unfolding of this particular 'why' only occurs in 
section three, which discusses exchange-value as the form of manifestation of value. 
Before engaging in that aspect of Marx's presentation of the determinations of the 
commodity-form, let us first dwell deeper on the specifically dialectical form of the 
analytical moment that precedes it. 
as At this juncture it is important to point out that, in the dialectical inquiry, analysis and synthesis 
overlap in the concrete intellectual labour of the scientist. Thus the actual activity of inquiry of the dialectical researcher involves a constant passage from phases of analysis to phases of synthesis and 
therefore do not immediately appear as distinct aspects of the process of cognition. However, they do 
constitute two real determinations of the dialectical method and therefore it is crucial to bear their difference in mind. And it is this real difference which appears 'in its purity' in the dialectical 
exposition, when the author decides to reproduce the analytical stage (whether in whole or in part) in the presentation. 
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The phase of analysis 
In contrast with the claims of those critics referred to above, we think that in the 
opening pages of chapter 1 Marx is not searching for a common property in 
commodities. Rather, he is searching for (i. e. not yet unfolding) the specific 
determination defining the potentiality of the commodity as a historical form of social 
wealth. 46 This potentiality Marx initially 'discovers' by looking at the use-value of the 
46 The difference between these two forms of grasping Marx's argument in the first pages of Capital 
expresses the difference between the dialectical form of the analysis and that of representational 
thinking. Many authors have highlighted the distinction between the abstractions of dialectics and those 
of representational thought as one between `real abstractions vs. mental generalisation' (Saad-Filho 
2002) or `empiricist abstractions vs. determinate abstractions' (Gunn 1992). `Empiricist abstractions' 
have also been called `formal abstractions' (Clarke 1991a) or `general abstractions' (Murray 1988). 
However, as Inigo Carrera points out (2003: 250), what most authors have overlooked is that the 
difference in the respective kinds of abstraction emerges as a result of the very form of the process of 
cognition on the basis of which those abstractions are identified. This difference in form not only 
applies to the synthetic or genetic phase - as is usually assumed - but crucially pertains to the process 
of analysis as well. Representational thought analyses a concrete form by separating what repeats itself 
from what does not in order to arrive at a certain characteristic which makes possible the mental 
construction of a definition of that concrete form as that which has this or that attribute. Conversely, 
dialectical thought analyses a concrete form by, first of all, facing it as embodying a qualitative 
potentiality for transformation. Secondly, by grasping that qualitative potentiality as the concrete form 
in which a more abstract form realises its own qualitative potentiality, i. e. its real necessity. Thus the 
dialectical ideal appropriation of the universe of different real forms does not proceed through an 
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individual commodity, which in capitalist societies acts as bearer of that second, 
historically-specific attribute of the products of labour, namely, exchange-value. Two 
things follow from this. First, that inasmuch as it is materially borne by the use-value 
of the commodity, this attribute is intrinsic to the commodity itself. Secondly, as 
argued above, that Marx is not trying to prove logically the existence of a common 
property but the commodity itself, in its immediacy, shows that it has that 'common 
property' immanent in it. 
Here a problem might arise because Marx does not explicitly say what that second 
attribute of the commodity consists in. He just names it (exchange-value) and then 
directly proceeds to its analysis. We think that the reason for this is that the meaning 
of that attribute was self-evident in the name itself in light of its everyday usage at 
that time. The fact that commodities have 'exchange-value' simply means that they 
have the power of exchangeability, that is, the aptitude to be transformed into a 
different use-value without the mediation of any material transformation in its bodily 
existence. What immediately follows in Marx's exposition is, then, the dialectical 
analysis of this social power of exchangeability of commodities. That is, Marx 
proceeds to answer what is the source of this specific potentiality intrinsic to the 
identification of the distinctiveness of forms on the basis of the degree of repetition of certain 
attributes. Rather, it analytically separates the different forms by discovering as immanent in a 
particular concrete form the realised necessity of another real form, which is abstract with respect to the 
first one, but concrete with respect to another form of which it is the realised necessity. Hence, whilst 
representational analysis grasps the general determination of real forms as immediate affirmations - 
hence self-subsistent entities - the distinctive mark of the process of analysis in dialectical research is 
to grasp, in the same analytic movement, both the real form under scrutiny and the more abstract one of 
which the former is the developed mode of existence. 
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commodity, i. e. what is the abstract form appearing in the concrete form of the power 
of exchangeability. 
As happens with every real form, the first thing he encounters when facing the 
exchangeability of the commodity is its immediate manifestation - the quantitative 
relation 'in which use-values of one kind exchange for use-values of another' (Marx 
1976a: 126). Thus, the first step in the analysis of exchangeability is the separation of 
the content and form of that specific attribute of the commodity, this being the only 
way in which we can penetrate through the concrete form in which an abstract form 
presents itself. Again, this is the immediate object of Marx's exposition in the 
passages that follow, and not the search for a 'common something' or 'third thing', the 
existence of which the distinction between form and content presupposes. This 
separation between form and content reveals that the different particular exchange 
relations that a commodity establishes with other commodities are actually 
expressions of something else that inheres in commodities and which gives them the 
identical qualitative potentiality of general exchangeability in a certain magnitude. 
Once form and content of the attribute of general exchangeability are distinguished, 
Marx continues with the analysis of the latter, which consists in separating that form 
of general exchangeability from the abstract form whose necessity it carries within 
itself as its 'other'. The particular form that this analysis takes is, again, not the search 
for a common element, but the search for the determinate action which posits that 
specific attribute existing in commodities. That action, Marx states, is a human action 
in one of its facets, namely: productive labour in its general character or abstract 
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labour. Commodities have this attribute of general exchangeability as products of the 
abstract character of the labour objectified in them. 7 
And here there is a tricky aspect in Marx's presentation, which might have contributed 
to much of the confusion. Because, although at that stage of the argument he has 
already shown that the common 'something' is the form of general exchangeability, he 
does not actually name it until separating, in turn, that form from its content or 
substance. 
All these things now tell us is that human labour-power has been expended to 
produce them, human labour is accumulated in them. As crystals of this social 
substance, which is common to them all, they are values - commodity values 
[Warenwerte]. 
We have seen that when commodities are exchanged, their exchange-value 
manifests itself as something totally independent of their use-value. But if we 
abstract from their use-value, there remains their value, as it has just been 
defined. The common factor in the exchange relation, or in the exchange-value 
of the commodity, is therefore its value (Marx 1976a: 128). 
47 Admittedly, Marx's transition to abstract labour might appear as abrupt, too unproblematic. But here 
it is important to bear in mind what we indicated above about the dialectical exposition having a 
fluidity which does not reflect the complexity of the real activity of analysis in the process of inquiry. 
Hence when considering the action that posits the form of general exchangeability of commodities, the 
only actions other than labour he contemplates (and discards) are purely natural actions. In other words, 
he does not consider other kinds of human action. 
158 
That intrinsic attribute of general exchangeability which is manifested in exchange- 
value, and which is posited by the abstract character of labour, is called by Marx 
value. Now, in opposition to the claims of a great deal of contemporary literature on 
Marx's theory of the value-form, we think that the (analytic) search for the specific 
determinations of the commodity - Marx's stated aim in Chapter 1 according to the 
quote above - is evidently not achieved with the discovery of abstract labour as the 
substance of value. 8 Quite to the contrary, that very specificity seemed to have 
slipped through Marx's fingers. In effect, although he found the specific attribute of 
the commodity in its value, when he moved to account for its substance he ended up 
with something which bears no specifically-capitalist character: `merely congealed 
quantitites of homogeneous human labour, i. e. of human labour power expended 
48 As a reaction to the ahistorical, Ricardian reading of Marx's account of the value-form, the `new 
consensus' tends to see abstract labour as a purely historical, specific social form (Mohun and 
Himmelweit 1978; Eldred and Haldon 1981; de Vroey 1982; Reuten 1993; De Angelis 1995; Postone 
1996; Saad-Filho 1997; Bellofiore and Finelli 1998; Kay 1999; Arthur 2001b). For a critique of this 
literature, see Kicillof and Starosta (2004). We do not agree with this. As we argue below, abstract 
labour is a generic material form, a . 
'productive expenditure of human brains, muscles, nerves, hands 
etc. ' (Marx 1976a: 134). What is specific to capitalist society is the role it plays by being determined as 
the substance of the most abstract form of objectified social mediation, namely: value. In a recent 
article, Murray (2000) comes very close to recognising this but, we think, eventually muddles the 
question by doubling the contradictory existence of abstract labour into two different categories: 
`physiological' abstract labour and `practically-abstract' labour. See also Reuten's reply to Murray 
(2000) and the latter's rejoinder (Murray 2002). Whilst still seeing abstract labour as capital-specific, 
Robles Baez offers probably one of the best treatments of the movement of the contradiction between 
the generic, physiological materiality of abstract labour and its historically-specific social 
determination as the substance of value deriving from the private character of labour in capitalism 
(Robles Baez 2004). 
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without regard to the form of its expenditure' (Marx 1976a: 128). But it is evident that 
in any form of society human beings objectified their subjective labour-power and 
that that process of objectification entailed both a concrete or particular character and 
an abstract or general one. Thus far, then, this stage of the analytic process does not 
show why this generic materiality takes the objectified social form of value. It does 
not even tell us what is the historical form of social labour which is determined as 
value-producing. It only tells us what is the material determination of that which in 
capitalist society is socially represented in the form of value. This is the reason why 
Marx still carries on with the analytic search of the formal determinants that it 
contains as a commodity and which stamp it as a commodity'. As any attentive reader 
could tell, the analytic process continues and it is only in the section on the dual 
character of labour that Marx finally finds the historically-specific form of social 
labour that produces commodities and, hence, value. The commodity, Marx 
concludes, is the objectification 'of mutually independent acts of labour, performed in 
isolation' (Marx 1976a: 131). In other words, it is the 'labour of private individuals 
who work independently of each other' (Marx 1976a: 165), or private labour, which 
constitutes the specifically capitalist form of labour. The analytic process completes 
the search for the specific determinations of the value-form by revealing that the 
attribute of general exchangeability of the commodity springs from the abstract or 
general character of privately performed labour materialised in it. The commodity, 
then, becomes known in its essential determination as the materialised general social 
relation of private and independent producers. 
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The synthetic phase 
It is only now that the synthetic stage of the presentation begins. This consists in 
ideally following the realisation of the discovered potentiality' immanent in the 
commodity. From then on, the commodity ceases to be grasped in its exteriority as an 
'inert' social form - as a sheer external object - and the exposition starts to follow 
its 
self-movement as the subject of the development of those determinations - previously 
discovered through analysis - into ever more concrete forms. This is subtly indicated 
by Marx at the end of his discussion of the qualitative determinations of the relative 
form of value. 
We see, then, that everything our analysis of the value of commodities 
previously told us is repeated by the linen itself, as soon as it enters into 
association with another commodity, the coat. Only it reveals its thoughts in a 
language with which it alone is familiar, the language of commodities. In 
order to tell us that labour creates its own value in its abstract quality of being 
human labour, it says that the coat, in so far as it counts as its equal, i. e. is 
value, consists of the same labour as it does itself. In order to inform us that its 
sublime objectivity as value differs from its stiff and starchy existence as a 
body, it says that value has the appearance of a coat, and consequently that in 
so far as the linen itself is an object of value [Wertding], it and the coat are as 
like as two peas (Marx 1976a: 143-4). 
The unfolding of this movement spoken 'in the language of commodities' is precisely 
what the subsequent synthetic stage of the presentation consists in. Value being a 
161 
purely social power of the commodity, it cannot be immediately expressed in its 
sensuous corporeal materiality. As the capacity of the commodity to be exchanged for 
other different commodities, value can only be manifested in the social relation of 
exchange between commodities. Therefore, the value of a commodity necessarily 
expresses itself only in the use-value of the commodity that is exchanged for the 
commodity in question as its equivalent. In this way, value takes the concrete shape of 
exchange-value as its necessary form of appearance. In its most developed form, 
value acquires independent existence as money and the expression of value in the 
particular commodity acting as money becomes determined as price. The opposition 
inherent in the commodity is thus externalised through the doubling of the 
commodity-form into ordinary commodities and money. The power of direct 
exchangeability of commodities negates itself as such to become affirmed as a social 
power monopolised by the money-form. 
It is in the course of the synthetic movement of this formal development, when seen 
from the point of view of its qualitative content, that the answer to the 'why' questions 
which the analytic stage was impotent to provide is given. In other words, it is the 
development of the expression of value that unfolds the explanation as to why the 
objectification of the abstract character of privately performed labour takes the social 
form of value or, to put it differently, why private labour is value-producing. 
Furthermore, we shall see that it is this ideal reproduction of the necessity of the 
value-form that eventually puts us before the immediate object of the exposition of 
the section on the fetishism of commodities - namely, the determinations of the 
alienated consciousness of the commodity producer - as its necessary concrete form. 
In a nutshell, the issue comes down to the fact that it is only the expression of value 
that progressively reveals to us the problem that the commodity-form of the product 
of labour is meant to solve. We are referring to the mediation in the establishment of 
the unity of social labour when performed in a private and independent manner. 
49 And 
since this unity becomes condensed in the money-form, it is the unfolding of its 
determinations, synthesised in the peculiarities of the equivalent-form and derived 
from its general determination as the form of immediate exchangeability, that 
so provides the answer to the question as to why private labour must produce value. 
49 In reality, the problem itself is posed by Marx's exposition in the previous section of the double 
character of labour, while still at the analytic stage of the presentation. Certainly, in our reconstruction 
above we omitted a step in his argument, which is that generalised commodity production presupposes 
the existence of an extended social division of labour and that the latter, as the 'totality of varying 
deployments of useful labour' is an 'eternal necessity of nature for the sake of mediating the material 
interchange between man and nature (i. e. human life)' (Marx 1976f: 12). It is at that juncture that the 
analysis of the individual commodity confronts us, for the first time, with the question of the unity of 
social labour. But, as noted above, this still leaves unanswered the question about why the value-form 
must mediate this process of metabolism when taking the form of private labour. 
so In the Second Edition of Capital and the 'Value-form' appendix to the First Edition, Marx develops 
all the peculiarities of the equivalent-form as part of his discussion of the simple form of value. 
Contrariwise, in the First Edition the second and third peculiarities are developed in the context of the 
'reversed' form of the expanded form of value, an intermediate step which Marx did not include in the 
Second Edition, where he directly jumped from the expanded form of value to the general form. We 
think that, for our purposes here, the presentation of the First Edition is clearer. In effect, as Marx 
himself notes (Marx 1976f: 26), the problem at stake (the establishment of the unity of social labour) 
becomes actually revealed to be solved when the expression of value acquires its plenitude as the form 
of general exchangeability by relating through the value-form the universe of all existing commodities. 
This only occurs with the general form of value (although a defective - because not unified - 
manifestation is already found in the expanded form). That is why we shall follow the presentation of 
14Z 
As the other side of its two-step analytic discovery, the synthetic ideal reproduction of 
the determinations of the value-form comprises two aspects, each one respectively 
corresponding to the second and third peculiarities of the equivalent form. The 
first 
one, whereby the concrete labour that produces the particular commodity acting as 
general equivalent becomes the form of manifestation of the general character of 
human labour, shows, precisely, why that material expenditure of labour-power has to 
act as the social form of labour, i. e. why it is that abstract labour is the substance of 
value. The second one, whereby the private labour that produces the equivalent 
the First Edition. On the other hand, there might be a strong reason why Marx decided to move the 
peculiarities of the equivalent form to the simple expression of value. Basically, the point is that for the 
presentation of the unfolding of the specific content of the qualitative determination involved in the 
expression of value its simple form suffices. That is why Marx states that `the whole mystery of the 
form of value lies hidden in this simple form' (Marx 1976a: 139). The further formal unfolding of the 
more developed expressions of value only entails quantitative differences within that very same 
qualitative determination. Certainly, that purely formal-logical construction helps the comprehension 
of the qualitative determination entailed in the form of value by making explicit aspects of the former 
which are not immediately visible in the simple form. This it does inasmuch as it shows the unfolding 
of the quantitative multiplicity and generality of the expression of value in their plenitude (Robles Baez 
1997). But no novel quality is unfolded [in passing, let us note that in the Logic Hegel develops those 
determinations of the `one and the many' still within the section on quality. However, as Gaete (1995: 
48-9) points out, they already constitute the transition to the determinations of quantity and are there 
for the sake of the smoothness of the passage from qualitative being to quantity]. Incidentally, this 
illustrates what is the role of formal logic within dialectical knowledge, namely: the representation of 
the determinations of quantity, that is, of `difference determined as indifference' (Inigo Carrera 2003: 
237). Or, in the words of Hegel, `a being that is indifferent with regard to determinacy' (Hegel 1991: 
157). 
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commodity becomes the immediate incarnation of directly social labour, in turn 
makes it evident why private labour must produce value at all. 
In effect, through the general expression of value, all commodities relate to each other 
as possessing an identical social essence as exchangeable things in the same 
magnitude. In other words, albeit in a mediated form that reflects their social form of 
value as the immediate attribute of the general equivalent, their social relation of 
general exchangeability achieves its unity. But, since they are only values as 
expressions of the same common social substance, i. e. abstract labour, the unity of the 
expression of value puts us before the unity of undifferentiated human labour. In 
determining the concrete labour that produced the equivalent as the immediate mode 
of appearance of abstract human labour, now the social relation between commodities 
itself makes plain that the different concrete labours that produced them are but 
different ways in which the total labour-power of society has been expended. Those 
varied useful labours now show themselves to be what they actually are: 
differentiations of the expenditure of human labour-power or determinate modes in 
which the human body has been productively exerted. In this `roundabout way', as 
Marx puts it, the development of exchange-value confronts us with the generic 
problem that any society must confront, namely, the social regulation of the 
differentiation of human labour, which `is capable of receiving each and every 
determination (... ) but is undetermined just in and for itself' (Marx 1976f: 20), and 
which is necessary for the reproduction of human life. The exposition of the 
dialectical analysis of the commodity had already discovered that a commodity- 
producing society presupposed an extended division of labour. Now we can see that 
the materialised social relation itself - the value-form - affirms itself as the mediator 
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in the articulation of that division of labour, i. e. in establishing the relation between 
different labours as organic specifications of human labour in general. 
As values the commodities are expressions of the same unity, of abstract 
human labour. In the form of exchange value they appear to one another as 
values and relate themselves to one another as values. They thereby relate 
themselves at the same time to abstract labour as their common social 
substance. Their social relationship consists exclusively in counting with 
respect to one another as expressions of this social substance of theirs which 
differs only quantitatively, but which is qualitatively equal and hence 
replaceable and interchangeable with one another (... ) It is only the kind of 
thing that can turn mere objects of use into commodities and hence into a 
social rapport. But this is just what value is. The form in which the 
commodities count to one another as values - as coagulations of human labour 
- is consequently their social form (Marx 1976f: 28-9). 
The necessity of abstract labour as the substance of value thus becomes finally 
unfolded. Abstract labour is the substance of value not because a logical argument 
says that it is the common property of commodities we were searching for in the name 
of sound principles of logic. Abstract labour becomes determined as the substance of 
value because in reality the latter is the objectified social form that mediates the 
organisation of that purely material expenditure of human body into its different 
concrete forms across society. The latter being what the value-form mediates, what 
else could be represented in that objectified form? On the other hand, it is self-evident 
that abstract labour does not cease to be a generic material form because of this 
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determination as the substance of value. Hence, as stated above, the determination of 
labour as abstract labour is not the reason behind its existence as value-producing. 
What is specific to capitalist society is that this purely material form negates itself as 
simply such to become affirmed as the producer of the (objectified) general social 
relation (Ifligo Carrera 2003: 301). Once objectified, the generic materiality of the 
abstract character of labour plays a particular social role in the process of social 
metabolism by being represented as the social objectivity of value. 
The commodities' social form is their relationship to one another as equal 
labour; hence - since the equality of totto coelo [utterly] different labours can 
only consist in an abstraction from their inequality - their relationship to one 
another as human labour in general: expenditures of human labour power, 
which is what all human labours - whatever their content or mode of operation 
- actually are. In each social form of labour, the labours of different 
individuals are related to one another as human labours too, but in this case 
this relating itself counts as the specifically social fonn of the labours (Marx 
1976f: 32) 
To recapitulate, thus far we have discussed how the formal development of exchange- 
value, and in particular the unfolding of the determinations of the second peculiarity 
of the equivalent-form, contains the account of the reason why abstract labour is the 
substance of value. What still remains to be answered is why abstract labour is the 
substance of value. In other words, we have to see why human productive activity 
becomes determined in capitalist society as value-producing, the second step in the 
synthetic movement referred to above. 
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In the same vein as the third peculiarity of the equivalent immediately follows from 
the second one, so does the answer to this question follow from the previous one. In 
effect, as the social incarnation of human labour in general, the concrete labour that 
produces the equivalent acquires in its immediacy the form of equality with respect to 
the other concrete useful labours. In this form of immediate identity with every other 
concrete labour, the labour that materialises in the general equivalent is immediately 
social, whilst the useful labours producing the rest of commodities remain not- 
immediately social. Thus the development of the expression of value in the form of 
exchange-value puts us before the reason why the organisation of the division of 
labour must necessarily be mediated in this reified form or, what is the same, why 
commodity-producing labour is essentially value-producing. Although materially 
dependent upon one another as part of the 'primordial system of the division of 
labour', this irreducibly social character of private labours is not immediately 
manifested when they are actually objectified in the direct process of production. 
Hence, this necessary social articulation of private labours is realised through the 
mediation of the exchange of the products of private labour as commodities. Only at 
that moment is it revealed whether the expenditure of the portion of social labour 
which each producer personifies is socially useful. This is the reason why the social 
character of the privately-performed individual productive activities is specifically 
represented as a determinate objective attribute of the products of labour: the form of 
their general exchangeability or their value-form. The basis of this reified social 
mediation thus resides in the fact that the unity of social labour is manifested, as Marx 
puts it in the Grundrisse, only post festuni, through the exchange of the products of 
labour (Marx 1993: 172). Furthermore, the unity of social labour thus becomes 
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socially represented in the form of the particular private product that the rest of 
commodities separate as their general equivalent and which eventually ossifies in the 
money-form. In tracing the genesis of the latter through the ideal reproduction of the 
expression of value, the synthetic stage of the dialectical exposition thereby positively 
unfolds the determinations of that which the analytic process could only point out. 
Namely, that the value-form of the product of labour is the materialised social relation 
of human beings and, therefore, the social subject of the fonn of the social process of 
production of human-life. 51 
It is only at this juncture that Marx introduces the fundamental discussion of the 
fetish-like character of commodities. The question that immediately arises, and which 
is hardly addressed in the literature, is why only and precisely then? We think that the 
answer to this question is inseparable from the issue about the determinate content of 
the section on commodity fetishism and its place in the overall structure of Marx's 
exposition in Capital. The object of the next section, then, is to proceed to deal with 
these questions. Again, we shall show that only through a proper grasp of the 
dialectical method can the full implications and significance of Marx's account of 
commodity-fetishism be uncovered. 
51 We shall see that in becoming capital, the materialised social relation of private and independent 
individuals is constituted as the social subject of the form and content of the process of production of 
human life. 
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The role and place of commodity fetishism in Marx's dialectical exposition in 
Capital 
The immediate object of exposition of the section on commodity fetishism 
Ever since the publication of works such as Rubin's Essays on Marx's Theory of Value 
(1972) or Lukäcs's History and Class Consciousness (1971) the emphasis on Marx's 
analysis of commodity-fetishism has been a hallmark of critical traditions of 
Marxism. In effect, according to those traditions, commodity-fetishism is the 
cornerstone upon which the understanding of Marx's mature works as a critique of 
political economy (as opposed to political economy or economics) depends (Clarke 
1991a; Holloway 1992). While there is no doubt that the analysis of the fetishism of 
commodities plays a fundamental part in Marx's critique of political economy, the 
question is, once we accept that premise, what are the precise meaning and 
implications of such a notion for the scientific comprehension of capitalist society as 
whole; and more concretely, for the proletarian political action through which the 
movement of capital realises its own annihilation. Here, the mere reference to the 
centrality of the historicity of bourgeois social forms and their fetishistic character 
does not suffice to grasp the critical and revolutionary nature of the critique of 
political economy. As we have been arguing throughout this thesis, the specific form 
of the dialectical method is fundamental in this respect. And pace Rubin (1972: 5), 
however central to the comprehension of Marx's critique of political economy, the 
analysis of the fetishism of commodities is not the basis of the determinations of the 
value-form. On the contrary, we would like to argue that the former is a necessary 
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development of the latter. 52 This is far from being a minor point and is actually crucial 
for a proper comprehension of the nature of commodity-fetishism and, hence, for the 
ideal reproduction of the determinations of the most general concrete forms of 
objectivity and subjectivity of capitalist society. 
In order to clarify the issue, let us go straight to the point and pose the fundamental 
question which underlies the proper comprehension of the place of the section on 
commodity-fetishism in the structure of Marx's dialectical presentation, namely: what 
is, in a nutshell, the immediate object of the exposition in that section? In our view, 
those pages basically develop the determinations of the alienated consciousness of the 
commodity-producer. Or, better stated, they unfold the determinations of the alienated 
consciousness as such which, therefore, becomes expounded as an alienated 
consciousness. This is because, in reality, the whole of Chapter 1 (and, actually, the 
whole of Capital) has as its object the alienated consciousness of the commodity 
producer. As indicated above, unlike the Paris Manuscripts, the exposition in Capital 
does not move towards alienated consciousness but takes it as its point of departure. 
However, the latter text starts not with the alienated consciousness in and for itself, 
but with its most general objective form in the capitalist mode of production, namely, 
the commodity. The latter is the immediate subject of those determinations and, 
hence, of the dialectical presentation. 
Conversely, in the section on commodity fetishism Marx discusses the way in which 
those forms of objectivity, engendered by the human brain itself when social labour 
52 See Inigo Carrera (2003: 307-12) for a critique of this inversion by Rubin. De Angelis (De Angelis 
1996: 15) makes the same critical point, although from a different approach. 
171 
takes the form of private labour, appear to the producers themselves. Their 
consciousness thereby comes to be the immediate object of the exposition. In this 
respect, it could be said that this section opens a kind of new presentational (sub)node, 
which, in turn, constitutes a necessary mediation for the determinations to be unfolded 
in Chapter 2 on the process of exchange. This in the sense that the section on 
commodity fetishism focuses on the determinations of the consciousness of the 
commodity producer analytically separated from the human action it regulates in the 
process of exchange. In other words, it expounds the determinations of consciousness 
with regards to its form. In Chapter 2, Marx then follows the determinations of that 
form of consciousness in motion, i. e. in its unity with action as conscious practice in 
the sphere of circulation 53 
As corresponds to the nodal structure of Marx's exposition, he starts the section on 
commodity fetishism with an immediate observation: 'A commodity appears at first 
sight an extremely obvious, trivial thing' (Marx 1976a: 163). However, very quickly 
he develops the analytic movement which brings us to the inner determinations 
53 And even at that level, the alienated action that personifies the realisation of the necessity of the 
commodity to establish an exchange relation is still abstract, part of what Marx calls in the 
Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, the 'theoretical phase of circulation' of 
commodities, `preparatory to real circulation' (Marx 1987a: 303), which can only take place once 'as a 
result of establishing prices, commodities have acquired the form in which they are able to enter 
circulation' (Marx 1987a: 323). By this Marx means the ideal reproduction of the determinations of the 
circulation of commodities which constitute the premises of its actual movement. This 'theoretical 
circulation' comprises Chapters 1,2 and the first section of 3 (the functions of measure of value and 
standard of prices). Only then the actual circulation of commodities is reproduced in thought, revealing 
the subsequent functions of money not as its preconditions but as its concrete forms. 
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discovered in the previous section and which constitute the actual starting point of the 
synthetic stage of the presentation. In effect, Marx points out, although immediately 
appearing as a trivial thing, the commodity is in reality an entity full of metaphysical 
subtleties, a sensible/suprasensible being with the fantastic power of being 
transformed into another use-value without even touching its materiality (Marx 
1976a: 163). On the other hand, at this stage of the process of cognition we already 
know the source of such mysticism; it derives from the commodity-form itself, i. e. 
from its character as a materialised social relation. This we - the readers of Marx's 
Capital - have discovered through the mediation of the development of our scientific 
consciousness. But how is this determination seen by the immediate consciousness of 
the commodity producer? The transition is, then, from the formal subject of the value- 
determinations, i. e. the commodity, to the material subject, i. e. the human individual. 
How is the practical activity of the human individual reflected in his/her own 
consciousness when the former takes on the forms unfolded in the previous sections? 
Or, to put it differently, how does the private individual see the social determinations 
of his/her individual action in order to organise its insertion into the system of the 
social division of labour? This question then occupies the bulk of Marx's attention in 
this section. 
Marx's answer is that, as a private and independent human being, he/she is impotent 
to recognise that his/her action possesses social determinations that transcend the 
immediacy of its singularity. As a consequence, the human individual must project or 
transpose - hence confront - those individually borne social powers as external to 
his/her individuality and existing as an objective attribute of the product of social 
labour. Thus, Marx argues, it is not the case that commodity producers consciously 
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recognise the equality of their private labours as individual fragments of human social 
labour and thereby exchange them as equivalents, i. e. give them the form of value. It 
is the other way round. They give the products of labour the form of value and, 
through this reified mediation, they equalise behind their own backs their private 
labours. The constitution of the social objectivity of the value-form, albeit the product 
of their own brain, appears to the commodity-producers as a fait accompli springing 
by nature from the materiality of the product of labour. In sum, the consciousness of 
the commodity producer is, in its most general form, an apparent, inverted 
consciousness. As the bearer of that form of consciousness, the human individual is 
unable to recognise the necessity - the determinations - of his/her action beyond the 
appearances presented by the latter. 
From this simplest determination of the consciousness of the commodity producer, 
Marx then proceeds to unfold its more concrete development. As the exchange of 
commodities extends its role in social reproduction, the plenitude of which is reached 
in capitalist society where it becomes the general social relation, this inverted 
consciousness starts to regulate the direct production process itself. Under those 
circumstances, already at that moment must the commodity-producer put his/her 
productive consciousness and will at the service of social powers which he/she sees as 
alien to him/herself, as belonging to the product of labour. In effect, in order to 
organise his/her qualitative integration into the social division of labour, the producer 
must not only produce socially useful things, but exchangeable products; he/she must 
produce value. With this determination, Marx starts to make explicit the inner nature 
of the consciousness of the commodity producer: it is not only an apparent 
consciousness but, more concretely, an alienated one. 
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Still, it is only when the movement of the quantitative articulation of the social 
division of labour becomes regulated by the magnitude of value that the extent of this 
alienated nature of human consciousness can be fully appreciated. This because the 
degree in which the products of labour are exchangeable starts to vary independently 
of the producer's individual consciousness and will. Hence, in order to satisfy his/her 
qualitatively and quantitatively determined needs - thereby reproducing 
his/her 
natural life - the producer cannot but determine his/her consciousness and will as 
the 
servants of the capricious changes of the magnitude of value of the commodity he/she 
produces. In other words, he/she not only faces his/her own social determinations as 
alien powers borne by the product of labour, but the latter comes to control the 
producer him/herself. As Inigo Carrera puts it, the commodity-producer can reproduce 
him/herself as a person only by acting as the most abject personification (Inigo 
Carrera 2003: 3-4). 4 At this juncture we can now grasp the precise place of the 
section on commodity-fetishism in Marx's order of presentation. Inasmuch as it has 
the consciousness of the commodity-producer as its immediate object of exposition, it 
can only appear after the analytic and synthetic development of the determinations of 
the value-form. The reason for this is that the the determinations unfolded in the 
former are nothing more than the forms in which the latter concretely develop. To put 
it plainly, the consciousness of the commodity-producer is a concrete form in which 
sa The rest of the section deals with the ideological scientific form of the alienated consciousness of the 
modern individual (political economy) and with general comments on other social forms and their 
respective forms of social consciousness. The latter are external observations in the dialectical 
presentation which evidently play a didactic or pedagogical role by helping emphasise the specificity of 
capitalist social forms. 
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the commodity, as the formal subject of the process of human metabolism, realises its 
own determinations. 
The full significance of this order of determination is manifested in Chapter 2, in 
which, as anticipated above, Marx presents that alienated consciousnes in motion, 
effectively acting. In other words, when he presents the process of exchange as the 
concrete realisation of the social relation materialised in the commodity. After 
analytically penetrating the immediate appearance that it is the human individual who 
consciously and voluntarily controls the product of labour, Marx sets out to unfold the 
realisation of the essential determination with which the previous section finished, 
namely: in capitalist society, 'the characters who appear on the economic stage are 
merely personifications of economic relations: it is as the bearers of these economic 
relations that they come into contact with each other' (Marx 1976a: 179). What 
follows, then, is the alienated action of individuals determined as personifications 
who, through their unconsciously organised social action, cannot help manifesting by 
way of their 'natural instinct' the 'natural laws of the commodity' discovered in 
Chapter 1 (Marx 1976a: 180). In effect, out of the development of the exchange 
process necessarily crystallises the money-form of the commodity. The value-form of 
the product of labour affirms itself as an abstract form through its self-negation, that 
is, by realising its own necessity in the form of the atomistic action of commodity 
owners. 55 Hence the importance of grasping not only the unity between the section on 
commodity fetishism and the rest of Chapter 1, but also of accounting for the crucial 
presentational unity between the latter as a whole and Chapter 2. 
55 Arthur (2004a: 37-38) correctly points this out. 
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As the ideal reproduction of these real relations among forms of different levels of 
abstraction, the dialectical presentation cannot posit the fetishism of commodities - 
i. e. the inverted self-consciousness of the commodity producer - prior to the unfolding 
of the social relations which are ideally expressed in that historical form of 
consciousness. If it did so, it would, like it or not, fall prey to the idealist inversion of 
positing social consciousness as taking concrete form in social being. And since the 
times of The German Ideology Marx and Engels had made clear that such a way of 
conceiving the relation between social being and forms of consciousness entailed 
turning the real relations upside down. Maybe aware of the risk that his own 
exposition be read in that inverted fashion, in the first edition of Capital Marx 
explicitly stated the order of the relation. 
First their relationship exists in a practical mode. Second, however, their 
relationship exists as relationship for them. The way in which it exists for 
them or is reflected in their brain arises from the very nature of the 
relationship (Marx 1976f: 36). 
In order to appreciate the importance of this, let us briefly discuss Rubin's claim that 
the account of commodity-fetishism constitutes the `propedeutic' to the account of the 
deteminations of the value-form (Rubin 1972: 6,61). In a nutshell, Rubin considers 
that the content of the section on fetishism is what in reality corresponds to the section 
on the form of value or exchange-value, i. e. the synthetic exposition of the reason 
why the product of labour must take the value-form. And this confusion should come 
as no surprise. Because, on the one hand, Marx's exposition itself contains the 
elements for an innattentive reader to be led to these mistaken conclusions. In effect, 
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in the section on commodity fetishism Marx interjects in the development of the 
alienated consciousness as such - i. e. in the course of the unfolding of the most 
general form of consciousness in capitalism - repetitions of points he had already 
developed when he was effectively presenting the determinations of the objectified 
general social relation (the objectified social being, so to speak). More concretely, the 
passages which are generally taken as offering the explanation as to why human 
labour must objectify itself in the form of value (Marx 1976a: 165-6) are actually 
external observations to the actual development taking place in those pages; maybe 
introduced, in this case, for didactic reasons, as a way of reminding the reader of the 
content of the previous section. The price for this is that the fluidity of the 
development of the immediate object of exposition is interrupted. That those passages 
are just external observations is evidenced by the way in which Marx introduces 
them: 
As the foregoing analysis has already demonstrated, this fetishism of the 
world of commodities arises from the peculiar social character of the labour 
which produces them (Marx 1976a: 165, our emphasis). 
Now, no matter the problems with Marx's exposition, it is not there that the basis for 
Rubin's confusion is to be found. The problem resides, in reality, in Rubin's 
inadequate comprehension of the dialectical structure of the exposition in Chapter 1 of 
Capital. As we have seen, the place where Marx unfolds the synthetic movement 
from (private) labour to value is not in the fourth section - which corresponds to the 
(abstract to concrete) synthetic movement leading from value to consciousness - but 
in section three on The form of value or exchange-value'. And yet in Rubin's scheme 
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of things this section plays no fundamental part. Why? Because for him that section 
contains a purely formal development, which simply illustrates the different forms of 
exchange-value as modes of expression of value. In his view, there is nothing about 
the qualitative content that is affirming through self-negation in the mode of that 
formal development. So much so, that in the 275 pages of his book on the theory of 
value, the formal development of exchange-value only deserves a footnote. In which, 
moreover, Rubin only mentions the development of exchange-value to state that he 
will not occupy himself with the form of value but only with value as form. 
56 No 
wonder then, that when he later in the book finds the reminder of the synthetic 
movement from private labour to value in the section on commodity fetishism, he is 
led to think that that development appears for the first time there and, therefore, 
constitutes its fundamental content. 7 
What are the implications of this misreading, so influential among contemporary 
followers of Marx? Basically, a conception of Marx's critique of political economy, 
and in particular of the section on commodity fetishism, one-sidedly determined as an 
56 If section three only contains a non-fundamental formal development, one wonders, then, why did 
Marx introduce in the first edition an appendix on the form of value? Besides, had Rubin paid attention 
to that appendix, he would have noticed that so much is the section on commodity fetishism a concrete 
form of the development of the form of value, that Marx introduced the latter discussion as the fourth 
peculiarity of the equivalent form. 
S' All in all, Rubin at least wants to preserve the introduction of 'labour' in the presentation in the 
context of the discussion of the commodity-form. But what to say about contemporary Marxists, such 
as Arthur (Arthur 1993: 77) and Reichelt (forthcoming), who attempt to postpone the introduction of 
labour as the substance of value until the development of the determinations of the capital-form? The 
formalism of that reading is thus taken to extremes. 
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exposition of the social constitution of the forms of objectivity of capitalist society. 
The transposed relation between human practical activity and its objectified forms of 
social mediation is exhausted in the constitution of the former as a hostile alienated 
social power standing above and constraining human individuality. But this inversion 
is not followed through to its necessary unfolding in the determination of the latter as 
personification of the value-form. This has the consequence of rendering the most 
general determination of human individuality in capitalism undertheorised, thus 
opening up the possibility of postulating an instance of exteriority between human 
consciousness and will (i. e. subjectivity) and the value-form; the former is thus seen 
as not fully determined as a mode of existence of the latter. As we shall see later on, 
this exteriority eventually hinders the full comprehension of what a consequent 
dialectical development of these abstract determinations necessarily leads to, namely: 
the discovery of the determination of (social) capital as the concrete alienated subject 
of the historical movement of present-day society. To put it differently, those 
readings fail to follow the transition from the fetishism of commodities to the 
fetishism of capital, that is, from its abstract determination as a formal inversion 
between subject and product of social labour up to its full transformation into a 
complete real inversion. 58 We shall leave this aside for the moment since it will be the 
topic of subsequent chapters. 
58 We refer to the fetishism of the commodity-form as formal inasmuch as it only pertains to the form 
of the process of social metabolism, its content remaining the production of use-values and, hence, of 
human life. At the level of the capital-form the fetishism is real because it not only refers to the form of 
the human life process but also to its content. As an attribute of capital, the alienated content of social 
reproduction becomes determined as the production of surplus-value, with the production of use- 
values, hence human life itself, as the unconscious result of its autonomised movement. 
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But there is another fundamental aspect of the determinations of alienated 
consciousness, which arises already at the level of the commodity-form, and which 
even the most sophisticated readings tend to overlook 59 Admittedly, this is not 
explicitly posed by Marx in the section on commodity fetishism. However, it appears 
more clearly in the Grundrisse and, as far as Capital itself is concerned, it is scattered 
bit by bit in different parts of Volume 1, only explicitly to appear in the chapter on 
simple reproduction. Be that as it may, we think that it is implicit in Marx's Capital 
from the very first chapter: the other side of the coin by which the human individual 
sees his/her social powers as the objective attribute of the product of social labour is 
the self-conception as the bearer of an abstractly free subjectivity. To put it simply, in 
capitalism free consciousness is not the abstract opposite of alienated consciousness 
but the concrete form in which the latter affirms itself through its own negation. As 
we shall see, this insight has fundamental implications for the comprehension of that 
which, as we have been arguing, is the central aim of the scientific development of the 
critique of political economy, namely, the self-consciousness of the determinations of 
its own revolutionary subjectivity by the working-class. In the next section, we return 
to the discussion of commodity fetishism in order to attempt to make explicit what 
Marx left in an implicit form. 
59 The work of Inigo Carrera (2003) drew our attention to this central aspect of Marx's critique of 
political economy, which is generally neglected in the Marxist literature. In what follows we draw 
heavily on his presentation. 
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Free subjectivity as alienated subjectivity 
As we have seen above, the historical specificity of the commodity-form of social 
relations resides in the constitution of private and independent production as the mode 
of existence of social labour. This, we have argued, constitutes the ground of the 
historical determination of productive labour as value-producing. The commodity 
producer is condemned to see the social determinations of his/her activity as an 
objective natural attribute of the product of labour. Thus far, then, the determinations 
of the alienated consciousness of the commodity producer have been reconstructed on 
the basis of Marx's explicit account of commodity fetishism. The question we have to 
address now is the following: how must this private producer, who has projected 
his/her social powers as the value-form of the product of labour, see him/herself, in 
order to effectively act as the personification of his/her commodity? In other words, if 
the commodity-form is the objective form of existence of the alienated consciousness, 
what is its corresponding subjective form? 
The development of the commodity as the general social relation presupposes the 
dissolution of all relations of personal dependence. The consciousness and will of the 
commodity producer is therefore not subordinated to any other consciousness and will 
in the organisation of his/her material life. In other words, seen in its immediacy (and 
that is the standpoint of all ideological representations of bourgeois society) the 
consciousness of the commodity producer is free. What is the actual meaning of this 
freedom when seen from the only materialist point of view, that is, from the point of 
view of the organisation and development of human productive subjectivity? 
Inasmuch as he/she is not subject to any relation of personal dependence, the private 
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individual has the full conscious control over the individual character of his/her 
productive activity. The 'tragedy' of this individual is that he/she is not the only one 
enjoying this apparently absolute freedom. In the same vein as every other 
consciousness and will is absolutely excluded from his/her own productive decisions, 
he/she is absolutely impotent to have any say in the organisation of the material life of 
any other process of individual metabolism, the organic totality of which comprises 
the metabolism of society. Hence the cost at which the plenitude of this control over 
the individual character of labour comes, namely: the absolute lack of control over its 
social character and the consequent constitution of the value-form as the reified 
mediator in the process of production of human life. And hence the need to put this 
free consciousness and will to produce an alien social power - i. e. value - in the best 
possible manner, as the only way to reproduce the producer's material life. The 
realisation of his/her freedom is his/her determination as personification of the social 
powers of his/her commodity. In other words, his/her free consciousness is, in reality, 
a concrete mode of existence of an essentially alienated consciousness. 
The crucial point at this juncture is to grasp the real relation between this abstract 
freedom as autonomy or self-determination and alienation beyond any appearance of 
externality - or inversion - between them. Since we started our discussion in this 
section with the immediate appearance of the consciousness of the commodity 
producer as free, the discovery of its form of existence as an alienated consciousness 
simply appeared as the development through self-negation of the former. Thus the 
appearance could arise that the relation between form and content of the 
consciousness of the private individual is such that alienation is the mode of existence 
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of freedom. 60 But the point is that, although initially presenting itself in that way, the 
unfolding of the determinations of the alienated consciousness shows that the relation 
actually suffers - as it were -a reversal, and the former is revealed as an apparent 
connection. The real relation consists of alienated consciousness affirming itself 
through self-negation by realising its determination in the form of free consciousness. 
Hence it is not that this freedom as 'self-determination', abstractly conceived as a 
natural attribute of human beings, is negated in capitalist society by taking the form of 
an alienated consciousness which is constrained to produce value. It is the other way 
60 Gunn (1992), in probably one of the most sophisticated recent attempts explicitly to deal with this 
question within Marxism, clings precisely to that inverted appearance. For him, the whole 'trick' 
necessary to grasp the contradictory relation between freedom and alienation in capitalist society 'has to 
be to see unfreedom as a mode of existence of freedom' (Gunn 1992: 29). Thus he claims that, in 
reality, there is no such a thing as unfreedom, but only 'unfree freedom', which 'amounts to freedom 
contradicted, or to freedom subsisting alienatedly, i. e. in the mode of being denied' (1992: 29). We 
shall see the consequences of this kind of inversion below but, for the moment, let us just notice that, 
despite his references to dialectics being the ideal expression of the real movement, Gunn reaches these 
conclusions through an exemplar exercise in dialectical logic. He starts with an axiomatic 
(ontologically or transcendentally grounded? ) definition of the concept of freedom and then subjects 
this concept to the general logical necessity of 'affirming itself through self-negation'. In our account, 
by contrast, we started with a 'concretum': not the 'concept of freedom' but the historically-determined 
free consciousness of the commodity producer. And it was by concretely reproducing in thought the 
realisation of its specific potentiality as capable of ruling the individual character of labour but not its 
social determinations that we discovered its actual determination as the form of the alienated 
consciousness. Moreover, we also found the latter not in general but in its specific form: as 
personification of the value-form. Only after concretely unfolding the movement of these social forms 
we recognised the general form of motion as one of 'affirmation through self-negation'. But we did not 
justify any transition by recourse to that general form of movement of the real. This, we think, 
illustrates the sometimes thin line separating the dialectical method from dialectical logic. 
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round. In the material process of producing his/her life at this particular stage in the 
historical development of the material productive forces of society, individuals can 
only socially relate with each other through the production of value, i. e. as 
personifications of the commodity; which, in turn, produces in these individuals this 
free consciousness as its necessary concrete form. In short, in capitalist society free 
consciousness is the concrete form taken by the alienated consciousness. It is by 
seeing him/herself - and therefore practically acting - as free that the individual 
reproduces the subordination to the commodity-form. The affirmation of this freedom 
as abstract self-determination of the subject becomes determined as the concrete form 
of the movement of the alienation inherent in the commodity-form of social relations, 
that is, in private labour. The fetishistic appearances of the objective forms of the 
alienated consciousness are thus paralleled by the corresponding `fetishism' of their 
subjective forms. We have seen the determination of the alienated consciousness of 
the commodity producer as an apparent consciousness that cannot recognise in value 
the social determinations of its individual productive activity, thereby seeing it as a 
natural attribute springing from the materiality of the product of labour. In the same 
vein, the commodity producer is impotent to recognise his/her free consciousness as 
the necessary concrete form taken by the affirmation of its alienated characater, 
thereby seeing it as a natural attribute of human individuals springing from an 
anthropological determination of the species. As Fine puts it, the other side of the 
fetishism of commodities is the 'fetishism' of the subject, the illusions of 'free creative 
practice' (Fine 2001: 87). In their unity, the value-form of the product of labour and 
the apparently free consciousness of the producer respectively constitute the most 
general, objective and subjective forms of existence of the alienated consciousness in 
the capitalist mode of production. 
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As evidenced by our reconstruction of Marx's account of commodity fetishism in 
Chapter 1 of the first Volume of Capital, his presentation of the determinations of the 
alienated consciousness of the commodity producer does not explicitly address its 
concrete form of subjectivity as free consciousness at that stage. In general, the 
references to the latter appear in the context of more concrete determinations, i. e. at 
the level of the capital-form. Furthermore, only in the chapter on simple reproduction, 
when the plenitude of alienation is presented through the constitution of social capital 
as the subject even of the process of individual consumption, that the explicit point 
about abstractly free consciousness as the necessary form of reproduction of its 
alienated content is made. At the level of the commodity-form, the closest reference 
to this determination of free consciousness appears very briefly only in relation to its 
more concrete juridical expression at the beginning of Chapter 2. That is, it appears 
only in relation to commodity owners (as opposed to producers), in the context of the 
direct (hence conscious and voluntary) relation between two particular private 
individuals established in the process of exchange - the contract - through which the 
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general indirect (hence unconscious) relations of commodity production assert 
themselves 61 
In the Grundrisse, however, not only are the juridical forms of commodity production 
subject to a more detailed treatment but, in addition, Marx makes the point about this 
determination of free consciousness as the concrete form of the alienated 
consciousness without ambiguity. 
In present bourgeois society as a whole, this positing of prices and their 
circulation etc. appears as the surface process, beneath which, however, in the 
depths, entirely different processes go on, in which this apparent individual 
61 It is precisely those more concrete juridical expressions of free consciousness - the notion of 
personality - that recent contributions within Marxism have developed (Reuten and Williams 1989; 
Fine 2002) - in general on the basis of a critical appropriation of the pioneering work of Pashukanis 
(Pashukanis 1983). However, we think that the determination of free consciousness as the concrete 
form of the alienated consciousness already obtains at the more abstract level of the materiality of the 
organisation of the development of productive subjectivity. It is to this more abstract determination that 
we have been referring. As Marx puts it in the Grundrisse, the juridic concrete forms taken by the free 
productive subjectivity of the private working individual are just'this basis to a higher power': 
Therefore, when the economic form, exchange, posits the all-sided equality of its subjects, 
then the content, the individual as well as the objective material which drives towards the 
exchange, is freedom. Equality and freedom are thus not only respected in exchange based on 
exchange values but, also, the exchange of exchange values is the productive, real basis of all 
equality and freedom. As pure ideas they are merely the idealized expressions of this basis; as 
developed in juridical, political, social relations, they are merely this basis to a higher power 
(Marx 1993: 245). 
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equality and liberty disappear. It is forgotten, on one side, that the 
presupposition of exchange value, as the objective basis of the whole of the 
system of production, already in itself implies compulsion over the individual, 
since his immediate product is not a product for him, but only becomes such in 
the social process, and since it must take on this general but nevertheless 
external form; and that the individual has an existence only as a producer of 
exchange value, hence that the whole negation of his natural existence is 
already implied; that he is therefore entirely determined by society; that this 
further presupposes a division of labour etc., in which the individual is already 
posited in relations other than that of mere exchanger, etc. That therefore this 
presupposition by no means arises either out of the individual's will or out of 
the immediate nature of the individual, but that it is, rather, historical, and 
posits the individual as already determined by society. It is forgotten, on the 
other side, that these higher forms, in which exchange, or the relations of 
production which realize themselves in it, are now posited, do not by any 
means stand still in this simple form where the highest distinction which 
occurs is a formal and hence irrelevant one. What is overlooked, finally, is that 
already the simple forms of exchange value and of money latently contain the 
opposition between labour and capital etc (Marx 1993: 247: 8) 
In this passage Marx raises two critical points. First, against those who want to 
preserve the forms of freedom and equality which emerge out of the simple 
circulation of commodities without its transformation into a process of capitalist 
exploitation, he states that simple circulation is just the abstract form in which 
capital's valorisation process - hence the exploitation of labour - appears. This is the 
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part of Marx's critique of modern freedom and equality generally - and correctly - 
emphasised within Marxism, usually in debates over the derivation of the state-form 
(Blanke, Jürgens et al. 1978). But note that Marx develops another aspect of his 
critique, which is precisely the one we have been highlighting. Namely, that even at 
the level of abstraction of the commodity-form, the freedom of private individuals is 
revealed as the way in which they act as personifications of the social determinations 
of their commodities. Their free consciousness is the concrete form of subjectivity of 
their'existence only as a producer of exchange value'. 
Leaving exegetical questions aside, our discussion should have made clear that even if 
not explicitly addressed, the whole section of commodity-fetishism is but the 
exposition of the determinations of free productive consciousness as the form of an 
essentially alienated consciousness. In a sense, the question comes down to Marx not 
having mentioned that the production of value entails an individual who sees 
him/herself as free. In reality, one could argue that such a determination is just a self- 
evident aspect of the notion of independent production, since to be independent 
entails not to be subject to any relation of personal dependence - hence, the idea of 
self-determination of the individual. Thus all that was needed was to unfold the same 
determinations presented by Marx in the section on commodity fetishism but with an 
explicit focus on the way in which those private producers must see their 
consciousness and will in order to realise the determinations of their alienated social 
being. 
At any rate, the important point is not whether Marx said it or not but what are the 
implications of this discovery of the inner connection between freedom and alienation 
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in the capitalist mode of production for the determination of science as practical 
criticism and, on the other hand, what are the consequences of overlooking it. In the 
following section, we move to the discussion of these fundamental issues in order to 
show, once again, that only on the basis of the dialectical method can these questions 
be adequately dealt with. 
Why does method make a difference? The implications of Marx's analysis of the 
commodity-form for the determinations of revolutionary subjectivity 
The discussion in the previous section allows us to draw a first provisional conclusion 
about the differentia specifica of Marx's critique of political economy, as opposed to 
political economy or sociology (no matter how radical or `Marxist' in their political 
stance). Through the ideal reproduction of the determinations of capital, Marx 
discovers its historical specificity in the private form taken by social labour, this being 
the general social relation of production regulating the reproduction of human life and 
hence the development of human productive subjectivity. As an expression of this 
historical form of social being, the consciousness of the private and independent 
individual becomes concretely determined as alienated. This alienated consciousness 
acquires two concrete modes of existence: objectively, it takes the value-form of the 
product of labour thereby determined as a commodity; subjectively, it is realised 
through the apparently free consciousness of the modem individual. The most general 
defining characteristic of Marx's scientific enterprise as a critique of political 
economy consists precisely in the discovery of this two fold determination of social 
existence (hence social consciousness) in capitalist society. As the essential content of 
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dialectical knowledge of capitalist social forms, those discoveries can only be the 
result of its dialectical fonn. In order to illustrate this, let us first see the consequences 
of the attempt ideally to apprehend the determinations discussed above through the 
lenses of representational thought, i. e. through logic (whether formal or dialectical). 
In the case of formal logic, the question is very straightforward. Since it conceives of 
real forms as isolated immediate affirmations, freedom and alienation repel each other 
by definition. From this point of view, freedom is freedom, and alienation is 
alienation, there being no way that one could be the mode of existence of the other. If, 
as generally happens, it stops short at the more immediate appearances of bourgeois 
society, it falls prey to the illusion that the human individual is free by nature and that 
the `objective context' of capitalist social relations allows that freedom to express the 
plenitude of its potentialities. This has been the simplest element defining the 
apologetic character of bourgeois social science. This is perfectly compatible with the 
postulation of this or that external limitation to the affirmation of freedom engendered 
by the autonomised regulation of capitalist social relations. In this case, adequate 
social reform by the state is conceived as being capable of removing those constraints, 
thereby leading to a kind of capitalism with a `human face'. Still, formal logic has 
even made its incursions within Marxism. Rational Choice or Analytic Marxism is a 
case in point (Roemer 1986). 62 In this more radical version, this formal-logical 
representation could even find the constraints to the affirmation of freedom in whole 
`institutions' which they see as defining the capitalist mode of production itself. For 
instance, capitalist private property, which is seen as limiting freedom by leading to 
an unjust distribution of social wealth, resources and/or capabilities. Hence, defenders 
62 An excellent critique of Rational Choice Marxism can be found in Bensaid's recent book (2002). 
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of `market socialism' see the transcendence of capitalism as entailing the preservation 
of the freedom and independence inherent in the commodity-form, which they take as 
given as the natural form of productive subjectivity of human beings, but without the 
inequality springing from private property in the means of production. In other words, 
they put forward a political programme which postulates the oxymoron of wanting to 
preserve the commodity as the general social relation without its necessary 
development into capital. Here formal logic provides these Marxists with another 
service: the respective existences of the commodity-form and the capital-form are just 
immediate affirmations, so we can have one without having the other. 
This inability to grasp the real relation between freedom and alienation in capitalist 
society manifests itself in a more subtle way in the case of dialectical logic. The 
latter, we think, has been the way in which Marxism has been attempting to grasp the 
said relation between free consciousness and alienated consciousness, which can be 
seen as such an application of a dialectical logic. In this case, the issue is all the more 
relevant since it directly pertains to the central theoretico-practical question we have 
been tracing in this thesis, namely, the determinations of revolutionary subjectivity. In 
a nutshell, the question at stake is the following: if the general social relation 
regulating human life in the capitalist mode of production takes concrete form in a 
reified consciousness, how is the overcoming of alienation and consequent 
affirmation of human freedom possible? The question turns out to be posed in terms 
of the relation between the form of consciousness bound to reproduce its alienation 
and the one embodying the potentiality of its transcendence, i. e. revolutionary 
subjectivity. And here is where - more or less explicitly - dialectical logic comes into 
play. Sticking to the apparent external relation between free subjectivity and alienated 
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subjectivity in the capitalist mode of production, the consciousness of the subject of 
revolutionary transformation - the working class - is logically represented as the 
antagonistic unity of those opposing determinations (Inigo Carrera 2003: 222). What 
is more, the relation is not only grasped in an external fashion but becomes actually 
inverted. Hence, also falling prey to the appearance of 'free creative subjectivity' as 
the natural attribute of human beings, the dialectical-logical representation conceives 
of the latter as the essential pole of that relation which is contradicted by the 
coexistence of the reified pole, in turn seen as constituting the inessential or apparent 
side of that relation. Thus, working class consciousness is represented as the unity of 
an alienated pole ('false' or 'reified' consciousness) and a free one (the true class 
consciousness, corresponding to the essential being of the proletariat as the 'universal 
class'). In turn, each pole is assigned to a specific kind of action by workers so that 
some forms of working class action are conceived as being the affirmation of a false 
or reified consciousness whilst others - in particular, revolutionary action - is seen as 
the affirmation of the workers' essential freedom. The difference between the different 
currents arises by virtue of the precise way in which they conceptualise that unity of 
opposing yet immediate affirmations. 
Still, we think that despite their differences and distinct degrees of sophistication and 
depth, a common thread runs through most of those conceptions. And this is the 
idealist notion that, somehow or another, the revolutionary consciousness embodying 
the overcoming of alienation derives from something external to the alienated general 
social relation through which human beings reproduce their life in capitalist society. 
In other words, that the source of the power to abolish the capitalist mode of 
production is to be searched in the (smaller or larger) irreducible element of free, self- 
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determining productive subjectivity, eternally present in human life. It is the 
immediate affirmation of this abstract freedom that is seen as constituting the 
substance of the revolutionary abolition of alienated social existence. As Postone 
rightly points out, the underlying assumption of that train of thought is that 
`revolutionary consciousness must be rooted ontologically or transcendentally' 
(Postone 1996: 39). 63 
Now, where does this notion of self-determining free subjectivity, which constitutes 
for those Marxist currents the content of revolutionary subjectivity, come from? 
Certainly not from the imagination of the theorist. When seen more closely, we can 
realise that it is in fact the concrete form of the alienated consciousness abstracted 
from its content, transformed into its 'logical' opposite and, from that apparent 
exteriority, posited as the source of the revolutionary negation of alienated 
subjectivity. On the other hand, we can now appreciate how this is just the other side 
of the unilateral reading of Marx's critique of political economy (and especially, the 
section on commodity fetishism) solely as a genetic development of the forms of 
objectivity of capitalist society. Because according to this reading the fetishism of 
commodities refers only to the social constitution of an apparently self-subsistent 
objectivity which confronts individuals as an alien and hostile power that dominates 
them. In this way, it overlooks the concrete form of free consciousness that is the 
63 As an illustration of this, see the contributions to the symposium on Postone's `Time, Labor and 
Social Domination'. With the exception of Stoeltzer (2004) and Neary (2004), most authors explicitly 
distance themselves from the view that the subsumption of the working class to capital (hence 
alienation) is total and end up postulating a moment of human subjectivity external to its inverted mode 
of existence as the transcendental or ontological ground for revolutionary consciousness (Albritton 
2004; Arthur 2004b; Bonefeld 2004; Hudis 2004; McNally 2004). 
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necessary other side of the constitution of that alienated form of social objectivity. 
" 
Emancipation is then posed in terms of riddance by that apparently free consciousness 
of the external coercion imposed by those modes of social objectivity upon its self- 
determination. In other words, that one-sided reading aspires to get rid of the 
commodity, money, capital and the state precisely on the basis of the concrete form of 
the alienated consciousness which is the necessary complement of the existence of 
those forms of objectivity. 
As stated above, the critique of political economy is such not only for grasping in 
thought the inner determinations of the value-form of the product of labour as an 
alienated social form, but also for discovering free consciousness determined as the 
concrete form of alienated consciousness in the capitalist mode of production. By 
ignoring this second 'leg' of the critique of political economy, Marxism deprives the 
latter of its revolutionary character and condemns it to remain just another concrete 
form of the reproduction of alienated human activity. Thus, it thereby transforms the 
64 Some authors do develop and subject to criticism the notion of bourgeois individuality. But the latter 
is reduced to individualism, that is, to the atomistic affirmation of that abstractly free subjectivity. 
Hence, the collective, solidaristic affirmation of that very same subjectivity in the form of class 
struggle, is seen as the absolute opposite of alienated subjectivity (or, at least, as embodying the 
immediate potentiality to `self-develop' into such an absolute negation of bourgeois individuality). See, 
for instance, Shortall's derivation of a `counter-dialectic of class struggle' - i. e. `the potential class 
subjectivity of the working class' - that `comes to delimit the functioning of the dialectic of capital', 
and whose foundation resides in the presupposition of the worker `as both a free subject and as non- 
capital' (Shortall 1994: 128-9, author's emphasis). By contrast, we shall show in the next chapter that 
the solidaristic affirmation of that abstractly free subjectivity is but a more concrete realisation of the 
very same alienated content, hence, of the reproduction of capital. 
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critique of political economy from the revolutionary reproduction of the concrete by 
means of thought into another logical representation. 
Further implications: on the practical nature of defetishising critique 
Another methodological issue implicit in the above discussion is the precise nature of 
the method of critique involved in Marx's account of commodity fetishism. 
Associated with the aformentioned one-sided reading of commodity fetishism as an 
account of genesis of the most general forms of objectivity of capitalist society is 
what we can term a Feuerbachian understanding of Marx's mature method of critique, 
i. e. a kind of transformative criticism. Even in its most sophisticated versions this 
critique boils down to demystifying commodity-fetishism by tracing the human 
origins of that alien objectivity. In this sense, there appears to be no difference 
between this method of critique and the one in the Paris Manuscripts. The only 
difference would be that in Capital Marx not only reduces alienated social forms to 
their human content but also answers the question of why that content takes that 
fetishistic form. But the thrust of the critique is seen to consist just in uncovering the 
practical activity of human beings as the social foundation of value. But if the point is 
to change the world, then the subsequent problem is how to turn this insight into 
practical criticism, that is, how to convert it into emancipating conscious practice. 
And here lies the crux of the matter. Because for these readings that connection seems 
to be as follows: the recognition of relations between human beings behind relations 
between things constitutes the foundation of radical transformative action. Since the 
content of the value-form is our conscious practice, i. e. the 'determining power of 
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social labour', then it follows that we must have the power of giving our practice 
another social form and getting rid of the value-form. In other words, the 
transformative powers of our action are not located in commodity-determined practice 
itself but in the essential character of an abstract material content deprived of social 
determinations which is 'logically' prior to its perverted existence as value-producing. 
For those readings, this mere discovery of the human content of 'economic categories' 
suffices consciously to organise the practical critique of capitalism (Bonefeld 1995; 
Holloway 1995; 2002a). 
According to our own approach, the question must be posed differently. The starting 
point of a truly dialectical critique of political economy must be our own conscious 
practice. Science as practical criticism is such for being the conscious organisation of 
our transformative action. Thus, the question we are investigating when engaged in 
dialectical research is the social determinations, i. e. the necessity, of our action (Inigo 
Carrera 1992: 1). 65 Only on that basis can we come to know what concrete form our 
action should take in order to achieve the willed transformation of the world. As 
Lukäcs puts it in History and Class Consciousness, the question at stake is the 
establishment of the `genuine and necessary bond between consciousness and action' 
66 (1971: 2). 
65 On the relation between dialectics and socialist politics see also the suggestive discussion provided 
by Eldred (1981). 
66 As I have argued elsewhere (Starosta 2003), although Lukäcs correctly posed the problem of 
dialectical knowledge as practical criticism, he eventually failed in establishing that link between 
consciousness and action. This failure lies behind his relapse into the Leninst separation between 
scientific organisation and execution proper in the political action of the working class (Starosta 2003: 
57-8). 
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Our own reconstruction of Marx's dialectical investigation of the determinations of 
the commodity-form (commodity-fetishism included) thus leads to different 
conclusions regarding the social determinations of our revolutionary action. True 
enough, in this process of cognition we become aware of the human content of the 
objective powers borne by the commodity. However, what follows from this insight is 
not that we therefore immediately carry the power to negate the commodity-form of 
our general social relation. Rather, it follows that whatever power we might have 
radically to transform the world, must be a concrete form of the commodity itself. 
And yet far from revealing the existence of that transformative power, the abstract 
determinations of social existence contained in the commodity-form show no 
potentiality other than the reproduction of that alienated social form. So much so that 
the free association of individuals (the determinate negation of capitalism) appears in 
Chapter 1 (incidentally, precisely in the section on fetishism) as the abstract opposite 
of value-producing labour and hence, as the extrinsic product of the imagination of 
the subject engaged in that process of cognition. Thus, Marx starts that passage 
referring to communism by saying 'let us finally imagine... ' (Marx 1976a: 171, our 
emphasis). 
Thus, the defetishing critique of revolutionary science does not consist in discovering 
the constituting power of a generic free human practice as the negated content of 
capitalist alienated forms, the former being the ground for our revolutionary 
transformation of the world. Rather, it involves the production of the self-awareness 
that the reproduction of human life in all of its moments - including our 
transfonnative action - takes in capitalism an alienated form. The immediate result of 
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the demystifying critique of the fetishism of commodities is to become conscious of 
our own alienation. This is our general social being and there is no exteriority to 
it. 
This means that fetishism is total which, in turn, means the social powers of our 
transformative action are borne by the product of labour. In this sense, the critique of 
commodity fetishism is only the first step in the discovery of whatever transformative 
powers we could develop in that alienated form. 
To put it differently, the objective reality of the inversion characterising the 
commodity-form of social relations implies that the most general determination of our 
transformative action is not to be the abstract negation of value-producing productive 
practice (private labour) but its concrete form. Hence, -we need to discover the 
necessity of revolutionary action to be immanent in the concrete development of the 
commodity-form and not outside it. Revolutionary action must personify a concrete 
determination of value-producing human practice. A necessity, however, whose 
realisation precisely consists in the abolition of value production itself. 
If the reproduction of the concrete in thought shows that the determinations immanent 
in the commodity-form do not carry, in their simplicity, the necessity of transcending 
value-production, the search for the latter must move forward unfolding the 
subsequent concrete forms in which the former develop. That is, our process of 
cognition still needs to go through more mediations in order to become fully aware of 
the necessity of our action in the totality of its determinations, that is, beyond any 
appearance presented by it. In order to develop the plenitude of its potentiality this 
conscious development must reach a concrete form of our alienated social being 
which embodies a determinate potentiality whose realisation: a) entails the abolition 
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of alienated labour itself and; b) has our transformative action as its necessary 
concrete form. 
The analysis of the commodity-form is thereby but the first step in the broader process 
of dialectical cognition through which the subject of revolutionary transformation 
discovers the alienated character of its social being and, consequently, of its 
consciousness and will (including its transformative will). However, when developed 
in its totality this process also produces the awareness of the historical powers 
developed in this alienated form and, consequently, of the revolutionary action that, as 
personifications of 'economic categories', the emancipatory subject needs to 
undertake. This is not the awareness of the external circumstances or objective 
conditions of a self-determining action. It is the awareness of the inner determinations 
of our alienated transformative action. Thus, dialectical social science does not look 
outside our action but, in penetrating its immediate appearances, goes right 'inside' it. 
In this way, the field of human practice is never abandoned. Only by virtue of its 
dialectical form, the critique of political economy becomes determined as the fully 
conscious organisation of human practice in the capitalist mode of production and, 
hence, as the revolutionary science of the working class. 
Thus far, however, our critical reading of Marx's Capital has shown no sign of 
providing us with the consciousness of the concrete determinations of our radical 
transformative action. In fact, all references to the working class as the revolutionary 
subject were, strictly speaking, completely extrinsic to the determinations we had 
before us. Therefore, in the next chapter we jump ahead in Marx's dialectical 
presentation right into heart of the determinations of social existence taking the form 
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of the class struggle, in order to see the extent to which they shed light on the 
necessity of revolutionary action. 
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Chapter 5. Capital accumulation and class struggle: On the form and 
content of social reproduction in its alienated form 
Introduction 
In the previous chapter we have critically reconstructed Marx's presentation of the 
determinations of the commodity-form and shown the fundamental importance of his 
dialectical method for a proper understanding of those first steps in the critique of 
political economy. We have also discussed the implications of such an understanding 
for the translation of those initial insights into the conscious organisation of the 
practical abolition of the alienation inherent in the commodity-form of social 
relations. Thus, we concluded that, although those first steps already revealed to us 
the alienated nature of our social existence (hence of our consciousness), they 
provided no answer to the question about all the social determinations behind our 
radical transformative action, i. e. about revolutionary subjectivity. The very idea of a 
revolutionary subject, or even of social life taking the form of a political action, was 
completely extrinsic to the determinations we had before us. The reproduction of the 
concrete by means of thought thereby still needs to advance towards more concrete 
determinations of the real in order to account for the necessity of the practical 
abolition of alienated social life. 
The main aim of this chapter is, therefore, to move forward in the critical 
reconstruction of Marx's critique of political economy up to the point at which, for the 
202 
first time in his presentation, he shows capitalist social existence as taking concrete 
form in an antagonistic political relation between classes. In other words, we shall 
discuss Marx's presentation of the specific determinations of the class struggle in 
capitalist society. Again, the discussion will be carried out in a methodologically- 
minded fashion so as to highlight the intrinsic connection between the specific form 
of Marx's scientific argument and its revolutionary content as practical criticism. We 
argue that, for Marx, the class struggle is a necessary concrete form in which the 
accumulation of capital realises its determinations. More concretely, the class struggle 
is the most general direct social relation through which the indirect relations of 
capitalist production assert themselves. This real relation is not grounded in the 
abstract general principles of structuralist methodology. Rather, it is the necessary 
expression of the development of the historically-specific alienation inherent in the 
commodity-form into its more concrete social form of capital. In other words, that 
real relation expresses the fact that, as an expression of an alienated social existence, 
social capital becomes determined as the concrete subject of the movement of modern 
society. This, we think, is the fundamental discovery of Marx's critique of political 
economy which, in turn, allowed him to find the determinations of revolutionary class 
struggle immanent in the historical movement of alienation itself. Moreover, we shall 
see that only on the basis of the unfolding of that determination is it possible to 
understand the limited transformative powers of the class struggle as a form of the 
reproduction of capital, its specific revolutionary powers behind its determination as 
the form of the latter's abolition and, finally, the mediation between the two. 
In order fully to understand these determinations of the class struggle in capitalist 
society, it is evidently necessary to unfold the more abstract social forms which the 
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latter presupposes. The following section, then, briefly reconstructs Marx's dialectical 
presentation of the determinations of capitalist social relations whose realisation leads 
to the constitution of the class struggle as a social form. 
Capital: the materialised social relation that takes possession of the species- 
powers of humanity 
Capital as the subject of the circulation process 
The point of departure of Marx's derivation of the capital-form is the result of the 
circulation of commodities, namely: money. As already mentioned, the circulation of 
commodities and its development engenders money in its functional determinations. 
The question arises, then, as to why it is necessary to start the exposition of capital 
with the money-form. Basically, because Marx, as in the analysis of the commodity, 
starts the analysis of capital with an immediate observation, i. e. with capital `as it 
appears at first sight'. On a formal level, this point of departure reflects Marx's 
structuring principle of the different chapters around presentational nodes, with the 
capital-form constituting a new stage in an exposition which, again, takes the 
immediate appearance of the social form at stake as starting point. And in its simplest 
manifestation capital presents itself as money. What needs to be investigated is, 
therefore, the specific nature of money as capital in contradistinction to money simply 
as such. Through this investigation, Marx presents the analytic moment of the 
exposition. 
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All that our immediate consciousness can tell us about this specificity is that it resides 
in the fore: of its circulation. Whereas the circulation of money as means of 
circulation can be represented with the form `C -M-C, the transformation of 
commodities into money and the re-conversion of money into commodities: selling in 
order to buy', money that is transformed into capital circulates in the form of `M -C 
- M, the transformation of money into commodities, and the re-conversion of 
commodities into money: buying in order to sell' (Marx 1976a: 247-8). However, 
behind these two distinct forms of circulation a difference of content lies hidden. In 
the case of the simple circulation of money within the framework of the circulation of 
commodities, the content of the process is given by satisfaction of needs, that is, by 
individual consumption. In other words, the use-value of the commodity is what 
constitutes the immediate object of the circuit. In this sense, the aim of the cycle is 
external to the process itself. In the other case, on the contrary, the circuit `proceeds 
from the extreme of money and finally returns to the same extreme. Its driving and 
motivating force, its determining purpose, is therefore exchange-value' (Marx 1976a: 
250). This has a two-fold consequence. In the first place, insofar as both extremes of 
the cycle M-C-M are identical this process simply as such is meaningless. 
Consequently, the extremes must be distinguished from each other in order to acquire 
rationality. Inasmuch as they are qualitatively identical, the only possible difference 
(and hence, that which must become the aim of the process), is the quantitative 
increase. Thus, the adequate form of this process of circulation must necessarily be M 
-C- M', where the initial sum of money (value in its concrete form of appearance) 
produces through its movement a larger amount of value, that is, a surplus-value. 
Money which circulates according to this form becomes determined as capital. 
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Secondly, and in contradistinction to what happens in the circuit C-M-C, the aim 
of the process is not external to it. The motive force - i. e. the valorisation of value - 
is 
internal to the process, it derives from the movement of circulation itself. Once the 
circulation of money as capital is complete, we return to the same point of departure: 
a quantitatively limited sum of money. And if the latter is to act as capital it must be 
thrown back into circulation. This means that the process of valorisation of value 
carries within itself the necessity of its own renewal, giving the process the character 
of being fonnally boundless. 
We started with the circulation of capital as it appears in its immediacy and found the 
production of surplus-value to be its content. The following point that needs to be 
accounted for is the source of the necessity of that movement. In other words, the 
phase of analysis still needs to go on in order to discover what sets into motion this 
process of multiplication of surplus-value. As with the analysis of the commodity, 
Marx presents his argument by first looking at apparent paths that the dialectical 
analysis could follow. Thus, it might seem that this process originates in the abstractly 
free activity of the possessor of money. However, as already shown by the analysis of 
commodity-fetishism, through their free conscious and voluntary action the owners of 
commodities cannot but act as personification of the social powers inherent in their 
commodities. Inasmuch as he/she is an alienated human being, the capitalist only 
realises through his apparently free action the immediate necessity of his/her capital. 
The movement of value, although mediated by the subjectivity of the capitalist, is not 
grounded in his/her consciousness and will. Thus, Marx discovers that the necessity of 
the process of circulation of money as capital comes from the automatic movement of 
value itself (Marx 1976a: 255). In becoming capital, value - the materialised social 
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relation of the private and independent individuals - turns into the concrete subject of 
the process of circulation of social wealth. 67 In turn, the commodity and money, the 
particular and the general mode of existence of mercantile wealth, become determined 
as transitory forms which value takes in its process of self-expansion. As Marx states, 
(... ) value is here the subject of a process in which, while constantly assuming 
the form in turn of money and commodities, it changes its own magnitude, 
throws off surplus-value from itself considered as original value, and thus 
valorises itself independently. For the movement in the course of which it adds 
surplus-value is its own movement, its valorisation is therefore self- 
valorisation [Selbstverwertung] (ibid., p. 255). 
The alienation of the human individual thus reaches a new stage. It is not only about a 
process of social production mediated by the value-form of the product. Not even 
about one that simply has value as the direct object of the process of exchange. The 
objectified abstract labour represented as the exchangeability of commodities has 
taken possession of the potencies of the process of circulation of social wealth itself. 
This moment of the human life-process is turned into an attribute of the life-cycle of 
capital which has the production of more of itself, i. e. its quantitative increase, as its 
only general qualitative determination. This is where the formal specificity of capital 
as an indirect, hence materialised, social relation resides. Thus, the production of 
human life has ceased to be the content of the movement of social reproduction and is 
67 Robles Bäez (1992) provides a useful discussion of these mediations involved in the constitution of 
capital as subject. 
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the unconscious outcome of the production of surplus-value, that is, of the only 
(alienated) content presiding the movement of modem society. 68 
Having discovered the generic essential determination of capital as self-valorising 
value, Marx's exposition turns to follow the concrete form in which this content, i. e. 
the production of surplus-value, is realised. The analytic phase of the exposition 
thereby gives way to the synthetic stage, which consists in positively unfolding by 
means of thought the previously discovered self-movement of capital as the alienated 
subject of that process. 
As the dominant subject [übergreifendes Subjekt] of this process, in which it 
alternately assumes and loses the form of money and the form of commodities, 
but preserves and expands itself through all these changes, value requires 
above all an independent form by means of which its identity with itself may 
be asserted (... ) Value therefore now becomes value in process, money in 
process, and, as such, capital. It comes out of circulation, enters into it again, 
preserves and multiplies itself within circulation, emerges from it with an 
increased size, and starts the cycle again and again (Marx 1976a: 255-6) 
At this point, the exposition faces a contradiction: the determinations developed thus 
far are revealed to be impotent to account by themselves for this process of 
multiplication of value. The law that governs the movement of the sphere of 
circulation - that is, the exchange of equivalents - is incapable of explaining the 
generation of a surplus-value. As Clarke (1991a: 114) succinctly puts it, this process 
68 The emphasis on `only' will become clear in the discussion below. 
I 
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cannot take place within exchange, at least as so far developed, because 
exchange does not create value, it merely changes its form. It is certainly the 
case that unequal exchanges could take place, but such exchanges could not 
yield a surplus value, they can only redistribute a portion of an existing sum of 
value as gains and losses balanced out. 
Although having circulation as its point of departure and hence, with this sphere as 
one of its moments, the process of value's self-expansion pushes beyond circulation 
itself. The movement of capital shows the necessity to find within the circulation of 
commodities a commodity whose use-value for capital is to produce more value than 
it costs. The existence of the doubly free worker provides capital with this 
requirement. As an independent human being, this worker can freely dispose of 
his/her individual productive powers. However, insofar as he/she is deprived of the 
objective conditions in which to externalise his/her free subjectivity, he/she must give 
his/her labour-power the form of a commodity to be sold in the market to the 
immediate personification of capital. 
What are the determinations of the commodity in its concrete form of the labour- 
power of the doubly free worker? As any other commodity, labour-power is a unity of 
value and use-value. The former is thus determined by the socially necessary labour 
time required for the production of this commodity which, in this particular case, 
resolves itself into the production of the means of subsistence necessary to reproduce 
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the physical and mental powers of the labourer. 69 The latter is nothing else than the 
actualisation of the productive capacities of the worker, i. e. labour. As stated above, it 
is through the appropriation of the use-value of this peculiar commodity that capital is 
able to valorise itself. The exposition must therefore develop the determinations of the 
process of consumption of labour-power which occurs `outside the market' (Marx 
1976a: 279). In this way, we will see in the next section how capital not only becomes 
69 At this stage of the exposition, the `historical and moral' component of the value of labour-power is 
an external presupposition to the movement of capital. Under these circumstances, that component 
expresses the conditions inherited from pre-capitalist social relations underlying the history of the 
genesis of each national fragment of the global working class, that is, the 'general level of civilisation' 
attained in a particular place at a particular time. This, we think, is the general determination 
underlying E. P. Thompson's historical study of the `moral economy' (Thompson 1971). A complete 
investigation of the value of labour-power, however, should include the internalisation of that 
`historical and moral' component as a moment of the expanded reproduction of capital. Now, although 
some elements for this investigation are scattered throughout Capital, Marx did not actually dealt in 
any systematic fashion with the qualitative and quantitative determinations of the consumption of the 
working class. We think that such an investigation would need to search for the content of those 
determinations in the historically-changing forms of productive subjectivity of the differentiated organs 
of the collective labourer, in turn resulting from the material forms of the production of relative 
surplus-value. Also, it would need to trace the way in which capital's relentless search for surplus- 
value leads to the creation of new needs. If we leave aside the limitations stemming from its 
structuralist method, the founding work of the French Regulation School by Michel Aglietta on the 
historically changing `norms of consumption' provides rich empirical material to track down the 
relation between value of labour-power and the material forms of the production of surplus-value 
(Aglietta 1979). For a thorough critical assessment of Aglietta's book, see Clarke (1991b). Subsequent 
work coming from that school managed to trivialise whatever interesting insights could be found in 
Aglietta's original contribution. See, for instance, the general synthesis offered by Boyer (1990). 
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the subject of the process of circulation of social wealth but also turns into the subject 
of the immediate process of production. 
Capital as the subject of the immediate process of production 
In order to valorise itself, then, capital has to take possession of the potencies of the 
human labour-process. Through the movement of material production that at the same 
time produces the reified general social relation - value - capital is able to carry out its 
real valorisation, which, before this point, was actually only potential. At this stage of 
the presentation, in which capital takes the materiality of the labour-process as a given 
presupposition (the fonnal subsumption of labour in capital), the only possibility to 
actualise capital's valorisation is to expand the amount of labour-power productively 
consumed by extending the working-day of the labourer beyond the hours of labour 
socially necessary to reproduce the value of labour-power (which therefore becomes 
determined as necessary labour). Thus, the secret of the immediate source of surplus- 
value is revealed: its origin lies in the surplus-labour that the labourers perform under 
the control of the capitalist to whom they freely sold their labour-power at its value. 
Consequently, this surplus-value becomes materialised in the product of labour which 
takes the form of the rightful private property of the capitalist. In other words, the 
valorisation of capital takes concrete form through the exploitation of the productive 
powers of living labour. In this way, it determines the production of use-values in the 
commodity-form as a concrete form of the production of surplus-value. From now on, 
the labour process becomes determined as the material bearer of the process of value's 
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self-valorisation. In this unity, the immediate process of production becomes a process 
of production of capital. 
Although capital is essentially determined to be indifferent to any qualitative 
distinction other than the production of its quantitative increase, its material 
embodiment in the labour process produces its qualitative differentiation. It is clear 
that the production of use-values through which the production of surplus-value takes 
place, necessarily involves the organic unity of labour-power and means of production 
in order to put the labour process into motion. However, the only portion of capital 
able to change its magnitude is the one that is materialised in labour-power, which 
thus becomes determined as variable capital. The portion materialised in the form of 
means of production lacks this capacity and hence negates the essential determination 
of capital of being an inherently variable magnitude. The value of the means of 
production is transferred by living labour to the product and just reappears in the same 
magnitude. Capital is thus negated simply as such to affirm itself as constant capital 
which, however, constitutes a necessary condition for the affirmation of its power of 
self-valorisation. In short, the valorisation of capital can only take concrete form 
through its differentiation between variable and constant capital. 
Valorisation of capital and class struggle 
The differentiation of the total capital advanced into constant and variable capital 
reveals to us that, on condition that a part of capital does take the concrete shape of 
means of production in the right proportion, the actual change of magnitude in which 
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the valorisation process consists immediately springs from the part of capital 
materialised in the form of labour-power. The inner measure of the degree in which 
capital self-valorises thus becomes determined by the ratio of the surplus-value 
produced to the variable capital (Marx 1976a: 324). This is what Marx terms the rate 
of surplus-value. From the perspective of its material content, the rate of surplus-value 
expresses in a specifically capitalist form the relation between surplus labour and 
necessary labour. The latter is the part of the working day necessary to produce the 
means of consumption which allow the reproduction of the labour-power of the 
workers. The former is constituted by the labour expended during the part of the 
working-day which goes beyond the labour-time necessary for the reproduction of 
labour power. 
With the determinations unfolded thus far, the value of labour-power - hence the 
magnitude of variable capital - is a given quantity for capital's process of valorisation 
(Marx 1976a: 340). In effect, with the productive subjectivity of the wage-labourer 
and the material forms of the objective conditions of the process of production as an 
external presupposition, the means of subsistence which enter into the consumption 
bundle of the labourer and the productivity of labour constitute a given condition for 
capital's production of surplus-value. Thus, if we look at the circuit of capital's 
valorisation in its purity - i. e. assuming that the law of equivalence regulates exchange 
- the value of labour-power appears to constitute an external limit to the realisation of 
capital's essential determination as self-expanding value. Under these circumstances, 
the degree of capital's valorisation depends on the length of the working day, which, 
unlike the value of labour-power, appears in its immediacy to be a variable quantity 
with no inherent limit to its extension apart from the absolute one constituted by the 
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24 hours of the day. However, this appearance vanishes as soon as we consider the 
materiality of the process of consumption of labour-power; the physical 
determinations of the expenditure of labour-power already pose a limit to the 
prolongation of the working day. In addition, the very reproduction of labour-power 
in the conditions determined by what Marx calls 'the general level of civilisation' - 
and, which, again, are external to capital at this stage of the presentation - requires 
that a part of the day is spent on the satisfaction of the 'intellectual and social 
requirements' of the labourer. 
It is only at this juncture that Marx, for the first time in the dialectical exposition of 
the critique of political economy, shows the necessity of the class struggle as a 
capitalist social form. In Marx's exposition, the class struggle is presented only as the 
necessary concrete form in which the physical and social limits to the extension of the 
working day are set. However, a closer scrutiny of Chapter 10 of Capital makes clear 
that its essential simplest determination is actually more general: the historically- 
specific determination of the class struggle in the capitalist mode of production 
consists in being the necessary concrete form of the buying/selling of the commodity 
labour-power at its value. 
In order to appreciate this it is fundamental to highlight an aspect of Marx's 
presentation which could otherwise appear as capricious and extrinsic to the concrete 
determinations we had before us, namely: the calculation of the daily value of labour- 
power, which is the one that ensures the reproduction of labour-power throughout the 
whole of a worker's working life (Marx 1976a: 343). What Marx intends to show by 
means of that calculation is that the excessive prolongation of the working day 
214 
actually involves the payment of labour-power below its value. 0 Hence, the resistance 
to that extension in the productive consumption of labour-power beyond a socially- 
determined 'normality' is only a concrete manifestation of the broader question about 
the realisation of the full value of labour-power. This is illustrated by Marx through 
the words of that fictional average wage-worker who, in giving the reasons for his 
refusal to let the capitalist impose his/her will on the determination of the length of the 
working day, claims: 'I demand a normal working day because, like every other seller, 
I demand the value of my commodity' (Marx 1976a: 343). 
The above quote has crucial implications. Because it shows without ambiguity that, in 
opposition to the claims of many contemporary Marxists, for Marx the social 
determination of the class struggle is not to be the antagonism between two different 
and irreconcilable principles of organisation of social life: the valorisation of capital 
and the production for human needs, or the 'logic of abstract labour' and the 'logic of 
concrete labour'. In this sense, the resistance of workers to the extraction of surplus- 
value does not immediately express (however 'contradictorily') the absolute opposite 
of the general social relation through which they reproduce their lives, namely, the 
70 The other side of this coin, which Marx did not seem explicitly to note, is that the value of labour 
power is not independent of the length of the working day. 
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valorisation of capital7' On the contrary, we think that Marx's analysis of the length 
of the working day in chapter 10 of Capital implies exactly the opposite: it presents 
the struggle of workers as a concrete form of the movement of alienated social life as 
any other form of their life-activity. In other words, though clearly an 'endemic' reality 
of the capitalist mode of production, the class struggle is not ontologically but socially 
constitutive of capitalism, since capitalist and worker, as owners of commodities (not 
as embodiments of ontologically different principles of social reproduction), personify 
71 For instance, the 'recalcitrance of use-value' (Arthur 2001b) to the pure dialectic of the value-form, 
'a world of pure form empty of content' (Arthur 2001a: 33). One could argue that the essentials of this 
train of thought can be found, in different guises, in various traditions of unorthodox Marxism. See, 
among others, Cleaver (1979; 1992), Albritton (2003), Radical Chains Collective (1993), Kay and Mott 
(1982), Dunayevskaya (1988), Dinerstein (2002). The difference between these alternative versions 
resides in the specific determination in which they locate this radical 'otherness' to capital which sets 
into motion its abolition. What they all seem to have in common is the view that the revolutionary 
negation of capital is not an alienated necessity of the accumulation of capital itself, engendered by the 
latter's own historical movement, instead of being its abstract negation. And notice that we mean this 
in the profoundest 'dialectical' sense of intrinsic connection. That is, not just in the banal sense that the 
revolutionary action is 'produced' by capital because the proletariat 'reacts' to the miserable or inhuman 
conditions to which capital condemns it. Thus posed, the relation is completely external. The question 
is: which concrete historical potentiality of the valorisation of capital - the only present-day general 
social relation - carries within itself, as its only form of realisation, the necessity of its own annihilation 
through the revolutionary action of the working class? At the other extreme of those 'ontologisations' 
of the class struggle lies its 'biologisation' by Kautsky, for whom the class struggle was simply a 
human instance of the natural struggle for survival characterising the relation among species (Kautsky 
1978: 201). 
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social determinations of the process of valorisation of capital whose realisation is 
antagonistic. 72 Let us return to Marx's text in order to substantiate this point. 
Marx's starting point in his presentation of the determinations of the class struggle 
over the length of the working day is the individual direct relationship between 
capitalist and worker, whose antagonistic character, far from constituting the abstract 
negation of the indirect social relations regulating the circulation of commodities, 
springs from the realisation of those laws themselves. The capitalist, acting as the 
personification of the necessity of his/her capital, wants to extend the length of the 
working day as much as possible. As a rightful buyer of commodities, he wants daily 
to extract as much use-value as possible from the commodities he/she buys (Marx 
1976a: 342); among them, the labour-power of the wage-labourer. Actually he/she is 
forced to do so by the competition from other individual capitals that mediates his/her 
determination as personification of the most immediate necessity of capital: the 
production of surplus-value (Marx 1976a: 381). The worker wants to limit that daily 
extraction. Actually he/she is compelled to do so if he/she wants to preserve his/her 
productive attributes in the conditions needed to be able to sell his/her labour power in 
the future. In other words, if he/she wants to get paid the full value of the latter 
throughout the course of his/her productive life-time. As we have seen, the struggle of 
72 It could be argued, as Shortall (1994: chapter 5) - building on insights originally developed by Negri 
in Marx Beyond Marx (Negri 1991) - and Lebowitz (2003) do, that our reading of Marx's presentation 
of the class struggle in Capital is perfectly accurate but only because Marx's account itself is one-sided 
and/or incomplete, leaving the struggles of wage-labourers which go beyond their determination as 
`variable capital' out of the picture. Although these authors also give the class struggle an ontological 
foundation, they differ from those referred to above in that they recognise that was not Marx's 
formulation, although it should have been. 
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the worker over the length of the working day is actually a concrete manifestation of 
the struggle over the realisation in full of the value of labour-power. 
73 
Thus, Marx concludes, the very operation of the indirect laws of commodity exchange 
leads to equally rightful but antagonistic stands on the length of the working. The 
resolution of this antinomy makes the valorisation of capital take the concrete form of 
a direct social relation of force: 
There is here therefore an antinomy, of right against right, both equally 
bearing the seal of the law of exchange. Between equal rights, force decides. 
Hence, in the history of capitalist production, the establishment of a norm for 
the working day presents itself as a struggle over the limits of that day, a 
struggle between collective capital, i. e. the class of capitalists, and collective 
labour, i. e. the working class. (Marx 1976a: 344) 
The point to note here is that although Marx claims that that direct social relation is 
actually a class relation, the determinations unfolded thus far do not show any 
necessity for such transition from the individual antagonism between capitalist and 
worker to its constitution as class struggle. In reality, that observation is at this stage 
of an external character, an anticipation of the actual presentation of the 
determinations of the valorisation process that make it take the form of an antagonism 
73 Hence, we can see now that every circumstance affecting the reproduction of labour-power - such as 
the intensity of labour, the wage, health and safety of working conditions, and so on - is a concrete 
expression of the question of the buying/selling of labour power at its full value. 
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between social classes. This presentation of the essential determinations of the class 
struggle Marx unfolds through a very long 'historical sketch' of the particular forms 
through which the former acquired concrete existence. Here, we shall concentrate on 
the general aspects of the determinations at stake, that is, we shall attempt to capture 
from Marx's account the contradictory tendencies of capital's valorisation process as 
such without reference to the concrete forms taken in the history of England as 
described by him. 4 
Marx organises his exposition by sketching out the way in which opposing tendencies 
regarding the length of the working day asserted themselves in the course of the 
movement of the history of the capitalist mode of production. Initially, he shows, a 
tendency to the brutal extension of the working day, which overstepped all traditional 
limits inherited from pre-capitalist social forms, made its way through history. In 
its 
general determination, this roughly corresponds to unchecked imposition of the will 
of the immediate personifications of capital in their voracious search for the utmost 
valorisation of their individual capitals, before 'the working class, stunned at first by 
74 Marx himself concisely presents the general determination at stake 'in its purity' - i. e. without 
its 
particular realisation in the course of the history of capital accumulation in England - in the preparatory 
Manuscripts of 1861-63 (Marx 1988: 180-5). On the dialectical-methodological significance of the 
notion 'historical sketch' see the seminal contribution by Müller and Neusüss to the so-called 'German 
State-Derivation Debate' (Müller and Neusüss 1975). In that text these authors highlight very well the 
need for concrete empirical study to see how the general determinations of capital accumulation unfold 
in the course of history in order to avoid the twin shortcomings of both an unmediated 'application! of 
the latter which would lead to a 'dogmatic history, ' and the abstract empiricism of sociology and 
political science. More generally, Müller and Neusüss's reconstruction of Marx's argument in the 
chapter on the working-day is still one of the best accounts to date. 
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the noise and turmoil of the new system of production, had recovered its senses to 
some extent' and 'began to offer resistance' (Marx 1976a: 390). In other words, the 
realisation of that tendency in its purity manifests the determinations of the 
valorisation process as they take shape without the constitution of the sellers of labour 
power as a class, i. e. through the individual antagonistic relationship they establish 
with the buyers of the only commodity they own, as discussed above. Under these 
circumstances, the respective power of buyer and seller of labour power is 
systematically biased towards the capitalist. Thus, if between equal rights, force 
decides, there will be a systematic tendency for the immediate personifications of 
capital to impose their will regarding the duration of the working day. Which means, 
as we have seen, the strife for 'the full 24 hours, with the deduction of the few hours 
of rest without which labour-power is absolutely incapable of renewing its services' 
(Marx 1976a: 375). Whilst the capitalist could survive without buying the labour- 
power of any particular labourer, the latter faces the sale of his/her labour power, 
which is his/her only general social relation, as an immediate necessity. Thus, in the 
desperate attempt to establish his/her general social relation, the worker faces the 
competition of other individuals who can only personify the commodity-form of their 
labour-power. Although at this stage it cannot be but an external reflection, Marx 
points out that even immediate observation suffices to see how the very movement of 
the alienated regulation of social life engenders the existence of a surplus population 
relative to the needs of capital's valorisation process, thus making evident that not all 
workers will be able to sell their labour-power and thereby placing them in a relation 
of exacerbated competition. Hence the capitalist knows that he/she will always find a 
worker willing to sell his/her labour-power, however long the working day might be: 
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What experience generally shows to the capitalist is a constant excess of 
population, i. e., an excess to capital's need for valorization at a given moment, 
although this throng of people is made up of generations of stunned, short- 
lived, and rapidly replaced human beings, plucked, so to speak, before they 
were ripe (Marx 1976a: 380). 
Marx then goes on to show the consequences of the pure operation of this tendency 
for the lengthening of the working day when the fixation of its limits is left to the 
unilateral action of the immediate personifications of capital, namely: the 
impossibility of workers to reproduce their labour-power in the very conditions that 
the valorisation of capital demands from them, which means, sooner or later, the 
impossibility of reproducing labour-power as such. 
By extending the working day, therefore, capitalist production, which is 
essentially the production of surplus-value, the absorption of surplus labour, 
not only produces a deterioration of human labour-power by robbing it of its 
normal moral and physical conditions of development and activity, but also 
produces the premature exhaustion and death of this labour-power itself (Marx 
1976a: 376). 
More generally, this implies that, when considered at the level of the individual 
antagonistic relationship between capitalist and worker, the valorisation of capital 
inevitably leads to a tendency for labour-power to be sold systematically below its 
value. However appealing this might be to the voracious appetite for an extra surplus- 
value of the individual capital, this immediate necessity goes against the mediated 
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necessity of the reproduction of the valorisation of capital as such to prevent the 
productive attributes of labour-power - the one and only direct source of surplus- 
value, hence of self-expansion - from exhaustion. Marx points this out by looking at 
this same phenomenon from another angle, i. e. by commenting on what would happen 
if labour power was sold at its value but for an unnaturally prolonged working day: 
If then the unnatural extension of the working day (... ) shortens the life of the 
individual worker, and therefore the duration of his labour-power, the forces 
used up have to be replaced more rapidly, and it will be more expensive to 
reproduce labour-power (... ) It would seem, therefore, that the interest of 
capital itself points in the direction of a normal working day (Marx 1976a: 
377). 
It is this other necessity of the valorisation of capital that takes shape through the 
antagonistic will of the worker, who tries to limit his/her conscious and voluntary 
subjection to the will of the capitalist in the immediate production process. And this is 
what gives rise to the opposite tendency of the valorisation of capital regarding the 
length of the working day, whose concrete realisation takes the form of the struggle of 
workers as a class. Marx illustrates this by showing how only the long and protracted 
resistance of workers eventually led to the intervention of the capitalist state, which, 
in the alienated form of a law, imposed the direct general regulation of the extensive 
quantitative limit to the productive consumption of labour-power by individual 
capitals. Which, seen from the perspective of the worker, appears as the only way of 
securing his/her material and social reproduction, that is, of getting paid the full value 
of labour-power. And he/she can only succeed at this - on average, through the 
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cyclical oscillation of the wage around the value of labour power - by establishing a 
relation of conscious co-operation with the rest of the workers in order to sell their 
labour power as a collective force. The general relation of competition among sellers 
of labour-power is thus realised in the form of its self-negation, i. e. by taking the form 
of a relation of solidarity. 5 Hence the social constitution of antagonistic class wills or 
the necessary concrete form of class struggle taken by the reproduction of the 
alienated existence of social life. 
For `protection' against the serpent of their agonies, the workers have to put 
their heads together and, as a class, compel the passing of a law, an all 
powerful social barrier by which they can be prevented from selling 
themselves and their families into slavery and death by voluntary contract with 
capital (Marx 1976a: 416). 
Thus far the textual reconstruction of the determinations of the class struggle in the 
capitalist mode of production, as they derive from their systematic place in Marx's 
dialectical presentation of the critique of political economy. As the above quote from 
Capital makes clear, in its simplest and most general form the class struggle carries no 
content other than the establishment of the conditions for the preservation and 
reproduction of the productive attributes of workers as wage-labourers. That is, it is 
75 Here we have the same point that the young Marx made against Proudhon that we commented upon 
in the first part of the thesis, namely: that co-operation or solidarity is not the abstract opposite of 
competition but its necessary concrete form when labour-power becomes a commodity. However, here 
the same conclusion is reached by Marx after unfolding all the determinations presupposed by it, thus 
eliminating the traces of externality in the relation between those two social forms that his presentation 
in the Poverty of Philosophy had. 
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the necessary form of the buying/selling of the commodity 'labour-power' at its full 
value. More generally, this implies that the determinations implicated in the mere 
existence of labour-power as commodity (or the merely formal subsumption of labour 
to capital) do not give the class struggle the transformative potentiality to go beyond 
the capitalist mode of production (Postone 1978). In this simple determination, the 
political action of the working class is just determined as a concrete form of the 
reproduction of capitalist social relations. Although for the first time in our 
reconstruction of Marx's reproduction of the concrete by means of thought we faced 
the necessity of capitalist social life to take the form of a political action of the 
working class, nothing in our journey put us before the necessity of the abolition of 
capital or, a fortiori, of the political action of the working class as its concrete form. 
6 
76 In order to avoid misunderstandings, let us note that we do not restrict the determination of the class 
struggle as a political action to the conquest of state power or to an action involving demands directed 
at the state. The political determination of the class struggle springs from the objectively general scope 
of the antagonistic direct social relation between capitalists and wage-workers (Inigo Carrera 2003: 
235-6). As Marx puts it in a letter to Bolte, 'a political movement' is 'a movement of the class, with the 
object of enforcing its interests in a general form, in a form possessing general, socially coercive force' 
(Marx 1965). Whether that general determination is manifested in the form of fragmented 'economic 
movements' or an immediately general 'political movement' is something which cannot be addressed 
at this level of abstraction. What should be clear is that the determination of the class struggle as the 
form of the sale of labour-power at its value does not simply involve the 'trade-union' form of the class 
struggle. Concomitantly, neither does that simplest determination of the class struggle mean that it will 
always be realised through the development of merely 'trade-union consciousness. ' In other words, that 
determination may well manifest itself in apparently extremely radical forms of the class struggle. In 
brief, what is at stake in this discussion is the simplest content of the class struggle regardless of its 
concrete forms. The confusion between content and concrete form of the class struggle is precisely 
what lies at the basis of the orthodox rigid separation between economistic and political consciousness 
of the working class. 
224 
Our search for the determinations of revolutionary subjectivity must therefore proceed 
into even more concrete determinations. This will be the subject of the next chapter. 
For the moment, we would firstly like further to explore the implications of this 
determination of the class struggle as a concrete form of the valorisation of capital. 
Some implications of Marx's exposition of the determinations of the class 
struggle in Capital 
Class struggle and the concrete subject of the movement of capitalist society 
The form of class struggle taken by the movement of capitalist society evidently 
implies the obstruction of the ceaseless movement of valorisation that constitutes the 
most general determination of capital as the alienated subject of that process. This 
could raise the question as to whether this determination entails the absolute negation 
of capital as the subject of the valorisation process, thus reducing the latter to a 
concrete form of the class struggle (Bonefeld 1995). Or, as commented above, it could 
lead to the conclusion that, since workers' struggles press in the opposite direction to 
the immediate necessity of capital personified by the capitalists, they must be 
expressing a different principle of social reproduction from the valorisation of capital. 
Thus, although it might be true that capital is the subject of the valorisation process, 
this does not exhaust the'logic of capitalism as a whole', which is said to comprise the 
antagonistic unity between the political economy of capital and the political economy 
of wage-labour (Lebowitz 2003: chapters 4 and 5). Each pole of that unity in 
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opposition is seen as the concrete subject of its own production process and the 
realisation of their respective goals is seen as repelling each other - hence their 
antagonism. However, each side needs the mediation of the other for its own 
reproduction - hence their unity (Lebowitz 2003: 75-6). 
There is no doubt that the interruption of the valorisation process constitutes the 
immediate negation of the most general necessity of capital as subject. However, as 
our reconstruction of Marx's argument has shown, the form of class struggle taken by 
the movement of society is actually a determination of the affirmation of capital as 
subject, albeit through its own negation. In other words, our point is that the social 
form of class struggle does not abstractly negate capital's condition of alienated 
subject but only expresses the necessarily contradictory character of its own 
movement as one of affirmation through self-negation. What the class struggle does 
negate is the condition of subject of the process of valorisation to what up to that point 
appeared to be the bearer of that social determination, namely, the individual capital. 
The fact that the actions of individual capitals undermine the reproduction of the very 
direct source of their self-expansion thus makes clear that the production of surplus- 
value is an attribute that exceeds the former's potentiality as particular private 
fragments of social labour. However, this does not reveal the class struggle as the self- 
determining force behind the movement of capitalist production, nor does it unveil the 
emergence an antagonistic principle of organisation of social life other than the 
valorisation of capital, which would be, in turn, incarnated in the working class. 
Rather, it only shows that the production of surplus-value is a potentiality of the 
alienated existence of social labour in its unity. In other words, Marx's exposition of 
the social form of class struggle evidences, for the first time in the pages of Capital, 
226 
that the concrete subject of the process of valorisation - and hence of the movement of 
alienated social production - is the total social capital. 
The class struggle, then, is the concrete form of development of the antithetical social 
necessities generated by this alienated total social subject in its process of 
valorisation. The fact that the most immediate necessity of capital is the formally 
boundless quantitative expansion of the surplus-value produced does not imply that 
the limitation to that expansion is not a necessity of its own reproduction. However, 
we have seen that the latter is a mediated necessity, this being the reason why it 
cannot be realised through the actions of capital's immediate or positive 
personifications - i. e. the capitalists - and why it can only be negatively or mediatedly 
personified by the working class in its struggle against the bourgeoisie. Hence, when 
the workers struggle, they do not cease to be subsumed to the movement of 
reproduction of alienated social life. On the one hand, their subjectivity does not act 
according to a 'logic' abstractly different from that of capitalist commodity production. 
As we have seen, the relation of conscious solidarity established by workers in their 
opposition to the positive personifications of capital is in complete accordance with 
the specific form of their social being, that is, with their determination as private and 
independent individuals and, more precisely, as commodity sellers (Postone 1996: 
314-23). Their conscious co-operation in the form of a political action is not the 
unmediated expression of a relation of solidarity between human beings as such. 
Rather, it is such a solidaristic relation mediated by the workers' condition as 
alienated human beings, that is, as personifications. In acting in this way without 
being aware of their determination as attributes of social capital - i. e. in seeing 
themselves as essentially free - they unconsciously personify a necessity of the 
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reproduction of their alienated general social relation, albeit one which is evidently 
antagonistic to that personified by the capitalist. 
Once again, the question of the dialectical method 
At this juncture we can now appreciate the methodological significance of this 
discussion. For the aforementioned notion that the political action of the working class 
ultimately expresses social necessities radically opposed to those of the accumulation 
of social capital rests on what we have seen in the first part of the thesis as the logical 
representation of the specific movement of affirmation through self-negation 
constituting the determination of social forms, in the form of a unity of two immediate 
affirmations. Thus, when the mediated necessities of social capital are only grasped in 
their immediate concrete form of existence as simple needs of the working class, the 
development of the latter appears as a social process regulated by different 'laws' from 
those of the reproduction of the valorisation of social capital itself. A process that 
furthermore appears to stand in external opposition to the needs of social capital, one- 
sidedly reduced to those immediate ones that are personified by the capitalist class. 
Moreover, this appearance is reinforced by the form taken by the circuit of 
reproduction of labour-power, which has the satisfaction of needs - hence the 
production of the worker - as its immediate result (LP-M-C ... PLY ... 
LP*; C-M-C* 
in its most general form) 77 From this, the conclusion is drawn that this circuit 
expresses a different existential logic or social ontology from that of capital's 
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valorisation process (M-C... P... C'-M') and, according to some authors, that it thereby 
provides the social basis for the revolutionary subjectivity of the proletariat. 
In a nutshell, the general question at stake is about the social determinations both of 
the needs of workers and the social form of their satisfaction. Thus, it may seem that, 
at least outside the process of production, i. e. in the sphere of individual consumption, 
the freedom of the wage-labourer ceases to be a concrete form of his/her alienation. 
There is no doubt that outside the immediate process of production and in the process 
of individual consumption through which labour-power is reproduced wage-labourers 
freely pursue their own goals. Unlike the subordination to the capitalist's despotic will 
reigning in the immediate process of production, in the process of reproduction of 
labour-power the wage-worker appears to be freely acting as a being-for-self and not 
'for another', as 'one who approaches capital as a means, a means whose end is the 
worker for self (Lebowitz 2003: 71-2). And yet the selling of labour-power as a 
commodity being the general social relation regulating the reproduction of the 
worker's life, he/she must apply that free consciousness and will materially to produce 
his/her productive subjectivity in the conditions determined by the autonomised 
movement of social life as an attribute of the product of social labour - i. e. by the 
production of surplus-value. The second sense of his/her freedom (the divorce of the 
labourer from the means of production) means that he/she can reproduce his/her 
natural life only by producing his/her attributes as a human individual in the material 
and moral conditions in which social capital needs him/her; that is, by producing 
himself/herself as a personification of the only commodity he/she owns. Certainly, in 
" Where LP is the abbreviation of labour-power and P1, corresponds to the process of reproduction of 
labour-power through individual consumption. 
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this process of self-production the wage-labourer is not subsumed to the cycle of 
valorisation of the individual capital and, therefore, he/she does not act for this or that 
particular 'other'. However, the whole gist of Marx's arguments aims at showing that, 
precisely through this free individual consumption (which, certainly, can only be 
secured by the class struggle), the worker reproduces his/her subsumption to social 
capital, which thereby affirms itself as the concrete subject not only of the processes 
of production and circulation of social wealth, but also of the process of individual 
consumption. 
The individual consumption of the worker, whether it occurs inside or outside 
the workshop, inside or outside the labour process, remains an aspect of the 
production and reproduction of capital (... ) The fact that the worker performs 
acts of individual consumption in his own interest, and not to please the 
capitalist, is something entirely irrelevant to the matter (... ) The maintenance 
and reproduction of the working class remains a necessary condition for the 
reproduction of capital. But the capitalist may safely leave this to the worker's 
drive for self-preservation and propagation (Marx 1976a: 718) 
In short, the individual consumption of the labourer is neither for the individual 
capital nor for himself/herself, but for social capital. The cycle LP-M-C ... PiP ... 
LP* is a moment of the accumulation of capital - and hence of capital's 'goal' of self- 
valorisation - as any other aspect of alienated social reproduction. 
As we can see, there is no exteriority to the alienated social relations of capital. 
Therefore, any revolutionary will and actual material powers to go beyond them the 
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workers might have can only derive from this complete subsumption of humanity to 
capital's 'principle' of valorisation. With the determinations unfolded thus far, the class 
struggle embodies no transformative potentiality other than being the form in which 
labour-power is sold at its value and, therefore, a form of the reproduction of the 
alienation of human productive powers in the form of capital. And yet even in this 
simple form, the class struggle puts us before a determination which, although unable 
to account for the content of the necessity for the abolition of the capitalist mode of 
production, already sheds light on the reason why the latter can only have a political 
action of the working class as its form. We are referring to the fact that the class 
struggle is the most general form taken by the organisation of social labour through a 
conscious and voluntary collective action in capitalist society (Inigo Carrera 2003: 6- 
7). This because determining the value of labour-power entails the determination of 
the way in which the total labour-power of society is allocated into its different useful 
forms; in this case, the general division between necessary labour and surplus-labour. 
And we have seen how this is resolved in the capitalist mode of production through 
the establishment of a direct relation of solidarity among workers in order to develop 
a consciously organised collective action. On the other hand, the annihilation of 
capital through the creation of the society of the consciously - hence concretely 
free - 
associated producers precisely consists of a social action of such a nature. Evidently, 
the latter is a social action which no longer expresses social capital's need for labour- 
power being sold at its value. Rather, it expresses the historically-determined 
necessity to move forward in the development of human productive subjectivity in a 
form which negates capital's existence as the general social relation reproducing 
human life, namely: by giving the materiality of social life the social form of its 
conscious general organisation as an attribute borne by each of the associated 
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individuals. But the point is that the material content of this transformation is 
achieved in the fonn of the political action of the (self-abolishing) proletariat, only 
because the latter already contains, within its simplest form, the potentiality of being 
the necessary concrete form taken by the general conscious organisation of social 
labour as a moment of the reproduction of social capital. 8 
78 It is this determination that generates the appearance that the class struggle as such embodies the 
potentiality to transcend the capitalist mode of production. 
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Chapter 6. Real subsumption and the genesis of the revolutionary 
subject 
Introduction 
Thus far, our critical reconstruction of Marx's argument in Capital has dealt with 
determinations which belong to what Marx termed the formal subsumption of labour 
to capital, that is, to the concrete form of the production of surplus-value in which the 
materiality of the production process remains a given presupposition of the 
valorisation process. As we have seen, nothing in those determinations put us before 
the central question we have been trying to answer through our reading of Marx's 
texts, namely, the necessity of revolutionary subjectivity. From a merely textual point 
of view and, as it were, `by default', this already gives us a clue about the alternative 
place in which to search for those social determinations: the real subsumption of 
labour to capital. And, in effect, we shall argue in this chapter that it is precisely in the 
historical development of the ever-changing concrete forms of the real subsumption 
that the answer to the question about revolutionary subjectivity that has been guiding 
the investigation in this thesis is to be found. 9 
79 A methodological question that immediately arises concerns the role of the different concrete forms 
of the real subsumption in Marx's 'sytematic-dialectical' exposition in Capital. On the one hand, Tony 
Smith argues that simple co-operation - which, incidentally, he incorrectly sees as expressing the 
formal subsumption of labour to capital - `does not characterize a specific stage in the reconstruction in 
thought of the value-form' (Smith 1990a: 126). On the other hand, he does admit that capital's 
necessity to transform the materiality of the production process of human life must have a place in the 
`systematic ordering of the categories'. But the latter, captured by the category 'capital as principle of 
transformation', must remain at that level of generality, the specific concrete forms of the production of 
relative surplus-value having no necessity other than being arbitrary `historical examples' among 'a 
myriad of combined an uneven forms' that could have been selected' (Smith 1990a: 127). Murray, for 
his part, correctly points out against Sayer (1987) and Balibar (1968) that all three material forms of the 
labour process belong to the real subsumption of labour to capital. However, he considers that only the 
general concept of co-operation belongs to the systematic dialectical argument, the three concrete 
forms of co-operation belonging to a separable historical dialectics (Murray 2004: 251,258). Finally, 
Reuten and Williams simply exclude the concrete forms of production of relative surplus-value from 
their systematic presentation of the determinations of the 'bourgeois epoch' (Reuten and Williams 
1989). In our view, a rigorous treatment of the qualitatively different concrete forms of the real 
subsumption must be an essential moment of the systematic-dialectical presentation of the 
determinations of capital. The chapters of Marx's Capital dealing with the forms of production of 
relative surplus-value are not there simply for the sake of an arbitrary historical illustration. Rather, as 
we demonstrate below, they are part and parcel of the dialectical unfolding of the immanent dynamic of 
self-valorising value and the transition between them expresses the necessary forms of development of 
human productive subjectivity as an alienated attribute of capital. Their exclusion from the presentation 
can only result in a formalistic comprehension of the nature of capital, which posits as contingent the 
relation between the latter and historical transformations of the materiality of the production process of 
human life. On the other hand, it should be noted that neither the distinction between formal and real 
subsumption, nor the one among the different forms of the latter, express pure historical phases of 
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All this should come as no surprise. In reality, this is no more than the concretisation 
of that insight about the most general determination of the process of 'natural-history' 
constituting the development of humanity, which Marx expounded in the Paris 
Manuscripts in 1844. As argued in the first part of the thesis, the content of the history 
of the human species consists, according to Marx, in the development of the specific 
powers of the human being as a working subject, i. e. of human productive 
subjectivity. It is in the historical transformation of its forms, Marx concluded, that 
the key to the abolition of capital - hence, to human emancipation - should reside. 
And yet we have seen that in 1844 Marx could only address that question in terms of 
an abstract and general `dialectic' of human labour and its alienated form of existence. 
It is precisely in Capital (and, crucially, in the Grundrisse), through the exposition of 
the determinations of the different forms of production of relative surplus-value, that 
Marx concretely develops that dialectic of alienated human labour, thus showing what 
capital accumulation does to the materiality of human productive subjectivity. The 
concrete question to be addressed thereby turns out to be the following: does capital 
transform human productive subjectivity in a way that eventually equips the latter 
with the material powers to transcend its alienated social form of development? From 
this materialist standpoint, only if this were the case would it make sense to pose the 
question of conscious revolutionary action as a concrete material potentiality 
capitalist development on the basis of which to construct an abstract periodisation. The historical 
material in those chapters should be read in exactly the same way as the one from the chapter on the 
working day, that is, as a `historical sketch' which, in its 'empirical' existence, expresses the realisation 
of the more abstract determination. 
235 
immanent in capitalist society. As Marx puts it in an oft-quoted passage from the 
Grundrisse, 
On the other hand, if we did not find concealed in society as it is the material 
conditions of production and the corresponding relations of exchange 
prerequisite for a classless society, then all attempts to explode it would be 
quixotic (Marx 1993: 159). 
Marx does not specify in the above passage what are those conditions; it is in the 
course of this chapter that we shall discuss those determinations in greater detail. For 
the moment, as a way of organising the discussion that follows and as an anticipation 
of the direction that our argument shall take, it might be worth highlighting what, 
according to Marx, are the most general determinations of emancipated human 
productive activity, that is, of human labour which has transcended the alienation of 
its powers as attributes of its material product. Clearly, as a consistent materialist, 
Marx vigorously rejected the formulation of `recipes (Comtist ones? ) for the cook- 
shops of the future' (Marx 1976a: 99). In other words, he refused time and again to 
elaborate on the actual, more concrete forms that social life would take under the free 
association of individuals or communism. However, this did not prevent him from 
grasping the most general or simplest determinations of the social form that 
constitutes the determinate negation of the capitalist mode of production in the only 
way available to an individual living before the emergence of the material conditions 
for the abolition of capital. That is, he discovered those determinations of communist 
society in their present mode of existence as an alienated potentiality borne by the 
capital-form to be realised - i. e. turned into actuality - precisely and necessarily 
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through the conscious revolutionary action of the self-abolishing proletariat. Those 
determinations of really free human productive activity appear scattered and just 
mentioned in passing in several of Marx's texts, and they all characterise the simplest 
determination of communism as consisting in the self-conscious organisation of social 
labour as a collective force by the thereby freely associated producers. But it is in the 
Grundrisse, in the context of the critique of Adam Smith's conception of labour as 
sacrifice, where, we think, Marx offers the clearest and most concise characterisation 
of the general attributes of what he calls `really free working'. 
The work of material production can achieve this character [as 'really free 
working', GS] only (1) when its social character is posited, (2) when it is of a 
scientific and at the same time general character, not merely human exertion 
as a specifically harnessed natural force, but exertion as subject, which 
appears in the production process not in a merely natural, spontaneous form, 
but as an activity regulating all the forces of nature (Marx 1993: 611-12). 80 
The interesting and at this point 'intriguing' aspect of this passage is that Marx does 
not only claim that in order to be really free labour must become a consciously 
organised, directly social activity, but also that the consciousness regulating that 
emancipated productive activity must be of a scientific kind. As we shall see later, this 
latter attribute, scarcely mentioned by Marx on other occasions, will prove of 
paramount importance for our comprehension of the concrete determinations of 
80 This crucial passage has not generally caught the attention of Marxists. An exception can be found in 
Schmidt (1971: 143-44), who offers an interesting discussion of the determinations of emancipated 
labour. 
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revolutionary subjectivity; a task that Marx himself achieved, although not without 
theoretical tensions and ambiguities. At this stage, we would just like to reformulate 
the question of the relation between capital and productive subjectivity posed above in 
the light of that passage from the Grundrisse. Does the development of capital 
transform human productive subjectivity in such a way as to engender the necessity of 
producing the latter with the two general attributes mentioned by Marx? And 
furthermore, is the working class the material subject bearing them? As stated above, 
we think that the answer to this question lies at the basis of any attempt to develop a 
materialist account of the determinations of revolutionary subjectivity. It is not only a 
question of the mere will radically to 'change the world' but of the concrete material 
powers to do so. In this final chapter, then, we attempt to reconstruct the way in which 
Marx, through the analysis of the real subsumption of labour to capital, presented the 
general elements for such a materialistic account of the socio-historical genesis of the 
revolutionary subject, thereby determining the critique of political economy as the 
latter's self-consciousness of the social necessity of its political action. 
The production of relative surplus value: general determinations 
With the determinations unfolded thus far in our reconstruction of Capital, that is, 
with the material conditions of production and the value of labour-power taken as a 
given presupposition, the valorisation of capital can only expand through the increase 
in the amount of labour set into motion by social capital. This, in turn, can only be 
achieved by the lengthening of the working day and/or by the increment of the 
number of workers exploited. We already have mentioned how the physical and social 
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limits of the former possibility are set in the concrete form of the class struggle. 81 The 
latter option has its `mathematical limits' determined by the growth of the working 
population (Marx 1976a: 442). These barriers to the production of surplus-value are 
transcended by social capital by giving its valorisation the concrete form of the 
production of relative surplus-value. 
The revolution in the material conditions of the social process of production, and the 
consequent real subsumption of labour under the rule of capital, constitutes the 
general determination of the production of relative surplus-value. In its different 
forms, the production of relative surplus-value consists in the transformation of the 
materiality of the labour process (and, crucially for our argument, in the subjectivity of 
the wage-labourers) in order to raise the productivity of labour and, therefore, reduce 
the value of labour-power and increase the rate of surplus-value. In this way, capital 
internalises the determination of that which, up to this stage, existed as an external 
presupposition to its power of self-valorisation, namely: the magnitude of variable 
capital. Notice that we are not referring here just to an abstract increase in the 
productivity of social labour unilaterally taken in its quantitative determination, that 
is, as the development of the capacity to produce more use-values with the same 
amount of labour. As we shall immediately see, the key to this development lies in its 
specific qualitative aspect (which also entails a quantitative determination), consisting 
in the advance of the productive co-operation of the labourers through simple co- 
81 Besides, the extension of the working-day would reach its absolute limit at the point of determining 
the whole 24 hours of the day as a means of producing surplus-value (Marx 1976a: 419). 
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operation, the division of labour of manufacture and the automatic system of 
machinery of large-scale industry. 
Co-operation and capital's reason to be in the historical process 
In simple co-operation, the free wage-labourer must apply his/her consciousness and 
will to the realisation of his/her individual productive activity which, as with the 
independent artisan, still involves the production of the commodity in its entirety. 
However, in so far as he/she is doubly free, he/she must do so in the conditions 
imposed by the direct relation established with the capitalist (to whom he/she freely 
sold his/her labour-power) within the immediate process of production. On the other 
hand, the capitalist is able to transform his/her money into capital because he/she 
employs not just one wage-labourer but a relatively large number of them. Thus, the 
possession by the capitalist of a certain magnitude of capital becomes a material 
condition for the realisation of this social production process (Marx 1976a: 448). 
The labour of these numerous workers working `together side by side in accordance 
with a plan, whether in the same process, or in different but connected processes' 
(Marx 1976a: 443) takes the form of co-operation. Simple co-operation, the mere 
agglomeration of the individual wage-labourers under the same roof, produces a first 
transformation in their labour process by determining them as members of a collective 
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productive organism, a collective labourer. 82 The initial formal expression of this is 
the objective constitution of the expenditure of the labour-power of the co-operating 
labourers as average social labour (Marx 1976a: 440-1). However, beyond this 
formal aspect and the aforementioned constitution of a collective labourer, the 
materiality of the individual human productive subjectivity of the workers 
qualitatively remains the same as in pre-capitalist forms of handicraft labour. As Marx 
puts it, these developments in the process of production of human life derived from 
simple co-operation do not entail any major `alteration in the method of work' itself 
(1976a: 441). 
And yet, Marx notes, a material revolution in the conditions of the labour process 
does take place: simple co-operation gives the latter a directly social character. In the 
first instance, this mainly affects the objective conditions of the production process, 
which start to be consumed in common, thereby resulting in the economy in the use of 
means of production. But, in addition, the directly social character of the labour- 
process reacts on the subjective factor as well. Although the productive subjectivity of 
each worker remains unaltered, the productive powers of human labour do suffer a 
development. First, the human individual being a social animal, through this co- 
operation the productive powers of social labour are enhanced so that the worker 
`strips off the fetters of his individuality, and develops the capabilities of his species' 
(Marx 1976a: 447). Secondly, not only do the workers develop their individual 
productive powers, but a directly social potency is created, `a new productive power, 
which is intrinsically a collective one' (Marx 1976a: 443). 
82 As Marx points out, co-operation is the 'fundamental form of the capitalist mode of production', 
whereas simple co-operation is its most abstract form (Marx 1976a: 454). 
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The significance of all this cannot be overestimated. For even these simplest 
determinations of the real subsumption suffice to put us, for the first time in our 
reconstruction of Marx's exposition, before an all-important aspect of the critique of 
political economy. We are referring to the discovery of the material specificity of 
capital. In effect, one of the central questions addressed by Marx's presentation in 
Chapter 13 of Capital is to show that, as a social form, capital not only entails a 
formal specificity - the inversion of human powers as powers of the product of labour 
- but also a material one. Or rather, it involves a specific material determination that 
can only develop through a specific social form. More concretely, capital is the social 
form that transforms the productive powers of free but isolated individual labour into 
powers of directly and consciously organised social labour. 83 
83 The material specificity of the concrete forms of production of relative surplus-value has been 
generally ignored by orthodox Marxism, which tended to reduce the problem to a question of who 
manages those very forms of the labour process. A classic example of this is Lenin's claim, after the 
Russian Revolution, that Taylorism could provide in its immediacy the material forms of the labour 
process for a socialist society (Lenin 1971) - for a brief account of the evolution of Lenin's changing 
views of Taylorism throughout his writings, see Scoville (2001). However, it is not just a question of 
simply noting the specifically-capitalist character of the labour process and concluding that they cannot 
immediately provide the basis for a communist society, as many Marxists have done in opposition to 
the orthodox uncritical silence on this issue [just to name a few classic works from very different 
heterodox traditions, see Braverman (1998), Dunayevskaya (1988), Panzieri (1980)]. The crux of the 
matter resides in grasping the relative historical necessity of those material forms, which certainly 
express the alienated domination of capital over labour, as a vanishing moment in the process of 
development of human productive subjectivity and, hence, in the production of the necessity of their 
own supersession (Marx 1993: 831-2). This, on the other hand, cannot but be overlooked if the critique 
of capital-determined technology is conceived as the representation of the latter as the simple product 
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As Marx points out, co-operation in the production process can be found in earlier 
social forms of the reproduction of human life. However, those forms presuppose a 
very weak development of the individuality of the human producer, either because 
they are based on the common ownership of the conditions of production and on an 
individual who 'has as little torn himself free from the umbilical cord of his tribe or 
of the class struggle, that is, as an attempt by capitalists to re-impose discipline in the labour process 
when faced with the insubordination of workers, the former in turn achieved through the arbitrary 
imposition of divisions and hierarchies (Cleaver 1979: 109-14; 1982; Holloway 1991). Seen in this 
light, the capitalist form of the production process of human life is represented as having no necessity 
other than an abstract power relation between the capitalist and the worker in the immediate process of 
production. Eventually, the logic of such an approach must lead to the very abandonment of the 
specific notion of the capitalist process of production as the unity of the labour process and the 
valorisation process to replace it with the abstract unity of the `technique of production' and `technique 
of dominating those who are producing' (Gorz 1976: viii). See also Marglin (1974) and Brighton 
Labour Process Group (1977) for other examples of extrinsic juxtaposition of power relations and 
technical forms. For a critique of this kind of approach, see Reinfelder (1980). This actually renders 
inexplicable the historical specificity of the material forms of the production of relative surplus-value. 
To begin with, the fact that `co-operation remains the fundamental form of the capitalist mode of 
production' (Marx 1976a: 454). And secondly, as we shall see below, the universal productive 
subjectivity that such co-operation eventually entails when taking the form of large-scale industry. In 
reality, those latter approaches actually conflate two distinct determinations, both mentioned by Marx 
in the same section of Capital, pertaining, as it were, to different levels of abstraction, namely: the 
determination of the materiality of the production process as a concrete mode of existence of capital's 
production of relative surplus-value (Marx 1976a: 553-62) - the content - and the deliberate use of 
machinery by the capitalist as a weapon in the class struggle over the value of labour power (Marx 
1976a: 562-3) - the mediating concrete form. The necessity of those material forms is grounded in the 
former. The latter is certainly a necessary mediation in such an alienated development of the productive 
powers of humanity, but it does not determine it. 
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community as a bee has from his hive' (Marx 1976a: 452), or, alternatively, because 
they 'rest on direct relations of domination and servitude, in most cases on slavery' 
(Marx 1976a: 452). Capitalist co-operation, on the contrary, presupposes a degree of 
development of the individuality of the labourer historically `attaining classical form' 
in the form of the freedom and independence of the isolated individual labour of the 
peasant and the artisan, that is, on the basis of the dissolution of all relations of 
personal dependence (Marx 1993: 156). 84 As Marx puts it when summarising at the 
end of Volume 1 the essence of the historical tendency of capital accumulation, 
The private property of the labourer in his means of production is the 
foundation of petty industry, whether agricultural, manufacturing, or both; 
petty industry, again, is an essential condition for the development of social 
production and of the free individuality of the labourer himself (... ) (Marx 
1976a: 927). 
84 That is why Marx centres the great bulk of his exposition of primitive accumulation and of the 
historical tendency of capitalist accumulation in the (violent) expropriation of the independent 
agricultural producer, which `forms the basis of the whole process' (Marx 1976a: 876), instead of 
elaborating on the `direct transformation of slaves and serfs into wage-labourers', which is a `mere 
change of form' in the exploitation of the direct producers (Marx 1976a: 927). It is the former that 
condenses the essential material content of the social transformation at stake, that is, the specific 
historical powers of the capital-form in the development of human productive subjectivity. This point is 
completely overlooked by those formalistic approaches that reduce the capital-form to a relation of 
power and struggle (see footnote 88). Thus, to Holloway, the essence of the genesis of the capitalist 
mode of production is best captured as the process of conversion of the serf into a wage-labourer 
(Holloway 2002a: 180-3), i. e. as the `mere change of form' of exploitation of the direct producers. The 
reason to be of capital in the materiality of human (pre)history is simply left out of the picture. 
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At this juncture it is necessary to emphasise that the mode of existence of social 
labour as private labour is not simply a juridical form referring to the fragmentation of 
the property of means of production (though that is certainly its simplest juridical 
expression). 85 But neither should it be understood as an abstract atomisation of social 
production unilaterally seen from an exclusively formal point of view. That is, as just 
another social form of the production process of humanity that constitutes the present- 
day objective conditions in which human individuals exercise their abstractly free 
productive activity. 86 As a social form, the private character of labour must be 
understood in its essential determination as a mode of development of the material 
productive forces of society borne by individual labour, i. e. of human productive 
subjectivity. Hence the most general determination of private labour discussed in the 
previous chapter: the absolute material and formal capacity consciously to rule the 
individual character of labour with no control of its general social character. In other 
words, it must be comprehended in relation to the individually borne material powers 
of human beings consciously to organise their own transformative action upon their 
natural environment, i. e. the productive consciousness of human beings as working 
subjects. If human beings invert their social powers as the value-form of the product 
of social labour it is because they have developed the individual character of their 
85 As Chattopadhyay notes, in the classic works of Soviet Marxism (including Lenin, Trotsky, 
Bukharin and Preobrazhensky) there was a noticeable tendency to conceive of the social relations of 
production as primarily juridical (Chattopadhyay 1996). The `juridicist' ideological representation can 
also be found in Kautsky (Kautsky 1978). 
86 As is the case, for instance, with the representation of the private character of labour as dissociation - 
which would constitute the logical negation of the `concept' of sociation and with association 
(exchange) as the mediating term in the logical contradiction - by contemporary authors within the 
`systematic dialectics approach' (Reuten 1988: 48-50; Arthur 1993: 71). 
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productive powers to a degree that cannot be further expanded under relations of 
personal dependence. However, the other side of this coin is that they have not yet 
created the universality of the material powers needed to regulate their social 
reproduction in a fully conscious form either. This is why the product of their social 
labour still confronts them as an alien power in the form of capital and the material 
development of their productive subjectivity takes the form of the production of 
relative surplus-value. 
But it is an insipid notion to conceive of this merely objective bond as a 
spontaneous, natural attribute inherent in individuals and inseparable from 
their nature (in antithesis to their conscious knowing and willing). This bond is 
their product. It is a historic product. It belongs to a specific phase of their 
development. The alien and independent character in which it presently exists 
vis-a-vis individuals proves only that the latter are still engaged in the creation 
of the conditions of their social life, and that they have not yet begun, on the 
basis of these conditions, to live it (Marx 1993: 162). 
It is the socialisation of that historical form of free labour - necessarily realised 
through the alienated value-form of the product of labour and through the relative 
mutilation of that individuality imposed by the second sense of the freedom of the 
wage-labourer - that constitutes the reason to be of capital in the history of the 
development of the powers of the human species. Although capital is the historical 
producer of the powers of directly social labour, it achieves this by subordinating the 
latter to the autonomised movement of social life alienated as an attribute of the 
material product of labour. In other words, those powers are developed by 
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determining directly social labour as a concrete form of development of the powers of 
private labour, i. e. as a mode of existence of capital's self-valorisation through the 
production of relative-surplus value. 87 The latter constitutes capital's formal 
specificity, the necessary social form in which the aforementioned material 
transformation of the production process of human life is historically achieved. 
Just as the social productive power of labour that is developed by co-operation 
appears to be the productive power of capital, so co-operation itself, contrasted 
with the process of production carried on by isolated independent producers, 
or even by small masters, appears to be a specific form of the capitalist 
process of production. It is the first change experienced by the actual labour 
process when subjected to capital (... ) This starting point coincides with the 
birth of capital itself. If then, on the one hand, the capitalist mode of 
production is a historically necessary condition for the transformation of the 
labour process into a social process, so, on the other hand, this social form of 
the labour process is a method employed by capital for the more profitable 
exploitation of labour, by increasing its productive power (Marx 1976a: 453). 
The significance of this two fold - social and material - character of capital's 
historical specificity cannot be overestimated. In effect, overlooking this material 
determination can only result in depriving the working class of the historical 
87 In other words, by determining free (productive) consciousness as a concrete form of the alienated 
consciousness. Or, to grasp it from a different angle, by determining the organisation of social labour in 
the form of direct (i. e. conscious) social relations in the immediate process of production as a concrete 
form of the essentially indirect general organisation of social labour through the valorisation of capital. 
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specificity of its revolutionary powers, thus making it impossible to distinguish the 
proletarian revolution, i. e. the political form taken by the fully conscious organisation 
of the social production process of human life, from the revolt of slaves against the 
personal domination of their owner. 88 
In a nutshell, Marx's uncovering of this two-fold determination of capital constitutes 
the first step - but only the first step - in the reproduction in thought of the socio- 
material genesis of the revolutionary subject. On the one hand, we can see now that 
the conscious organisation of the immediate production process of human life is not, 
88 See De Angelis (1995) and Holloway (2002a) for examples of such a formalistic understanding of 
capital. In a way, one could argue that these approaches ultimately remain refined versions of what 
Loren Goldner in the early 1980s insightfully noted concerning not just 20`h century `official Marxism' 
(broadly conceived to include authors as diverse as Lenin, Bukharin, Baran, Sweezy, Bettelheim), but 
also 'Western Marxist' currents such as the Frankfurt School, namely: the comprehension of 
'capitalism (... ) not [as] a system of valorization, but [as] a system of power', according to which 
'capital ceased to be a dynamic and was transformed into a "hierarchy"' (Goldner 1981). The 
consequence of this is, as Goldner comments concerning 'Monopoly Capital' theory, the production of 
a theory which ceases to be 'about forces and relations of production' and becomes 'a sociological 
theory of hierarchy and oppression, the balance of forces between the classes in question being a 
question of struggle and will' (Goldner 1981). Whilst the approaches that constitute the explicit target 
of Goldner's critique tended directly to ignore the general determination of capital as value-in-process, 
the interesting thing about works such as those of De Angelis and Holloway referred to above is how 
they relapse into the same reduction of the critique of political economy to a sociological theory of 
oppression while at the same time paying lip-service to the categories of Marx's Capital. See Goldner 
(2001: 2-3) for suggestive reflections on the historical conjuncture underpinning this cultural mood of 
'middle-class radicalism', which, unlike the Marxian notion of freedom as the fully conscious 
transformation of necessity, 'conceives of freedom as "transgression", as the breaking of laws, the 
"refusal of all constraints". ' 
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as it appeared when we were before the more abstract determinations of social life 
synthesised in the commodity-form, the abstract negation of our present-day general 
social relation. 89 However, the determinations unfolded thus far also carry a limit to 
the expansion of directly social labour, thereby still determining it as a concrete form 
of the historical development of the powers of its opposite: private labour. 
In effect, although the constitution of simple co-operation represents a step forward in 
the organisation of human life as a directly collective potency, this social power is not 
yet the self-conscious product of the direct association of the producers but is set into 
motion with the previous mediation of the sale of their labour-power as independent 
and isolated individuals to the capitalist. Therefore, since `their co-operation only 
begins with the labour process, but by then they have ceased to belong to themselves' 
(Marx 1976a: 451), and their labour now belongs to capital, all the productive powers 
of labour that spring from the social combination of the workers are transformed into 
attributes of capital. In their very corporeality as working subjects, i. e. in the 
materiality of their productive subjectivity, the labourers 'merely form a particular 
mode of existence of capital' (Marx 1976a: 451) in its movement of valorisation. 
What is more, not only are those directly social productive powers of co-operation 
inverted as an attribute of the workers' materialised social relation, but its conscious 
organisation is not even exercised by them but by the immediate personification of 
self-valorising value, namely, the capitalist. Inasmuch as it is through his/her 
consciousness and will that the now collective conditions required for the wage- 
labourers' individual labours to take place (their co-operation) are posited, the 
capitalist becomes the conscious incarnation of the direct organisation of the social 
89 See page 198 above. 
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character of the labour of the group of workers under his/her command. For the 
workers, this social character thus appears in the ideal form of a `plan drawn up by the 
capitalist, and, in practice, as his authority, as the powerful will of a being outside 
them, who subjects their activity to his purpose' (Marx 1976a: 450). On the other 
hand, inasmuch as it is not only oriented to the production of a use-value but to the 
valorisation of capital through the production of surplus-value - i. e. through the 
exploitation of labour - the direction of this process by the capitalist takes a despotic 
form (Marx 1976a: 450). 
The determinations of simple co-operation thereby seem to intensify the power of the 
capitalist over the worker in the antagonistic direct relationship that they establish in 
the immediate process of production. This power is not simply the formal result of the 
separation of the labourer from the objective conditions of labour. Inasmuch as the 
capitalist concentrates the `work of directing, superintending and adjusting the co- 
operative labour of wage-workers' (Marx 1976a: 449), his/her command becomes a 
material pre-requisite of the labour process itself. As Marx puts it, `that a capitalist 
should command in the field of production is now as indispensable as that a general 
should command on the field of the battle' (Marx 1976a: 448). The dependence of the 
wage-labourers upon capital now starts to be expressed even in relation to the 
materiality of the production process. Far from moving in the direction of the 
determination of the working class as a revolutionary subject, these developments 
seem to deepen the latter's subjection to the alienated movement of capital's 
valorisation. 
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And yet the very same alienated form of their co-operation that, furthermore, 
strengthens the power of the capitalist, engenders a countertendency which presses in 
the opposite direction to the unchecked development of the latter. In effect, by putting 
the workers together under the same roof, capital facilitates the establishment of the 
relations of solidarity through which, as we have seen in the previous chapter, the 
workers attempt to restrict the consumption of their labour-power by the capitalist 
(Marx 1976a: 449). However, Marx immediately adds, this intensified resistance does 
not yet express an absolute limit to the development of the alienation inherent in the 
capital-form. It only increases `the pressure put on by capital to overcome this 
resistance' (Marx 1976a: 449) through the development of the despotism of capitalist 
command in the forms that are peculiar to it (Marx 1976a: 450). Eventually, capital 
attempts to break this barrier to its valorisation by revealing `in practice' that simple 
co-operation is just one particular form of the production of relative surplus-value 
`alongside the more developed ones' (Marx 1976a: 454). 
Capitalist manufacture and the material basis of the class struggle 
Whatever the historical origins of the production process of capitalist manufacture - 
that is, whether it arises from a combination of formerly independent crafts into one 
collective labour-process of a single commodity, or whether its genesis is found in the 
analytical decomposition of an existing activity into its component parts - the essence 
of this concrete form of production of relative surplus-value consists in the division of 
the total labour necessary for the production of a determinate use-value into particular 
detail operations. The labour process of an entire commodity now involves the 
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articulation of those differentiated productive functions into a co-ordinated whole. As 
the resulting different manual tasks involved are assigned to what now become 
specialised workers, their labour becomes more productive (Marx 1976a: 458). With 
this increased productivity of labour, capital's production of relative surplus-value is 
consequently achieved. And this not just because of the enhanced productivity. Since 
the latter is the result of the simplification of the required necessary skills, the 
`expenses of apprenticeship' are reduced - or almost disappear in the case of the 
unskilled type of labourer also produced by the development of manufacture - this 
having the additional result of decreasing the value of labour power (Marx 1976a: 
470). Moreover, the fixation of the worker in a single form of activity eliminates the 
time necessary to change from one sort of activity to the other, permitting capital to 
increase the intensity of labour (Marx 1976a: 460). 
These transformations of the productive subjectivity of the individual labourers have 
their counterpart in the way in which they are articulated organically as part of a 
single labour-process. In other words, those mutations result in the transformation of 
the determinations of the collective labourer, which actually becomes `the item of 
machinery specifically characteristic of the manufacturing period' (Marx 1976a: 468). 
The latter no longer consists in the mere agglomeration of individual productive 
processes under the same roof. It now becomes a complex, directly social body 
differentiated into qualitatively distinct partial organs. In turn, these transformations 
not only make the qualitative articulation of the different individual labours a more 
complex process. It also determines, as a material necessity of the labour process, the 
establishment of a quantitative proportionality between the qualitatively different 
partial organs of the collective labourer. The individual labour of the workers in itself 
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ceases to be productive of commodities. This attribute now belongs to the integration 
of those particular and partial labours, i. e. to the collective labourer as such (Marx 
1976a: 469,475). The immediately social character of the production process within 
the workshop is thus no longer limited to the positing of its conditions but reaches the 
labouring activity itself, a point that Marx brings out by comparing the determinations 
of the organisation of the fragment of social labour under the command of an 
individual capitalist with the general organisation of social labour through the 
commodity-form across society (1976a: 475-77). Furthermore, since the renewal of 
the production of relative surplus-value involves the further development of the 
division of labour within the workshop, it becomes a law of the valorisation of capital 
that the number of partial organs comprising the collective labourer - and hence the 
conscious organisation of social labour - must keep extending (Marx 1976a: 480). 
In this way, capital makes another step forward in the realisation of its civilising 
mission. However, it still does so by determining directly social labour as a concrete 
form of development of the powers of private - hence alienated - labour, so that 
`anarchy in the social division of labour and despotism in the manufacturing of labour 
mutually condition each other' (Marx 1976a: 477) 90 As happened with simple co- 
operation, all the emerging powers of social labour deriving from this more developed 
form of human productive co-operation are turned into attributes of capital in its 
process of self-expansion through the production of relative surplus-value (Marx 
90 This point about the `inner connection' between the general unconscious regulation of social life 
through the valorisation of capital and the despotic nature of the conscious plan inside the workshop 
(later on, the factory), has been correctly emphasised by Dunayevskaya and her followers against the 
uncritical celebration of the latter by orthodox Marxists (Dunayevskaya 1988; Hudis 1998: 103). 
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1976a: 486). But the subsumption of the powers of living labour under the rule of 
capital is now not only expressed in that inversion between subject and object of 
social production. With the manufacturing division of labour, the alienated 
development of the powers of social labour is furthermore achieved through the 
mutilation or degradation of the individual productive subjectivity of the wage- 
labourers, giving the conscious organisation of social labour within the workshop a 
specifically capitalist character not only because of its determination as the material 
bearer of the valorisation of capital and, hence, as an attribute despotically exercised 
by the capitalist, but because of the materiality of the production process itself. In 
effect, the specialisation of the worker in a single operation means that a one-sided 
aspect of human personality is developed, undermining all the potential universality 
of human productive capacities. The wage-labourer thus becomes a fragmented 
individual. If with simple co-operation the productive subjectivity (hence activity) of 
the worker became a mode of existence of capital, now his/her corporeality as a 
working subject, in its very materiality, becomes a result of the production of relative 
surplus-value. 
While simple co-operation leaves the mode of the individual's labour for the 
most part unchanged, manufacture thoroughly revolutionizes it, and seizes 
labour-power by its roots. It converts the worker into a crippled monstrosity 
by furthering his particular skill as in a forcing-house, through the suppression 
of the whole world of productive drives and inclinations, just as in the states of 
La Plata they butcher a whole beast for the sake of his hide or his tallow. Not 
only is the specialized work distributed among the different individuals, but 
the individual himself is divided up, and transformed into the automatic motor 
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of a detail operation, thus realizing the absurd fable of Menenius Agrippa, 
which presents man as a mere fragment of his own body (Marx 1976a: 481-2). 
The directly social powers of the collective labourer are thus developed at the expense 
of the productive attributes of the individual worker (Marx 1976a: 483). This 
specifically capitalist concrete form of human labour-power means that the direct 
producer actually further loses the productive consciousness of the unity of the labour 
process of the entire commodity - now immediately social within the workshop - 
which the simple commodity producer still preserved. The productive consciousness 
of the unity of the collective labourer becomes an attribute personified by the 
capitalist, the workers only keeping conscious control of the ever more partial 
individual activity, now only a fragment of the total labour process of the determinate 
use-value at stake. 
The knowledge, the judgement, and the will, which, even though to a small 
extent, are exercised by the independent peasant or handicraftsman, in the 
same way as the savage makes the whole art of war consist in the exercise of 
his personal cunning, are faculties now required only for the workshop as a 
whole. The possibility of an intelligent direction in production expands in one 
direction, because it vanishes in many others. What is lost by the specialized 
workers, is concentrated in the capital that confronts them. It is a result of the 
division of labour in manufacture that the worker is brought face to face with 
the intellectual potentialities [geistige Potenzen] of the material process of 
production as the property of another and as a power that rules over him. This 
process of separation starts in simple co-operation, where the capitalist 
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represents to individual workers the unity and the will of the whole body of 
social labour. It is developed in manufacture, which mutilates the worker, 
turning him into a fragment of himself. It is completed in large-scale industry, 
which makes science a potentiality for production which is distinct from 
labour and presses it into the service of capital (Marx 1976a: 482). 
In this process, the alienation of the human powers of the labourer as attributes of 
capital reaches a further stage. What the workers lose with their subjection to the 
manufacturing division of labour is that specific human attribute that, as Marx 
discusses in Chapter 7 of Capital but had claimed as early as in the 1844 Manuscripts, 
distinguishes the human form of the appropriation of the forces of nature from its 
animal form, namely, the `spiritual powers' of the production process or the conscious 
capacity to organise its rationality and purpose. Concerning the total labour process in 
which the workers take part, that which `distinguishes the worst architect from the 
best of bees' (Marx 1976a: 284) is stripped of their productive subjectivity. In this 
specifically material sense, capital is thus an inhuman social form of development of 
human productive powers 91 
The subordination of workers to the rule of capital and the dependence of the 
production process on the direction of the capitalist that already started to appear with 
simple co-operation is thereby intensified in the division of labour of manufacture. 
The conversion of the worker into `the automatic motor of a detail operation' means 
that the wage-labourer not only has to sell his/her labour power for not possessing the 
91 This inhumanity reaches its extreme with capital's production of a relative surplus population, 
comprising the workers who are literally prevented from the exercise of their own species being. 
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objective means necessary for exercising his/her subjective productive capacities. The 
crippling of his/her productive abilities means that `now his own individual labour 
power withholds its services unless it has been sold to capital' (Marx 1976a: 482). 
The worker whose labour-power is now the product of the production of relative 
surplus-value does not even know how to produce an entire commodity by 
him/herself. He/she becomes increasingly forced to sell his/her labour-power to 
capital as the only means to reproduce his/her life. 
And yet these very same determinations which appear to weaken the workers' 
resistance to capital's restless striving for relative surplus-value, engender a barrier to 
this affirmation of the materialised social relation as the concrete subject of the 
process of production of human life. The key to the comprehension of this 
contradiction immanent in capital's valorisation process lies in the very essence 
defining the division of labour of manufacture: 
Whether complex or simple, each operation has to be done by hand, retains the 
character of a handicraft, and is therefore dependent on the strength, skill, 
quickness and sureness with which the individual worker manipulates his tools 
(Marx 1976a: 458). 
That is, the production process of manufacture still depends on the crucial 
intervention of the handicraft expertise of the labourer. The structure of co-operation 
is purely subjective, gaining articulation only through the bodily motion of the 
individual workers as the fundamental material subjects of that collective labour 
process. The fluidity of the labour-process (hence, of the valorisation process which it 
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sustains) depends on the willingness of individual workers to act as partial organs of 
the collective labourer. Hence, this lack of `an objective framework independent of 
the workers themselves' (Marx 1976a: 489) as the foundation of manufacture 
provides a material basis for an empowered resistance of workers in the antagonistic 
relation they establish with capital (Marx 1976a: 490). 92 This material basis, however, 
does not yet provide the class struggle with a different qualitative determination - 
whether being the form of the expropriation of the bourgeoisie or being the form of 
the abolition of capital - other than the only one we have already unfolded in the 
previous chapter, namely, that of being the concrete form in which the value of 
labour-power is set. It only increases the magnitude of the force borne by the working 
class in its political action. 93 Thus, the insubordination of the workers constitutes an 
obstacle to the valorisation of capital which does not yet express the need for the 
development of the productive powers of social labour to transcend its alienated form 
as production of relative surplus-value. As Marx makes clear, it only forces the latter 
to develop into a concrete form which undermines that material basis underlying the 
said obstacles to the domination of capital, namely, the system of machinery. 
92 This material basis actually engenders a countertendency to that increased political force through the 
fragmentation of workers caused by their insertion into a wage hierarchy revolving around skills. 
93 The relevance of this determination is not confined to the historical comprehension of the now very 
distant past used by Marx as illustration in Capital. It is crucial, for instance, to understand the peculiar 
political power of the workers during the so-called Fordist cycle of accumulation (Inigo Carrera 2003: 
47-9). In effect, especially concerning the production of machinery itself, and however degraded the 
productive subjectivity of workers. Fordist methods still involved the subordination of the adjustment 
and calibration of machines and even the assembling process itself to the manual skills of labourers. 
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One of its [manufacture's, GS] most finished products was the workshop for 
the production of the instruments of labour themselves, and particularly the 
complicated pieces of mechanical apparatus already being employed (... ) This 
workshop, the product of the division of labour in manufacture, produced in its 
turn - machines. It is machines that abolish the role of the handicraftsman as 
the regulating principle of social production. Thus, on the one hand, the 
technical reason for the lifelong attachment of the worker to a partial function 
is swept away. On the other hand, the barriers placed in the way of the 
domination of capital by this same regulating principle now also fall (Marx 
1976a: 491). 
As we can see, the form of manufacture taken by the immediate production process 
further develops the contradictions and tendencies immanent in the movement of 
capital as alienated subject which were insinuated by the determinations of simple co- 
operation. In the first place, both capital's world-historical role in the development of 
the species-powers of humanity and its contradictory march forward in the historical 
process of its realisation acquire a clearer expression. Thus, in giving an immediately 
social character not only to the `objective factor' of the labour process but also to the 
`subjective factor', capital shows its historical tendency to produce at least the first of 
the two general attributes of productive subjectivity which, as mentioned in the 
introduction, are crucial for the constitution of `really free working' - hence for the 
abolition of capital itself. However, the division of labour of manufacture also reveals 
the contradictory form in which that process unfolds. And this not only because the 
socialisation of labour is achieved by formally determining immediately social labour 
as a concrete form of the self-movement of valorisation of capital. This contradiction 
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acquires a further material expression in the mutilation of the individual character of 
the productive subjectivity of wage-labourers as the mediation for the historical 
production of direct producers with the material powers consciously to organise their 
social life-process as `a fully self-conscious single collective labour-power'. 
In the second place, we can now appreciate more clearly that the determinations of the 
class struggle over the value of labour-power are not exhausted in the formal 
subsumption of labour to capital. If one stops short at that level of abstraction as 
developed in Chapter 10 of Capital, the appearance arises that the balance of class 
forces - and so, for instance, the duration of the working day - is contingently 
determined. However, Marx's analysis of simple co-operation and, even more so, of 
the division of labour of manufacture, makes evident that there is a material basis for 
the respective political power of each class in struggle. 94 Thus, the further unfolding 
of the determinations of the valorisation of capital reveals that the materiality of the 
forms of the real subsumption of labour to capital mediate not only the transformative 
power of the workers' political action determined as the form of capital's 
94 In those two chapters Marx refers to the resistance of workers in general. Specifically concerning the 
length of the working day, the plenitude of this determination becomes manifest in the chapter on 
machinery and large-scale industry. There Marx shows without ambiguity what is the material 
determination behind its duration, namely: the inverse relation between its length and the intensity of 
labour deriving from the concrete material forms of the production of relative surplus-value, i. e. 
between extensive and intensive magnitudes of the exploitation of labour. See Marx (Marx 1976a: 
542). Grossmann, in The Law of Accumulation and Breakdown of the Capitalist System, correctly 
highlights the direct relation between the intensification of labour and the value of labour-power. See 
Grossmann, cited in Grupo de Propaganda Marxista (2000: 45). 
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transcendence (a point we have been making but still need to prove), but also that of 
its role as moment of capital's reproduction. 5 
We have followed the transformations of the collective labourer brought about by 
capital through the first two forms of existence of the production of relative surplus- 
value, namely, simple co-operation and the division of labour of manufacture. From 
the perspective of the development of the revolutionary subjectivity of the working 
class, these changes in the materiality of social life still do not equip the workers with 
the material powers to abolish capital synthesised in the two general productive 
attributes necessary for 'really free working' mentioned in the introduction. Although 
their individual labours increasingly become directly social, their work of material 
production is evidently not of a `scientific and general character'. First, the very 
`technically narrow basis' of manufacture - i. e. handicraft - `excludes a really 
scientific division of the production process into its component parts' (Marx 1976a: 
458). Secondly, far from developing workers with general productive attributes, we 
95 More generally, this also can serve to illustrate once again the importance of the dialectical method 
as the 'reproduction of the concrete by means of thought'. Here we can appreciate very clearly why we 
can see through all appearances presented by a determinate social form - in this case, the class struggle- 
only by grasping it in the totality of its determinations, that is, by making the full, laborious journey 
from the abstract to the concrete. Laziness and/or hastiness of thought thereby translates into impotence 
fully to comprehend - hence transform - the concrete; which, as Marx reminds us in the Grundrisse, is 
such precisely for being 'the concentration of many determinations, hence the unity of the diverse' 
(Marx 1993: 101). 
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have seen that manufacture involves an individual labour of a particularistic kind 96 
Our search for the determinations of revolutionary subjectivity must therefore carry 
on. Let us then turn to Marx's analysis of large-scale industry and explore if it is there 
that those determinations are contained. 
Large-scale industry and workers' productive subjectivity in Capital 
As we have been arguing, the guiding thread running through Marx's exposition of the 
concrete forms of production of relative surplus-value resides in the revolutions to 
which capital subjects the productive subjectivity of the doubly-free labourer as the 
means for the multiplication of its power of self-valorisation. However, it is not there 
that Marx's presentation of the determinations of large-scale industry begins. The 
reason for this derives from the very starting point of the production of relative 
surplus-value through the system of machinery characterising large-scale industry 
itself. As Marx points out, if in manufacture the point of departure of the 
transformation of the material conditions of social labour was productive subjectivity 
as such (with the transformation, in the form of a specialisation, of the instrument of 
96 The constitution of a section of unskilled labourers in manufacture, that is, of workers whose 
speciality is the lack of all specialisation (Marx 1976a: 470), does constitute a first insinuation of the 
emergence of labourers with universal productive attributes. However, this universality is not the 
expression of an expanded productive subjectivity of wage-labourers but of an absolute degradation. 
Moreover, the number of unskilled universal workers required by manufacture remains relatively 
small, the essence of the latter being expressed mainly in workers with particularistic development of 
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labour determined as a result of the former), in large-scale industry the transformation 
of the instrument of labour constitutes the starting point, the transformation of the 
wage-labourer being its result (Marx 1976a: 492). 
Marx presents the essence of this transformation of the human labour process by 
developing the specific materiality of machinery, in particular vis-a-vis the labour 
process in manufacture. In reality, the simplest determination of that difference was 
already anticipated by Marx in the transition contained in the previous chapter of 
Capital, where the necessity of the development of machinery was laid bare. We are 
referring to capital's need to do away with the subjective basis of manufacture through 
the development of an 'objective framework' for material production, independent of 
the manual expertise and intervention of workers. In brief, it was about giving an 
objective form to the powers of social labour springing from direct productive co- 
operation. 
The two-fold material specificity of the machine thereby springs from the 
objectification of both the - however restricted - knowledge and manual skills and 
strength of the manufacturing labourer. On the one hand, capital strives to substitute 
the movement of the forces of nature for that of the human hand as the immediate 
agent in the transformation of the object of labour into a new use-value. On the other 
hand, it attempts to displace the immediate subjective experience of the worker as the 
basis for the conscious regulation of the labour process, i. e. as the basis for the 
knowledge of the determinations of the latter. This implies, in the first place, the need 
their productive attributes. Universal workers, on the contrary, are the most genuine product of the 
system of machinery. 
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to turn the production of the latter into an activity which, whilst clearly remaining an 
inner moment of the material process of social production, nonetheless acquires a 
differentiated existence from the immediacy of the direct production process. Coupled 
with the need to objectify it as a productive power directly borne by the 'dead labour' 
represented in the machine, that knowledge must necessarily take the general form of 
science. As Marx summarises it, 
As machinery, the instrument of labour assumes a material mode of existence 
which necessitates the replacement of human force by natural forces, and the 
replacement of the rule of thumb by the conscious application of natural 
science (Marx 1976a: 508). 
We can now start to appreciate how capital advances, for the first time in human 
(pre)history, in the generalisation of the application of science as an immediate 
potency of the direct process of production. 7 
The employment of the natural agents - their incorporation so to speak into 
capital - coincides with the development of scientific knowledge as an 
independent factor in the production process. In the same way as the 
production process becomes an application of scientific knowledge, so, 
conversely, does science become a factor, a function so to speak, of the 
97 We say 'generalisation' because capital did not invent natural science. However, by converting 
science into the general principle of material production, the production of relative surplus-value 
enormously fostered its development and continuous progress. And yet, it can only develop scientific 
thought within the limits springing from being an alienated social form. We shall come back to this 
crucial issue below. 
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production process. [30] Every invention becomes the basis of new inventions 
or new, improved methods of production. It is the capitalist mode of 
production which first puts the natural sciences [XX-1262] to the service of 
the direct production process, while, conversely, the development of 
production provides the means for the theoretical subjugation of nature (Marx 
1994: 32). 
Through this concrete form of production of relative surplus-value, capital starts to 
move in the direction of the social constitution of the second general attribute of 
productive subjectivity which the coming into existence of 'really free working' 
presupposes, namely: the determination of productive consciousness as scientific, 
thereby objective, in character. But large-scale industry does not only move forward 
in the production of this material condition. It also fosters the deepening of the first 
attribute, that of labour becoming directly social. In effect, with the system of 
machinery the co-operative character of labour comes to be a presupposition of the 
actual exercise of productive activity, whose necessity springs from the materiality of 
the instrument of labour itself. What is more, we can now see that those two general 
attributes are not extrinsically related but each one presupposes the other. 
Large-industry (... ) possesses in the machine system an entirely objective 
organization of production, which confronts the worker as a pre-existing 
material condition of production (... ) Machinery, with the few exceptions to be 
mentioned later, operates only by means of associated labour, or labour in 
common. Hence the co-operative character of the labour process is in this case 
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a technical necessity dictated by the very nature of the instrument of labour 
(Marx 1976a: 508). 
Thus far, then, these are the fundamental aspects of Marx's exposition of the material 
specificity of the production process of capital based on the system of machinery, i. e. 
the transformations it suffers in its aspect as a process of production of use-values. 
But the process of production of capital is such for being the unity of the labour- 
process and the valorisation process. Hence, Marx's presentation goes on to develop 
the specific impact of the system of machinery on the latter, which can be summarised 
in the following points: 
*As happened with all the productive powers deriving from the exercise of 
human productive co-operation in an immediately social form (whether in its 
simple form or through the manufacturing division of labour), the use of 
scientific discoveries costs capital nothing. They are natural forces of social 
labour that capital appropriates for free for the purpose of its valorisation 
(Marx 1976a: 508). 
*However, the productive consumption of the results of science involves the 
utilisation of ever more complex and costly means of production in an ever 
increasing scale. The capitalist appropriation of science thus entails an 
expanding magnitude of the average capital disbursement necessary to set the 
production of relative surplus-value, springing in this case from the growth of 
constant capital (Marx 1976a: 509). 
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*This increment in the magnitude of constant capital is evidently reflected in 
the value of the product. However, the two-fold nature of the capitalist 
production process as the unity of the labour process and the valorisation 
process means that this reflection is not simple or immediate. Machines do not 
create value but living labour transfers their value to the product; and it does 
so only in proportion to 'its average daily wear and tear' (Marx 1976a: 510). 
On the other hand, they enter as a whole in their determination as a material 
factor of the labour process. This 'difference between the mere utilisation of 
the instrument and its depreciation' (Marx 1976a: 509-10), and expression of 
the powers of the objectification of past labour, is also appropriated 
gratuitously by capital. 
*However attractive these gratuitous services to capital's valorisation brought 
about by the introduction of machinery might be, the latter faces a specific 
limit stricter than the generically mercantile one given by the difference 
between the labour the machine costs and the labour it saves (Marx 1976a: 
515). The reason for this springs from capital's valorisation taking concrete 
form through the appropriation of unpaid surplus-labour. Thus, for the 
capitalist, the limit to the use of the machine 'is therefore fixed by the 
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difference between the value of the machine and the value of labour-power 
replaced by it' (Marx 1976a: 515, our emphasis) 98 
With this, Marx's presentation exhausts the novel determinations brought about by the 
system of machinery to the production process as they pertain to its 'objective factor'. 
What necessarily follows, then, is the investigation of the impact of these 
transformations on the'subjective factor' of the labour process, i. e. on the worker. 
In the third section of the chapter on large-scale industry, Marx firstly presents what 
he refers to as only 'some general effects' of the system of machinery on the worker, 
that is, those changes that can be discussed without developing the specific form in 
98 This specifically capitalist limit to the introduction of machinery thus not only evidences the 
restricted character of this alienated social form of development of the material productive forces of 
society vis-ä-vis a classless, communist society (Marx 1976a: 515, fn. 16) - incidentally, a 
determination completely overlooked by bourgeois economists who, like Schumpeter and his 
contemporary disciples (Schumpeter 1934; 1947; Dosi, Freeman et at. 1988), make a great fuss about 
the technological dynamism of the capitalist mode of production. See Smith (2004) for a Marxist 
critique of Neo-Schumpeterian economics and Bellofiore (1985) for a comparison between Marx and 
Schumpeter. In addition, this also sheds light on the contradictory forms in which capital unfolds its 
nonetheless undeniable dynamism in the development of the productive powers of social labour. As 
Marx points out, the development of the system of machinery in some branches of industry may create 
such a surplus labour-force in others that capitalists could force down wages below the value of labour- 
power as a source of extra profit, thereby hindering the development of the productive forces in those 
sectors of production (Marx 1976a: 516). Finally, this also gives the 'exact demonstration' of the 
progressive character of the class struggle over the value of labour-power as an active force in the 
development of the productive forces of society and, therefore, in the production of the material 
conditions for its own determination as the form of the abolition of capital. 
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which the 'human material is incorporated with this objective organism' (Marx 1976a: 
517). In other words, these are the effects whose development does not involve any 
new qualitative determination in the productive subjectivity of workers. Rather, they 
refer to the quantitative changes that machinery brings about in capital's valorisation 
process as a process of exploitation of the worker. These include: the quantitative 
extension of the mass of exploitable labour-power through the incorporation of female 
and child labour; the tendency to prolong the working day; and the tendency to 
increase the intensive magnitude of the exploitation of human labour. 99 
It is in section 4, through the presentation of the functioning of 'the factory as a 
whole', that Marx starts to unfold the specific qualitative determinations of the 
productive subjectivity of large-scale industry. The discussion of a passage from Ure 
serves Marx succinctly to identify the most general determination of the factory as the 
ambit of capitalist society where the conscious regulation of an immediately social 
production process takes place. A conscious regulation, however, that is determined 
as a concrete form of the inverted general social regulation as an attribute of the 
materialised social relation in its process of self-expansion. In the factory - and this is 
the issue that Ure's definition overlooks - this inverted social existence reaches a 
further stage in its development by acquiring a 'technical and palpable reality' (Marx 
1976a: 548). 
99 As mentioned above, the discussion of these last two aspects completes the unfolding of the 
determinations of the material basis of the respective forces of the classes in struggle over the value of 
labour-power. Again, it shows that the political power of the working class springs from those 
necessities of the reproduction of social capital which clash with those simply realised through the 
indirect regulation of social labour and personified by the capitalists. 
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Thus, the scientific conscious regulation of social labour characterising large-scale 
industry is not an attribute borne by those workers performing direct labour in the 
immediate production process. For them, those powers exist already objectified in the 
system of machinery, to whose automatic movement they have to subordinate the 
exercise of their productive consciousness and will, to the point of becoming 'its 
living appendages' (Marx 1976a: 548). Large-scale industry consequently entails an 
enormous scientific development of the 'intellectual faculties of the production 
process' only by exacerbating their separation from manual labourers. In its mode of 
existence as a system of machinery, the product of labour comes to dominate the 
producer not only formally but even materially as well. Capital thus appears to 
manual workers as the concrete material subject of the production process itself. 
As the personification of the system of machinery acting as a material mode of 
existence of capital, the capitalist represents before the direct labourers the 
consciousness of the unity of their productive co-operation. The conscious articulation 
of their directly social labour therefore appears as the product of the capitalist's 
autocratic will, which, given the increasing complexity and scale of the co-operative 
production process under his/her command, acquires an objective form in the factory 
code and its 'barrack-like discipline' (Marx 1976a: 549). 
With all these elements, we can now turn to synthesise the specific determination of 
the productive subjectivity of the worker of large-scale industry. In - tendentially - 
doing away with the need for all specialised skill and knowledge from the workers, 
the production of relative surplus-value through the system of machinery gives the 
development of their productive subjectivity the concrete form of an absolute 
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degradation. In this brutal way, and in opposition to the particularism of the 
subjectivity of the wage-labourer of manufacture, large-scale industry begets, as its 
most genuine product, a universal worker, i. e. a productive subject capable of taking 
part in any form of the human labour process. 1°° In the words of Marx, 
Hence, in place of the hierarchy of specialised workers that characterizes 
manufacture, there appears, in the automatic factory, a tendency to equalize 
and reduce to an identical level every kind of work that has to be done by the 
minders of the machines; in place of the artificially produced distinctions 
between the specialized workers, it is natural differences of age and sex that 
predominate (Marx 1976a: 545). 
With this tendency to the production of workers who are capable of working with any 
machine, the material or technical necessity for the life-long attachment of individuals 
to a single productive function disappears. However, the exploitative relation between 
capitalists and workers that mediates the development of the material productive 
forces of social labour as an alienated attribute of its product, leads to the 
100 For post-modern social thought, any claim that there is something progressive in capital's tendency 
to produce universal subjectivities can only represent a totalitarian attack by the Western metaphysics 
of the subject aimed at suppressing the ontologically irreducible difference on which human 
subjectivity is predicated. In the same vein as Adam Smith could not distinguish labour from alienated 
labour and therefore saw the former as intrinsically a sacrifice, post-modern social thought cannot 
distinguish the progressive nature of the development of the universality of human subjectivity as such 
from the alienated capitalist form in which the conditions for its realisation are historically achieved, 
i. e. from the alienated universality of the determination of human beings as personifications. See 
Goldner (2001: 91-7). 
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reproduction of the 'old division of labour' in even more hideous fashion. Large-scale 
industry's tendency to produce an increasingly universal worker is thereby realised in 
the concrete form of its negation, that is, by multiplying the spaces for the exploitation 
of living labour on the basis of an exacerbation of 'ossified particularities'. Thus, the 
individual capitalist could not care less about the disappearance of the technical 
necessity for a particularistic development of the worker's productive subjectivity. 
Under the pressure of competition, his/her only individual motive is the production of 
an extra surplus-value. If he/she can obtain it by attaching the worker to 'the lifelong 
speciality of serving the same machine' (Marx 1976a: 547), so he/she will. And, in 
effect, the reproduction of the division of labour under the new technical conditions 
implies that a lower value of labour-power can be paid - since 'the expenses necessary 
for his [the workers, GS] reproduction' are 'considerably lessened' - and, in addition, 
that a greater docility on the part of the exploitable human material is induced - since 
'his helpless dependence upon the factory as a whole, and therefore upon the 
capitalist, is rendered complete' (Marx 1976a: 547). 
It is crucial at this juncture to be clear about this contradictory movement between 
universality and particularity of the determinations of the productive subjectivity of 
large-scale industry. Paraphrasing Marx, here, as everywhere else, we must 
distinguish between the general tendency of capital accumulation and the concrete 
forms in which the essence of the historical movement is realised. Thus, the essential 
determination which, as we shall see, expresses the reason to be of the capitalist mode 
of production, lies in the tendency to universalise the productive attributes of wage- 
labourers. This is the general movement of the production of relative surplus-value 
through the system of machinery which underlies - hence, gives unity to - the 
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variegated forms that the labour-process presents in the course of capitalist 
development. '0' In order to substantiate this, let us now move ahead in our 
reconstruction of Marx's investigation of large-scale industry to the point in Capital 
where he further unfolds the movement of the identified contradiction, i. e. to the 
subsequent discussion of factory legislation in section 9 of this same chapter. 
Marx's exposition starts by reminding the reader of the already presented most general 
determination of factory legislation as the mode of existence of the general conscious 
regulation of social labour as an alienated potency of the accumulation of capital - that 
is, not simply pertaining to the conscious regulation of social labour within each 
private fragment of total social capital but to the establishment of the general 
conditions which must be presupposed by all of them. This puts us before what we 
have already seen in our discussion of the legal regulation of the duration of the 
working day by the capitalist state, namely: the way in which the autonomised 
movement of the private organisation of social labour through the valorisation of 
capital engenders the general direct regulation as its necessary product. 
Factory legislation, that first conscious and methodical reaction of society 
against the spontaneously developed form of its production process, is, as we 
101 Again, this point can help us highlight the fundamental importance of the two-fold movement of the 
dialectical method (analytic and synthetic) underlying its power both to penetrate surface appearances 
of reality in order to discover the essence of social forms and to unfold the necessity of the concrete 
forms in which that essential moment is realised. Regarding the capitalist labour-process, the dialectical 
method can avoid the twin shortcomings present in the Marxist literature of both the one-sided 
empiricist focus on its more concrete forms - which substitutes a radical industrial sociology for a 
proper dialectical investigation (Burawoy 1979; Edwards 1979; Burawoy 1985) - and the speculative, 
unmediated imposition of the general determination on concrete forms which still involve its negation 
- as, we think, happens with, for instance, the 'immaterial labour' thesis popularised by Negri and 
Hardt's Empire (2000: 28-30), and originally coming from their and their colleagues' work around the journals Futur Anterieur and Multitudes (Lazzarato and Negri 1991; Lazzarato 1996). An empirical 
study informed by such an approach can be found in Corzani, Lazzarato et al. (Corsani, Lazzarato et al. 1996). 
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have seen, just as much the necessary product of large-scale industry as cotton 
yarn, self-actors and the electric telegraph (Marx 1976a: 610). 
But if in its material content this determination of the production of relative surplus- 
value shows its progressive character as a form of development of the productive 
powers of social labour, its concrete realisation as state regulation - in turn, only 
imposed upon the immediate personifications of capital with the mediation of the 
class struggle - makes evident its limits springing from its alienated form. Hence, as 
Marx points out, the fact that factory acts cannot go beyond only meagre provisions 
'strikingly demonstrates that the capitalist mode of production, by its very nature, 
excludes all rational improvement beyond a certain point' (Marx 1976a: 612). 102 
Be that as it may, the crucial point for our argument is that Marx's analysis of factory 
legislation completes (as far as Capital is concerned) the development of the specific 
determinations of the productive subjectivity of large-scale industry, which had left 
us, in section 4, with an unresolved contradiction between its general tendency for 
universality and the exacerbation of the particularism of the division of labour that, 
left to the unrestrained will of individual capitalists, it allowed. In addition, we shall 
see how this discussion leads Marx, for the first time in his dialectical exposition, to 
discover the revolutionary historical potentialities carried by this specifically capitalist 
form of human labour-power. 
102 The uncritical glorification of the advance in the state regulation of social production by `state 
socialists' (whether in its reformist or 'revolutionary' guise) grasps the content of this process without being aware of its alienated form. The abstract critique of 'libertarian' communist currents, grasps the 
oppressive nature of the form but ignores that, in this way, a progressive content realises itself 
274 
The movement of 'the contradiction between the division of labour under manufacture 
and the essential character of large-scale industry' (Marx 1976a: 615) acquires a first 
expression in the establishment of compulsory elementary education for working 
children. As Marx points out, the unchecked exploitation of child labour by individual 
capitals led not only to the 'physical deterioration of children and young persons' 
(Marx 1976a: 520), but also to an artificially-produced intellectual degeneration, 
which transformed 'immature human beings into mere machines for the production of 
relative surplus-value' (Marx 1976a: 523). And since 'there is a very clear distinction 
between this and the state of natural ignorance in which the mind lies fallow without 
loosing its capacity for development, its natural fertility' (Marx 1976a: 523), these 
excesses of the capitalist exploitation of child labour-power eventually reacted back 
on the very capacity of valorisation of total social capital by jeopardising the 
existence of the future generation of adult- workers in the 'material and moral 
conditions' needed by capital accumulation itself. This is illustrated by Marx through 
a discussion of the case of the English letter-press printing trade, which, before the 
introduction of the printing machine, was organised around a system of apprenticeship 
in which workers 'went through a course of teaching till they were finished printers' 
and according to which 'to be able to read and write was for every one of them a 
requirement of their trade' (Marx 1976a: 615). With the introduction of printing 
machines, however, capitalists were allowed to hire children from 11 to 17 years of 
age, who 'in a great proportion cannot read' and 'are, as a rule, utter savages and very 
extraordinary creatures' (Marx 1976a: 615). These young workers were day after day 
attached to the simplest of tasks for very long hours until being 'discharged from the 
printing establishments' for having become 'too old for such children's work' (Marx 
1976a: 615). Those then 17-year-old workers were left in such intellectual and 
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physical degradation that were unfitted to provide capital, even in the same factory, 
with the miserably restricted productive attributes that it required from its immediate 
source of surplus-value, i. e. human labour-power. 
The education clauses of the factory legislation allow Marx not only to dispel any 
doubt about social capital's 'universal vocation' in its transformation of human 
productive subjectivity. They also serve him to highlight, for the first time in his 
whole dialectical exposition, that it is only the development of that specific form of 
human productive subjectivity that expresses capital's historic movement in the 
production of the material powers for its own supersession as the general social 
relation regulating human life. 
As Robert Owen has shown us in detail, the germ of the education of the 
future is present in the factory system; this education will, in the case of every 
child over a given age, combine productive labour with instruction and 
gymnastics, not only as one of the methods of adding to the efficiency of 
production, but as the only method of producing fully developed human 
beings (Marx 1976a: 614). 
Notice, however, that Marx makes clear that the education clauses represent the genn 
- and just that - of the 'education of the future'. To put it differently, Marx's discussion 
aims at showing both that the social forms of the future are effectively carried as a 
potentiality by the productive subjectivity of large-scale industry under consideration 
and that, with the determinations unfolded thus far, that potentiality is not immediate 
yet. On the contrary, in their 'paltriness', the education clauses reveal that these 
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determinations are far from being a 'method of producing fully developed human 
beings'. Rather, they are forms of positing individuals whose subjectivity is still 
trapped within the miserable material forms imposed by the reproduction of the 
conditions for capital's valorisation. Other material transformations are still needed to 
mediate the development of those germinal elements into their plenitude. 
Social capital's necessity to produce universal workers is not exhausted by the 
obstacles to its valorisation posed by the division of labour within the workshop. As 
Marx remarks, 'what is true of the division of labour within the workshop under the 
system of manufacture is also true of the division of labour within society' (Marx 
1976a: 615). In effect, inasmuch as the technical basis of large-scale industry is 
essentially revolutionary, it entails the permanent transformation of the material 
conditions of social labour and, therefore, of the forms of exertion of the productive 
subjectivity of individual workers and of their articulation as a directly collective 
productive body (Marx 1976a: 617). This continuous technical change thereby 
requires individuals who can work in the ever-renewed material forms of the 
production of relative surplus-value. Thus, ' Marx concludes, 'large-scale industry, by 
its very nature, necessitates variation of labour, fluidity of functions, and mobility of 
the worker in all directions' (Marx 1976a: 617). However, he also points out again 
how the general organisation of social production through the valorisation of 
independent fragments of social capital negates the immediate realisation of this 
tendency for an all-sided development of individuals. '03 The private fragmentation of 
social labour, and its reified social mediation through the capital-form, permits the 
reproduction of 'the old division of labour with its ossified particularities' (Marx 
103 Bellofiore (1998) provides suggestive reflections on this question. 
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1976a: 617) and gives the imposition of variation of labour the form of 'an 
overpowering natural law, and with the blindly destructive action of a natural law that 
meets with obstacles everywhere' (Marx 1976a: 618). In this contradictory form, the 
realisation of large-scale industry's tendency to produce universal workers nonetheless 
marches forward, also revealing that it is in the full development of this determination 
that this alienated social form finds its own absolute limit. In other words, that it is in 
the fully-developed universal character of human productive subjectivity that the 
material basis for the new society rests. 
This possibility of varying labour must become a general law of social 
production, and the existing relations must be adapted to permit its realization 
in practice (... ) the partially developed individual, who is merely the bearer of 
one specialized social function, must be replaced by the totally developed 
individual, for whom the different social functions are different modes of 
activity he takes up in turn (Marx 1976a: 618). 
With this analysis Marx unfolds, then, another instance of the way in which the 
general necessities of the reproduction of social capital (in this case, workers bearing 
a universal productive subjectivity) enter into contradiction with its concrete 
realisation through the private actions of individual capitals (which strive for the 
perpetuation and exacerbation of the particularistic development of productive 
subjectivity). Moreover, we see once again how this contradiction moves by 
determining the working class as the personification of the mediated necessities of the 
valorisation of capital, the latter providing the material and social basis for proletarian 
political power. In effect, the development of large-scale industry makes the 
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possession of a universal subjectivity a matter of survival for the members of the 
working class since, as evidenced by the aforementioned case of the printing trade 
workers, only in that way can they be in a position to sell their labour-power to capital 
(thereby turning the alienated necessities of social capital into an immediate need for 
their social and material reproduction). Thus, workers have to 'put their heads 
together' again and, through their struggle as a class, force the capitalist state to 
'proclaim that elementary education is a compulsory pre-condition for the 
employment of children' (Marx 1976a: 613). But what is elementary education if not a 
- certainly very basic - step in the formation of future universal workers? That is, in 
the development of productive attributes that equip the labourer to work not in this or 
that particular aspect of the immediately social labour-process of the collective 
labourer of large-scale industry, but in whatever task that capital requires from 
him/her? 
Social capital's need for universal workers thereby provides another material basis for 
the political power of the working class in its confrontation with the capitalist class 
over the conditions of its social reproduction. In this first expression of that relation 
between large-scale industry and workers' power represented by the Factory Acts, the 
class struggle does not appear to transcend its most general determination as the form 
of the buying/selling of the commodity labour-power at its value. And yet Marx 
advances the proposition that, when concretely developed, that tendency towards 
universal productive subjectivity will eventually provide the class struggle with 
expanded transformative powers, namely, those necessary for the establishment of the 
workers' 'political supremacy' as a class. 
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Though the Factory Act, that first and meagre concession wrung from capital, 
is limited to combining elementary education with work in the factory, there 
can be no doubt that, with the inevitable conquest of political power by the 
working class, technological education, both theoretical and practical, will 
take its proper place in the schools of the workers (Marx 1976a: 619). 
Now, the question immediately arises as to what are the more concrete determinations 
behind this inevitability of the proletarian conquest of political power. Unfortunately, 
no answer is given by Marx in these pages. In fact, we would like to argue that no 
answer could have been provided at all. The unfolding of the necessity of 'proletarian 
dictatorship' as a concrete social form involves still more mediations and, therefore, 
the former is not carried by the social form we are facing at this point of the 
exposition in the form of an immediate potentiality to be realised through the political 
action of the workers as a class. Thus, at this stage of the dialectical presentation, both 
this latter remark and the one discussed above regarding the totally-developed 
individual as the basis for the abolition of capital, cannot be but unmediated 
observations, external to the concrete determinations of the productive subjectivity of 
large-scale industry that we have before us. On the other hand, inasmuch as the latter 
does involve a certain degree of universality, a limited, albeit real, expression of the 
underlying tendency for the production of its fully-developed shape, Marx's 
reflections, although external, are undoubtedly pertinent. From a methodological point 
of view, he could therefore legitimately introduce those remarks in order to anticipate 
the direction that the further unfolding of this historically-specific contradiction of the 
capitalist mode of production - 'the only historical way in which it can be dissolved 
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and then reconstructed on a new basis' (Marx 1976a: 619) - should take. 
104 But as a 
proper, complete dialectical account of the determinations underlying the proletarian 
conquest of political power or, above all, the revolutionary production of the free 
association of individuals, the presentation as thus far developed definitely falls short. 
This, in itself, should not be problematic. According to the approach to the dialectical 
method we have been developing in this thesis, this juncture of our search for the 
determinations of revolutionary subjectivity is no dead-end at all. It only means that 
our journey from the abstract to the concrete still needs to proceed forward. Thus, as 
far as the dialectical critique of political economy as such is concerned, no anomaly 
lies before us. But very different is the question when approached not from the 
standpoint of the dialectical knowledge of revolutionary subjectivity as such, but from 
that of the elements for such an investigation we can find already objectified in 
Marx's Capital. In that respect, we think that the problem that the contemporary 
reader of Capital attempting to discover those determinations faces is, to put it briefly, 
that they are not there. Let us expand on this point. 
We have seen how Marx, when faced with the tendential universality of the worker of 
large-scale industry and the growing conscious regulation of social labour it entails, 
104 In the same vein, Marx's comments on capital's raison d'etre in the chapter on simple co-operation 
also bear this two-fold mark of externality and pertinence. The former because, unlike the condensed 
recapitulation of the general movement in the chapter on the 'Historical Tendency of Capitalist 
Accumulation', the totality of the determinations behind the realisation of that world-historical role is 
not yet there. The latter because, as we have pointed out earlier in our argument, that certainly is the 
first time in the presentation that we can grasp an initial manifestation of the historical powers of 
private labour to take concrete form in their opposite: consciously organised, directly social labour. 
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extrinsically reflects upon the specific material form of productive subjectivity 
necessary to 'build society anew' on a really free basis. On the other hand, we have 
highlighted the methodological pertinence of such a reflection given that - as the 
passage on 'really free working' from the Grundrisse quoted above stated - the latter 
itself has as one of its determinations that of being a bearer of universal productive 
attributes, i. e. capable of 'material production of a general character'. So far so good. 
But, as the reader will remember, the attribute of universality did not exhaust the 
determinations of the form of productive subjectivity with the immediate potentiality 
for 'really free working' (which, as we argued, should provide the material foundation 
of revolutionary political subjectivity). In the first place, the latter also entailed a 
process of material production whose general social character was immediately 
posited. This condition is present - at least tendentially - in the productive subjectivity 
of large-scale industry as developed in Capital too. 105 But, in addition, note that 
Marx's passage from the Grundrisse mentions that the universality of 'revolutionary' 
productive subjectivity must be the expression of a scientific consciousness, capable 
of organising work as 'an activity regulating all the forces of nature'. And here lies the 
crux of the matter. 
cos In the chapter on 'Machinery and Large-Scale Industry', the tendency to expand the scope of the 
conscious regulation of the social character of labour co-exists with an opposite tendency to multiply 
the number of privately-mediated branches of the social division of labour, which is also the product of 
the movement of this form of production of relative surplus-value (Marx 1976a: 572). But no reason is 
given for one or the other tendency to prevail. This occurs later in Marx's presentation, when he unfolds 
the determinations of the 'General Law of Capitalist Accumulation'. There, the tendencies to the 
concentration and centralisation of capital show how the first tendency eventually imposes itself over 
the second. 
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Because although the productive subjectivity of the worker of large-scale industry as 
presented in Capital tends to become universal, this universality is not the product of 
the scientific expansion of his/her capacity consciously to regulate the production 
process, but of the increasing (eventually absolute) deprivation of all knowledge of 
the social and material determinations of the labour-process of which he/she is part. 
As we have seen above, for the workers engaged in the direct process of production, 
the separation of intellectual and manual labour reaches its plenitude. This kind of 
labourer can certainly work in any automated labour-process which capital puts 
before him/her, but not as the 'dominant subject' with 'the mechanical automaton as 
the object'. Rather, for those workers 'the automaton itself is the subject, and the 
workers are merely conscious organs, co-ordinated with the unconscious organs of the 
automaton, and together with the latter, subordinated to the central moving force' 
(Marx 1976a: 544-5). The scientific productive powers needed to regulate the forces 
of nature, and which are presupposed to their objectified existence in a system of 
machinery, are not an attribute that capital puts into the hands (or, rather, in the heads) 
of direct labourers. In brief, in the figure of this wage-labourer bearing what, 
following Inigo Carrera (2003), we shall term an absolutely degraded productive 
subjectivity, scientific consciousness and universality do not go together but in 
opposition to one another. In other words, it is not this degraded productive 
subjectivity that, simply as such, carries in its immediacy the historical revolutionary 
powers that Marx himself considered necessary to make capital 'blow sky high'. 
Moreover, neither has Marx's exposition demonstrated that the very movement of the 
present-day alienated general social relation - capital accumulation - leads to the 
social necessity to transform, in the political form of a revolution, the productive 
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subjectivity of those labourers in the direction of their re-appropriation of the powers 
of scientific knowledge developed in this alienated form. 
And yet despite this insufficiency as an account of the material genesis of the 
revolutionary subject, it is here that Marx's exposition in Capital about the 
determinations of human productive subjectivity as an alienated attribute of the 
product of labour comes to a halt. In the rest of Volume 1 (and the two remaining 
volumes), Marx no longer advances, in any systematic manner, in the unfolding of the 
material and social determinations of the revolutionary subject. From the point of the 
presentation reached, and after moving to the exteriority of the inner determinations 
of the production of surplus-value and to its reproduction, he just makes a gigantic 
leap into the conclusion contained in the chapter on the 'Historical Tendency of 
Capitalist Accumulation', where Marx offers the following well-known account of the 
determinations leading to the abolition of the capitalist mode of production. 106 
Along with the constant decrease in the number of capitalist magnates, who 
usurp and monopolize all the advantages of this process of transformation, the 
mass of misery, oppression, slavery, degradation and exploitation grows; but 
with this there also grows the revolt of the working class, a class constantly 
increasing in numbers, and trained, united and organized by the very 
106 Which, when taken by itself, can certainly lead to the most mechanistic of accounts of revolutionary 
subjectivity, very easy to codify into a dogma. The point is that the content of the chapter at stake 
merely summarises the general movement that Marx has been unfolding throughout the whole of 
Volume 1 and, in particular, in the chapters on relative surplus-value and the general law of capitalist 
accumulation. When seen in this light, it is obvious that the development of the determinations of 
revolutionary subjectivity is a very complex (i. e. mediated) one indeed. 
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mechanism of the capitalist process of production. The monopoly of capital 
becomes a fetter upon the mode of production which has flourished alongside 
and under it. The centralization of the means of production and the 
socialization of labour reach a point at which they become incompatible with 
their capitalist integument. The integument is burst asunder. The knell of 
capitalist private property sounds. The expropriators are expropriated (Marx 
1976a: 929). 
If we leave aside the question of the misleading conflation between two different 
(and therefore analytically separable) 'moments' of the revolutionary action of the 
working class contained in this passage - namely, the expropriation of the bourgeoisie 
and the abolition of capital - the question remains as to whether the determinations 
developed by Marx in the previous chapters suffice to justify the transition to this 
excessively simplistic and all too general account of the way 'the capitalist integument 
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is burst asunder'. 107 Certainly, the tendency to the centralisation of capital discussed in 
107 Whatever the ambiguities of Marx's formulation in the passage from the chapter on the Historical 
Tendency of Capital Accumulation cited above, a cursory reading of his so-called `political writings' 
makes evident that he was very clear about the `unity-in-difference' between the expropriation of the 
bourgeoisie and the abolition of capital. To begin with, this is synthesised in the political programme of 
the working class to be implemented through the revolutionary 'conquest of political supremacy' 
contained in the Communist Manifesto, whose immediate economic content unequivocally comes down 
to the absolute centralisation of capital in the form of state-property - hence the abolition of the 
bourgeoisie - and does not involve the abolition of the capitalist mode of production (Marx and 
Engels 
1976b: 504-5). As Chattopadhyay competently shows (1992: 92-3), for Marx the revolutionary 
conquest of political power together with the expropriation of the bourgeoisie were the necessaryforms 
in which to start the process of transformation of the capitalist mode of production into the 
free 
association of individuals. But, unlike the conception found in Lenin and orthodox Marxism generally, 
Marx was very clear that the political rule of the working class 'does not by itself signify the collective 
appropriation by society, and does not indicate the end of capital' (1992: 93). The 'dictatorship of the 
proletariat' was for Marx a period within the capitalist mode of production - hence, not a non-capitalist 
transitional society - in which the latter was to be entirely revolutionised in every nook and cranny up 
to the point of fully preparing wage-workers for their self-emancipation - hence for their self-abolition 
as working class (1992: 93). This has several implications. First, during that period workers continue to 
be wage-labourers (the sale of labour-power to the 'single capital' for a wage still being the general 
indirect social relation regulating the reproduction of the worker's life). In the second place, no matter 
how radically democratic the self-government of the direct producers (and Marx thought it would be. 
See Draper 1974 for a textual analysis of this), they still confront the social determinations of their 
individual life activity as an objectified power of the product of social labour, whose autonomised 
movement of self-valorisation actually rules the production process of social life (Inigo Carrera 2003: 
26). As much as with workers' co-operatives within an individual fragment of social labour, self- 
government by wage-labourers is tantamount to the general self-management 'of the use of the means 
of production to valorize their own labour' (Marx 1991: 571, our emphasis). Thirdly, this means that, 
although taking place in the form of a revolution, the political action of the working class that conquers 
political supremacy and expropriates the bourgeoisie cannot be the product of a fully self-conscious 
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the chapter on the 'General Law of Capital Accumulation' does provide an exposition 
of the necessity behind the progressive socialisation of labour as an attribute of the 
capitalist form of private labour. But such an account stops short at the exteriority of 
the quantitative determination of the scope of consciously organised social labour 
without saying anything about the qualitative transformations of the productive 
subjectivity of the collective labourer that such an extension of the scale of the former 
subjectivity - otherwise it would not continue to see the social determinations of human individuality as 
external to the latter and hence as objectively borne by the product of labour. In other words, this form 
of political subjectivity is not the one which expresses the historical necessity for the self-conscious 
transcendence of the capitalist mode of production and whose determinations our investigation has 
been searching for. It is only the expression of the clash of capital accumulation with the mediation of 
private property, i. e. of the need for capital to take the form of a directly collective property, the 
immediate 'form of social capital (capital of directly associated individuals) in contrast to private 
capital' (Marx 1991: 567). Even more so than the joint-stock companies mentioned by Marx in Volume 
3 of Capital, 'this is the abolition of capital as private property within the confines of the capitalist 
mode of production itself (Marx 1991: 567). And yet, given that the centralisation of capital is the 
most potent form for the production of relative surplus-value and, a fortiori, for the alienated historical 
movement toward the constitution of universal productive subjects, the conquest of political supremacy 
and the expropriation of the bourgeoisie becomes 'a necessary point of transition towards the 
transformation of capital back into the property of the producers' and 'towards the transformation of all 
functions formerly bound up with capital ownership in the reproduction process into simple functions 
of the associated producers, into social functions' (Marx 1991: 568). As we shall see below, the 'ultra- 
leftist' political programme for 'immediate communisation' (Aufheben Collective 2003; Theorie 
Communiste 2003; Aufheben Collective 2004) is absolutely right as far as the content of the political 
action of the fully developed, self-conscious revolutionary subject is concerned. It is wrong in thinking 
that such a form of subjectivity can emerge in the course of history without passing 'through long 
struggles, through a series of historic processes transforming circumstances and men' (Marx 1986: 
335) and which can only come about as the result of the 'conquest of political supremacy'. 
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presuppose. Seen from that perspective, we think that the transition to revolutionary 
subjectivity contained in the passage is definitely unmediated. For how are those 
workers whose productive subjectivity has been emptied of almost all content to 
organise the allocation of the total labour-power of society in the form of a self- 
conscious collective potency, the latter being what the abolition of capital is all about? 
The growing 'misery, degradation, oppression and so on' certainly confront those 
labourers with particularly extreme immediate manifestations of the alienated mode of 
existence of their social being. Therefore, they could lead them to reinforce their 
collective resistance to capitalist exploitation by strengthening their relations of 
solidarity in the struggle over the value of labour-power. But, in themselves, those 
expressions of capitalist alienation have no way of transforming the class struggle 
from a form of the reproduction of that alienation into the form of its fully self- 
conscious transcendence! 08 As stated above, from a materialist perspective, the 
question does not boil down to the will radically to transform the world, but to the 
existence of the material powers to do so. As Marx puts it in the Holy Family, it is 
about an 'absolutely imperative need determined as 'the practical expression of 
necessity' (Marx and Engels 1975: 37). The emergence of the social necessity 
underlying the historical constitution of the latter still involves the mediation of more 
revolutions in the materiality of the productive subjectivity of workers. 
In this sense, we concur in general with those who claim that Marx's Capital is 
incomplete. However, this not in the sense that the dialectic of capital needs to be 
log And for an action to be fully self-conscious means to be aware of its own determinations in their 
totality. Hence, however fierce, the particular resistance to immediate manifestations of alienated social 
life does not involve the necessity to grasp the latter beyond all appearance it presents. 
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complemented with that of class struggle (Shortall 1994) or with the political 
economy of wage-labour (Lebowitz 2003), as if those latter aspects were not an inner 
moment of the former itself. Rather, we think that it is the very 'dialectic of capital' 
and, more concretely, the contradictory movement of the production of relative 
surplus-value through the system of machinery, that is in need of completion. Without 
this further exploration into the development of human productive subjectivity as an 
alienated attribute of social capital, a gap is bound to remain between the 'dialectic of 
human labour' unfolded in the relevant chapters of Capital and the revolutionary 
conclusions at the end of Volume 1. 
In the following section, we shall turn to outline Marx's presentation of the 
determinations of the system of machinery in the Grundrisse. We shall see that 
although the complete systematic unfolding of the missing determinations is not there 
either, the main elements for such a further investigation of revolutionary subjectivity 
can be extracted from that text. 
The Grundrisse and the system of machinery: in search of the missing link in the 
social determinations of revolutionary subjectivity 
Before getting into the discussion of Marx's account of the system of machinery in the 
Grundrisse, and as a kind of entry point to the latter, let us return for a moment to our 
reconstruction of the determinations of large-scale industry as presented in Capital. 
More concretely, let us go back to the relation between science and the production 
process. We have seen how, although this form of production of relative surplus-value 
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entailed the general application of science as a productive force, the latter was not an 
attribute materially borne by those labourers engaged in direct labour in the 
immediate process of production. For them, that scientific knowledge took the form of 
an alien power already objectified in the machine. This is remarked by Marx in the 
Grundrisse as well. 
The worker's activity, reduced to a mere abstraction of activity, is determined 
and regulated on all sides by the movement of the machinery, and not the 
opposite. The science which compels the inanimate limbs of the machinery, by 
their construction, to act purposefully, as an automaton, does not exist in the 
worker's consciousness, but rather acts upon him through the machine as an 
alien power, as the power of the machine itself (Marx 1993: 693). 
And yet as Marx puts it in the Results of the Immediate Production Process, those 
scientific powers ultimately are themselves the products of labour (Marx 1976d: 
1055). Thus, although the formal subject of those powers - as happens with all the 
powers springing from the direct organisation of human co-operation - remains 
capital, the question immediately arises as to who is the material subject whose 
(alienated) intellectual labour develops the scientific capacities of the human species 
and organises their practical application in the immediate process of production. 
Having discarded manual labourers as such a productive subject, it would seem that 
the only alternative must be to turn our attention to the only remaining character 
present in the direct production process, namely, the capitalist. Is it him/her who 
personifies, through the development of his/her productive consciousness and will, 
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capital's need for the powers scientifically to control the movement of natural forces? 
The answer is given by Marx in a footnote to the chapter on 'Machinery and Large- 
Scale Industry' in Capital: 
Science, generally speaking, costs the capitalist nothing, a fact that by no 
means prevents him from exploiting it. "Alien" science is incorporated by 
capital just as "alien" labour is. But "capitalist" appropriation and "personal" 
appropriation, whether of science or of material wealth, are totally different 
things. Dr. Ure himself deplores the gross ignorance of mechanical science 
which exists among his beloved machinery-exploiting manufacturers, and 
Liebig can tell us about the astounding ignorance of chemistry displayed by 
English chemical manufacturers (Marx 1976a: 508). 
Thus, it is not the capitalist who embodies the intellectual powers to develop the 
scientific knowledge presupposed by its objectified existence in a system of 
machinery. The science incorporated in the immediate production process is the result 
of the appropriation of the product of the intellectual labour of an 'other'. This 'other', 
whose productive activity the direct production process of large-scale industry carries 
as a necessary mediation, is not explicitly present in Marx's exposition in Capital. 
There might be two reasons for this exclusion. First, because in Marx's time such a 
social subject was only beginning to develop. And, secondly, because Marx's 
presentation in Capital is restricted to the transformations suffered by the productive 
subjectivity of those workers remaining in the direct production process. However, 
what his whole analysis implicitly suggests is that among the transformations that 
large-scale industry brings about is the extension of material unity comprising its total 
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labour-process outside the boundaries of the 'factory walls'. 109 Hence, the direct 
process of production becomes just an aspect of a broader labour-process which now 
entails two additional moments: the development of the power consciously to regulate 
in an objective and universal fashion the movement of natural forces - i. e. science - 
and the application of that capacity in the practical organisation of the automatic 
system of machinery and whatever remains of direct labour - the technological 
application of science, including the consciousness of the unity of productive co- 
operation. Certainly, these other moments are also present in Capital (Marx 1976a: 
549). However, Marx's presentation there seems to revolve around the emphasis on 
their separated mode of existence vis-a-vis the subjectivity of direct labourers and 
which is presupposed by their activity. By contrast, in the Grundrisse he oscillates 
between such an angle on the question (Marx 1993: 693-4) and one which puts at the 
forefront the underlying material unity of the total activity of living labour, where the 
development of science and its technological applications act as essential constitutive 
moments. 110 With the system of machinery, 
109 In this analysis of the further determinations of the production process of large-scale industry we 
follow the approach developed in Ingo Carrera (2003: 1-37). 
110 Dunayevskaya (1989: 80-86) correctly notes the difference in presentation between the account of 
the system of machinery in the Grundrisse - where the emancipatory potentialities of the system of 
machinery are considered - and the one in Capital - where its determination as a materialised 
expression of the domination of dead over living labour is emphasised. However, she wrongly 
attributes that to a change in Marx's view on the subject instead of as an account of qualitatively 
different potentialities engendered by the very same development of the system of machinery and 
personified by the different partial organs of the collective labourer. 
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(... ) the entire production process appears as not subsumed under the direct 
skillfulness of the worker, but rather as the technological application of 
science. [It is, ] hence, the tendency of capital to give production a scientific 
character; direct labour [is] reduced to a mere moment of this process (Marx 
1993: 699). 
The determinations presupposed by the production of relative surplus-value involve 
the specification of commodity-owners into capitalist and wage-labourer. Having 
discarded the former as the material subject of scientific labour, it is self-evident that 
only those determined as doubly-free individuals can personify the development of 
this moment of the production process of large-scale industry. Thus, although not 
explicitly addressed by Marx, the benefit of historical hindsight makes it very easy for 
us to recognise how social capital deals with its constant need for the development of 
the productive powers of science, namely: by engendering a special partial organ of 
the collective labourer whose function is to advance in the conscious control of the 
movement of natural forces and its objectification in the form of ever more complex 
automatic systems of machinery. Whilst the system of machinery entails the 
progressive deskilling of those workers performing what remains of direct labour - to 
the point of emptying their labour of any content other than the mechanistic repetition 
of extremely simple tasks - it also entails the tendential expansion of the productive 
subjectivity of the members of the intellectual organ of the collective labourer. Capital 
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requires from these workers ever more complex forms of labour. " As much as those 
discussed in Capital, these are also 'immediate effects of machine production on the 
worker. ' Needless to say, inasmuch as this expanded productive subjectivity is nothing 
more than a concrete form of the production of relative surplus-value, the exercise of 
the newly developed intellectual productive powers is inverted into a mode of 
existence of capital in its movement of self-valorisation as well. ' 12 
In this alienated form, capital thereby produces a material transformation whose 
fundamental significance well exceeds the production of wage-labourers simply 
bearing different productive attributes. What is at stake here is, first and foremost, a 
radical substantial transformation of the very nature of human labour (Inigo Carrera 
2003: 11). The latter progressively ceases to consist in the direct application of 
111 Braverman's so-called 'deskilling' thesis (1998) is obviously a one-sided reduction of this two fold 
movement of degradation/expansion of the productive subjectivity of the collective labourer required 
by the system of machinery to one of its moments (Inigo Carrera 2003: 32). One of the immediate 
reasons behind such a unilateral account lies, as Tony Smith points out, in its very restricted definition 
of 'skill', very much referring to manufacturing skills (Smith 2000: 39). An early in-depth critical 
examination of Braverman's thesis can be found in Eiger (1979). In fact, one could argue that both 
'Fordist' and 'Post-Fordist' methods involve both deskilling and the enhancement of workers' 'skills'. On 
Fordism, see Clarke (1992). Clarke (1990) demolishes the fantasies of most of the literature on 'Post- 
Fordism', laying bare its purely ideological character. On'lean production' see the work of Tony Smith 
just referred to above. 
112 That is, the productive powers of science take an alienated form not just vis-ä-vis manual labourers, 
who face them already objectified in the system of machinery. Intellectual labourers also confront the 
development of science they themselves personify as an alien power borne by the product of their 
social labour. Moreover, we shall see in the next chapter that the alienated nature of this development 
of intellectual labour is even expressed in its general scientific form, i. e. its method. 
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labour-power onto the object of labour with the purpose of changing its form. It now 
increasingly becomes an activity aimed at the conscious control of the movement of 
natural forces in order to make them automatically act upon the object of labour and, 
in this way, effect its change of form. According to Marx's exposition of the system of 
machinery in the Grundrisse, it is in the contradictory historical unfolding of this 
specific material transformation of human productive subjectivity that the key to the 
absolute limit to capital resides. 
To the degree that labour time -- the mere quantity of labour -- is posited 
by 
capital as the sole determinant element, to that degree does direct labour and 
its quantity disappear as the determinant principle of production -- of the 
creation of use values -- and is reduced both quantitatively, to a smaller 
proportion, and qualitatively, as an, of course, indispensable but subordinate 
moment, compared to general scientific labour, technological application of 
natural sciences, on one side, and to the general productive force arising from 
social combination [Gliederung] in total production on the other side -- a 
combination which appears as a natural fruit of social labour (although it is a 
historic product). Capital thus works towards its own dissolution as the form 
dominating production (Marx 1993: 700, our emphasis). 
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To put it briefly, the issue here is the old question of the relation between intellectual 
and manual labour. 113 More concretely, the fundamental point to grasp is the 
specifically capitalist form in which the antithetical movement of those two moments 
of living labour asserts itself with the development of the system of machinery. And 
the revolutionary aspect of this historically-specific transformation of living labour in 
capitalist society is that both the scale and complexity of the production process and, 
in particular, the increasingly scientific character of its organisation, make the 
subjectivity of the capitalist (the non-labourer) impotent to personify the now directly 
social labour under the rule of his/her capital. Which means, in other words, that the 
113 Sohn-Rethel's Intellectual and Manual Labour (1978) has become a locus classicus on this 
question. It certainly provides a good starting point, especially concerning the historicity of the forms 
of scientific thought. However, his idiosyncratic approach is not exempt from shortcomings. For a 
critical assessment of Sohn's Rethel work, see Kapferer (1980), Bahr (1980), and Reinfelder and Slater 
(1978). The main shortcoming of Sohn-Rethel's book correctly highlighted by these critical appraisals 
is its ambiguity on the question of the capital-determined nature of the very materiality of technological 
forms and the forms of science presupposed by them. In effect, despite all his emphasis on the 
historicity of what we have termed `representational scientific thought', Sohn-Rethel actually attributes 
the latter full objective validity, albeit with `false consciousness, ' meaning by this lack of awareness of 
its own social existence and historical genesis (Kapferer 1980: 81). The transcendence of the capitalist 
mode of production therefore does not actually involve the transformation of the very forms of 
scientific knowledge and technology, but only their liberation from their blindness to their own social 
determinations as an inner moment of human labour. This is the result of the reunification of 
intellectual and manual labour. But if Sohn-Rethel ultimately failed to grasp the inherently capitalist 
nature of the very structure of modern science and technology, the critics referred to above fail to see 
the necessity of the transcendence of those forms of scientific thought as an immanent potentiality 
engendered by the historical movement of the capital-form itself, albeit one which expresses the 
necessity of its own annihilation. 
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development of the powers of intellectual labour and their exercise becomes an 
attribute of the 'labouring classes'. 114 As Marx states in the Theories of Surplus-Value: 
Concentration of capital (... ) It is in this extreme form of the contradiction and 
conflict that production - even though in alienated form - is transformed into 
social production (... ) As functionaries of the process which at the same time 
accelerates this social production and thereby also the development of the 
productive forces, the capitalists become superfluous in the measure that they, 
on behalf of society, enjoy the usufruct and that they become overbearing as 
owners of this social wealth and commanders of social labour. Their position 
is similar to that of the feudal lords whose exactions in the measure that their 
services became superfluous with the rise of bourgeois society, became mere 
outdated and inappropriate privileges and who therefore rushed headlong to 
destruction (Marx 1972). 
114 The complexity and scale of the co-operation of the collective worker of large-scale industry render 
the subjective powers of the capitalist impotent to personify in the name of his/her capital even the 
unproductive labour of superintendence of the productive organs of the former. All the functions of 
supervision, coercion and management come to be personified by a partial organ of the collective 
labourer (Marx 1976a: 549; 1991: 510-11). The parasitic nature of the capitalist (though not yet of 
capital) thereby becomes increasingly concrete. Incidentally, the confusion over the parasitic nature of 
the capitalist and that of the capital-form underlies Negri's views of the present, `Post-Fordist' forms of 
human co-operation as carrying in their immediacy - that is, without the mediation of more material 
transformations - the potentiality to explode the capital-relation (Negri 1992: 65-68; Negri and Guattari 
1999: 156-60). 
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The scientifically-expanded productive subjectivity of intellectual labour is, by its 
own nature, increasingly general or universal. The exertion of this form of human 
labour-power aims at the expansion of the conscious control over the totality of the 
forces of nature. Moreover, this subordination of the latter to the powers of living 
labour involves the comprehension of their general determination in order to thereby 
develop their particular technological applications in ever-evolving systems of 
machinery. Thus, as Marx puts it in Volume 3 of Capital in order to highlight its 
specificity vis-ä-vis co-operative labour, scientific labour is, by definition, universal 
labour (Marx 1991: 199) 
With the constitution and permanent revolutionising of this organ of the collective 
labourer, capital thereby engenders another tendency for the production of workers 
bearing a universal productive subjectivity! 15 However, this universality is no longer 
the abstract universality deriving from the absolute lack of individual productive 
capacities to which direct labourers are condemned. When developed into its 
plenitude, it becomes the rich, concrete universality of organs of a collective subject 
who become increasingly able consciously to rule their life process by virtue of their 
capacity scientifically to organise the production process of any automatic system of 
machinery and, therefore, any form of social co-operation on the basis of large-scale 
industry. As the productive subjectivity of workers expands, it progressively ceases to 
115 A remarkable weakness of Postone's (1996) otherwise interesting analysis of the real subsumption 
lies in his implicit reduction of the working class of large-scale industry to direct manual labourers. 
Clearly, the formal subject of the development of science and technology is capital, as happens with all 
the productive powers of social labour springing from the direct co-operation of workers. However, the 
development of those productive powers has no material subject in Postone's account. That is why he 
cannot see that the potentiality for the abolition of capital is actually borne by the proletariat. 
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be the case that the worker's individuality vanishes 'as an infinitesimal quantity in the 
face of the science, the gigantic natural forces, and the mass of social labour 
embodied in the system of machinery' (Marx 1976a: 549). For the latter are the direct 
products of the objectification of their productive subjectivity. 
Nature builds no machines, no locomotives, railways, electric telegraphs, self- 
acting mules etc. These are products of human industry; natural material 
transformed into organs of the human will over nature, or of human 
participation in nature. They are organs of the human brain, created by the 
human hand; the power of knowledge, objectified. The development of fixed 
capital indicates to what degree general social knowledge has become a direct 
force of production, and to what degree, hence, the conditions of the process 
of social life itself have come under the control of the general intellect and 
been transformed in accordance with it. To what degree the powers of social 
production have been produced, not only in the form of knowledge, but also as 
immediate organs of social practice, of the real life process (Marx 1993: 706). 
We saw how in Capital Marx focused on the 'negative side' of the effects of 
production of relative surplus-value through the system of machinery upon the 
material forms of the productive subjectivity of the working class. The historical 
emergence of the social necessity for the constitution of a 'fully-developed social 
individual' thus appeared as an abstract possibility, whose connection to capital's 
development of machine production seemed to be completely external. Conversely, 
we can appreciate now how in the Grundrisse Marx posits capital's relentless 
tendency to 'call to life all the powers of science and of nature, as of social 
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combination and of social intercourse' (Marx 1993: 706) as necessarily engendering 
the historical becoming of that concrete universal subjectivity itself. 
No longer does the worker insert a modified natural thing [Naturgegenstand] 
as middle link between the object [Objekt] and himself; rather, he inserts the 
process of nature, transformed into an industrial process, as a means between 
himself and inorganic nature, mastering it. He steps to the side of the 
production process instead of being its chief actor. In this transformation, it is 
neither the direct human labour he himself performs, nor the time during 
which he works, but rather the appropriation of his own general productive 
power, his understanding of nature and his mastery over it by virtue of his 
presence as a social body -- it is, in a word, the development of the social 
individual which appears as the great foundation-stone of production and of 
wealth (Marx 1993: 705). 
Moreover, and here in accordance with Capital, he presents the latter as the one 
whose further expansion eventually clashes with its alienated capitalist social form 
and, therefore, as the material form of productive subjectivity that carries as an 
immediate potentiality the necessity for the 'creation of the new society'. Hence, Marx 
continues, 
The theft of alien labour time, on which the present wealth is based, appears a 
miserable foundation in face of this new one, created by large-scale industry 
itself (... ) The surplus labour of the mass has ceased to be the condition for 
the development of general wealth, just as the non-labour of the few, for the 
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development of the general powers of the human head. With that, production 
based on exchange value breaks down, and the direct, material production 
process is stripped of the form of penury and antithesis (Marx 1993: 705-6). 
It might seem that Marx is here substituting the intellectual labourer for the manual 
labourer as the revolutionary subject. However, the point is that the key does not 
consist in abstractly opposing intellectual and direct manual labour in order to 
privilege one over the other, but in grasping the contradictory forms in which capital 
historically develops these two necessary moments of the labour-process. Since 
Marx's exposition in the Grundrisse is only concerned with the general tendency and 
its historical result - i. e. with the movement of `bourgeois society in the long view 
and as a whole' (Marx 1993: 712) - he does not pay much attention to the 
contradictory forms in which the latter asserts itself. However, it is clear that in the 
historical unfolding of the tendency for the progressive objectification of all direct 
application of human labour-power onto the object of labour as an attribute of the 
machine, capital actually reproduces and exacerbates the separation between 
intellectual and manual labour. 
In effect, inasmuch as capital's conversion of the subjective expertise of the direct 
labourer into an objective power of the machine is not an instantaneous event but only 
done by degrees, every leap forward in the abolition of manual labour brought about 
by the revolution in the material forms of the process of production is realised by 
actually multiplying the spaces for the exploitation of manual living labour. In fact, 
the new technological forms themselves can generate as their own condition of 
existence the proliferation of a multitude of production processes still subject to the 
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manual intervention of the labourer, whether as an appendage of the machine, as a 
partial organ in a manufacturing division of labour or even in the form of domestic 
labour. Thus, until the conditions for the (nearly) total elimination of manual labour 
are produced, direct labour as an appendage of the machine and the division of labour 
of manufacture tend to be reproduced under the new conditions and with even more 
degraded forms of productive subjectivity and harsher conditions of capitalist 
exploitation. 116 
And yet it is certainly the case that this internal differentiation of the collective 
labourer on the basis of the respective forms of productive subjectivity is the self- 
negating form in which the abolition of that separation is realised in the historical 
116 This is illustrated by Marx in section 8 of the chapter on 'Machinery and Large-scale Industry' 
in 
Capital. There he shows how the production of relative surplus-value through the system of machinery 
reproduces modem manufacture, handicrafts and domestic industry. In this way, capital does not only 
revolutionise the determinations of the social existence of those workers incorporated into large-scale 
industry but also of those of the sections of the working class still working under the division of labour 
in manufacture or domestic industry. The latter forms of the social production process persist in their 
survival only through the imposition of the most brutal forms of the exploitation of the workers. 
However, Marx makes clear that the subsistence of manufacture and domestic industry is always 
provisional. The general tendency of capital is for the total development of large-scale industry. 
Moreover, Marx's discussion makes clear that the working class does not have to 'sit and wait' until the 
simple limit for the subsistence of manufacture is reached -a limit given by its relative productivity of 
labour vis-ä-vis large-scale industry. Inasmuch as the struggle for the shortening of the working day 
succeeds in forcing its implementation in the branches of production where manufacture persists, it 
accelerates the development of large-scale industry by not allowing the selling of labour-power below 
its value and, therefore, by reducing the capitalist limit to the introduction of machinery. Here we have 
another instance of the way in which progressive politics mediates revolutionary politics, the former 
being the concrete form of the development of the material conditions for the emergence of the latter. 
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process. Thus, through the very exacerbation of their separation, capital tendentially 
abolishes the qualitative and quantitative weight of manual labour in the process of 
reproduction of social life, thereby converting the essential moment of living labour 
into an intellectual process. In this way, capital's transformation of the labour-process 
eventually reaches a point in which the separation between intellectual labour and 
what is now a quantitatively and qualitatively insignificant amount of manual labour, 
cannot materially obtain as a form of organising the life-process of humanity. The 
development of the material productive forces of society can only assert itself through 
the reunion of intellectual and manual labour in the individual subjectivity of every 
partial organ of the now directly social productive body, but with the former having 
the form of objective social knowledge (i. e. science), instead of being the product of 
the immediate subjective productive experience of the labourer (as in the case of 
independent handicraft production). As we shall see below, it is the consciously 
organised political action of the whole working class (whatever its productive 
subjectivity) that is the necessary form in which this latter material transformation is 
realised. 117 
117 Besides, it goes without saying that, although the workers bearing an expanded productive 
subjectivity express the movement towards the development of an all-sided universal individuality, they 
do so within the limits of capital as an alienated social form. In other words, it is not the immediacy of 
the material forms of their productive subjectivity that constitutes the kind of `rich individuality which 
is as all-sided in its production as in its consumption, and whose labour also therefore appears no 
longer as labour, but as the full development of activity itself, in which natural necessity in its direct 
form has disappeared; because a historically created need has taken the place of the natural one' (Marx 
1993: 325). As much as the workers with a degraded productive subjectivity, they not only have to 
change `society' but also undergo a process of self-change in the course of the revolutionary process. 
Hence, both organs of the collective labourer have to `get rid of the muck of ages' imposed by the 
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Be that as it may, the point is that in its formally boundless movement of self- 
valorisation, capital thereby cannot stop in the historical production of universal 
productive subjects. At the same time, this constant revolution in the material forms 
of human productive subjectivity can only take place through the progressive 
socialisation of private labour, thereby positing the extension of the scope of the 
conscious regulation of directly social labour as an immediate necessity for capital's 
production of relative surplus-value. Thus, through the development of large-scale 
industry, capital works towards the historical emergence of the other pre-condition for 
`really free working' as well. 
In the production process of large-scale industry (... ) just as the conquest of 
the forces of nature by the social intellect is the precondition of the productive 
power of the means of labour as developed into the automatic process, on one 
side, so, on the other, is the labour of the individual in its direct presence 
posited as suspended individual, i. e. as social, labour. Thus the other basis of 
this node of production falls away (Marx 1993: 709). 
On the two-fold basis of the expansion of the scientific productive powers of the 
`social intellect' and of the determination of human labour as directly social, capital 
moves right towards reaching its absolute historical limit as a social form. This limit 
is not reached when capital accumulation ceases to develop the material productive 
forces of society as, following Trotsky (Trotsky 2002: 1-2), orthodox Marxists would 
determination of human subjectivity as a concrete form of the production of relative surplus-value. 
More concretely, this entails the transformation of intellectual labour and its generalisation. 
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have it. Quite to the contrary, capital clashes with its limit when the very same 
alienated socialisation of labour through the production of relative surplus-value 
begets as its own immanent necessity the development of the productive forces of 
society in a particular material form, namely: the fully conscious organisation of 
social labour as the general social relation regulating the reproduction of human life. 
Under those circumstances, the further leap forward in the material productive forces 
of society - dictated by capital accumulation itself - comes into conflict with capitalist 
relations of production. Translated into our mode of expression, this classical Marxian 
insight can only mean the following. The alienated social necessity arises for the 
human being to be produced as a productive subject that is fully conscious of the 
social determinations of his/her individual powers and activity. Thus, he/she no longer 
sees society as an alien and hostile potency that dominates him/her. Instead, he/she 
experiences the materiality of social life (i. e. productive co-operation) as the 
necessary condition for the development of the plenitude of his/her individuality and 
therefore consciously recognises the social necessity of the expenditure of his/her 
labour power in organic association with the other producers. But this form of human 
subjectivity necessarily collides with a social form (capital) which produces human 
beings as private and independent individuals who consequently see their general 
social interdependence and its historical development as an alien and hostile power 
borne by the product of social labour. The determination of the material forms of the 
labour process as bearers of objectified social relations can no longer mediate the 
reproduction of human life. Capital accumulation must therefore come to an end and 
give way to the free association of individuals. 
4 
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But with the suspension of the immediate character of living labour, as merely 
individual, or as general merely internally or merely externally, with the 
positing of the activity of individuals as immediately general or social activity, 
the objective moments of production are stripped of this form of alienation; 
they are thereby posited as property, as the organic social body within which 
the individuals reproduce themselves as individuals, but as social individuals. 
The conditions which allow them to exist in this way in the reproduction of 
their life, in their productive life's process, have been posited only by the 
historic economic process itself; both the objective and the subjective 
conditions, which are only the two distinct forms of the same conditions 
(Marx 1993: 832). 
In brief, capital exhausts its reason to be in the historical process, thereby producing 
the social necessity of its abolition and, at the same time, revealing the material 
content pushing forward in that alienated form: the self-production of the human 
individual as a working subject or the historical development of human productive 
subjectivity. 
As the system of bourgeois economy has developed for us only by degrees, so 
too its negation, which is its ultimate result. We are still concerned now with 
the direct production process. When we consider bourgeois society in the long 
view and as a whole, then the final result of the process of social production 
always appears as the society itself, i. e. the human being itself in its social 
relations. Everything that has a fixed form, such as the product etc., appears as 
merely a moment, a vanishing moment, in this movement. The direct 
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production process itself here appears only as a moment. The conditions and 
objectifications of the process are themselves equally moments of it, and its 
only subjects are the individuals, but individuals in mutual relationships, 
which they equally reproduce and produce anew. The constant process of their 
own movement, in which they renew themselves even as they renew the world 
of wealth they create (Marx 1993: 712). 
We can appreciate now how Marx's analysis of the system of machinery in the 
Grundrisse provides the elements for the completion of the unfolding of the 
determinations of the productive subjectivity of large-scale industry that are missing 
in Capital. Moreover, we have attempted to show that these further mediations are 
crucial for the concretisation of what in the latter book appeared as an abstract 
possibility: the engendering of the material determinations - hence the social 
necessity - underlying the abolition of capital itself. Still, the exposition in the 
Grundrisse itself seems to be incomplete too. For, as the reader will recall, the point 
of this whole reconstruction was to uncover the determinations of the revolutionary 
subjectivity of the working class. More precisely, we have argued that this whole 
journey from the abstract forms of capitalist social existence to its more concrete 
determinations - the critique of political economy - was nothing more than the 
reproduction in thought of the necessity of revolutionary action. 
And yet, if anything, the political action of the proletariat is noticeable for its absence 
in Marx's account of the dissolution of the capitalist mode of production in the 
Grundrisse. As Rovatti points out, the passages on the system of machinery are 
perfectly compatible with a fatalist objectivist or mechanical conception of the 
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Chapter 7. By way of a conclusion: further explorations into the 
determinations of revolutionary subjectivity 
Revolutionary subjectivity as alienated subjectivity 
In order to reconstruct those necessary further mediations in the historical production 
of revolutionary subjectivity, which are absent from the Grundrisse, we need to bring 
back Marx's analysis of the class struggle as presented in Capital. For, as we have 
seen, there Marx uncovers two underlying determinations of the political action of the 
working class which, although pertaining to its role as a moment of capital's 
reproduction, are of fundamental importance for its specific determination as the 
necessary form of capital's transcendence. The first one already appeared in the 
determinations of the class struggle springing from the formal subsumption of labour 
to capital as discussed in chapter 5. There we discussed the determination of the 
political action of the working class as the necessary mediation, in the form of a 
consciously organised, collective social action, for the imposition of the general 
conscious regulation of social labour in the capitalist mode of production; that is, as a 
concrete form of the fundamentally unconscious - hence inverted - organisation of 
social life through the commodity-form. Furthermore, we showed in the previous 
chapter that the struggle of workers as a class was also the necessary form in which 
social capital's need for workers with an increasingly universal productive 
subjectivity, resulting from the movement of the real subsumption in the form of 
large-scale industry, asserted itself. 
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With those two determinations of the class struggle in mind, the answer to the 
question as to why the transcendence of capital can only be realised in the form of a 
proletarian political action follows quite simply. We have seen that, in its content, the 
communist transformation of social life precisely consists in the realisation of the 
plenitude of the two aforementioned determinations underlying capital's historic 
mission, namely: the production of the fully-developed universal productive subjects, 
in turn the necessary form of human individuality presupposed by the fully conscious 
organisation of social life as a directly collective potency. Thus, as the material 
subject whose productive subjectivity this historic-economic process transforms 
'behind its back' in the direction of a fully developed and socialised universality, the 
working class thereby becomes determined to personify, through its revolutionary 
action, the alienated necessity of social capital to be superseded in the free association 
of individuals. Fundamental implications follow from this. 
We mentioned when discussing commodity-fetishism that, behind the traditional 
Marxist view, rests the idea of revolutionary consciousness as the absolute opposite of 
the alienated consciousness, that is, as grounded in the abstractly free human 
subjectivity of the proletariat. By contrast, what follows from our approach is that 
revolutionary consciousness can only be a concrete form of the alienated 
consciousness itself. Let us elaborate on this. In the first place, this means that the 
necessity for revolutionary transformation springs from the movement of self- 
valorising value itself. More concretely, it is a concrete determination of capital's 
incessant drive to produce relative surplus-value. The crux of the matter is that it is a 
necessity of the production of relative surplus-value which can only take concrete 
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form through the abolition of the production of surplus-value (hence of capital) itself. 
In other words, that particular cycle of material reproduction of society is 
autonomously set into motion by the production of relative surplus-value. But the 
determinate form taken by the material transformation of the production process of 
human life necessitated at that stage by the former is the fully conscious organisation 
of human productive co-operation. Which, in turn, means that the social form of the 
life process of humanity must be revolutionised as well: it is a change of the 
materiality of the production process which, albeit needed by the valorisation of 
capital, can no longer proceed on the basis of that alienated social form. When read 
from the standpoint of the mature critique of political economy, the following oft- 
quoted passage from the Holy Family captures very well the gist of the matter: 
Indeed private property drives itself in its economic movement towards its 
own dissolution, but only through a development which does not depend on it, 
which is unconscious and which takes place against the will of private 
property by the very nature of things, only inasmuch as it produces the 
proletariat as proletariat, poverty which is conscious of its spiritual and 
physical poverty, dehumanization which is conscious of its dehumanization, 
and therefore self-abolishing (... ) Not in vain does it [the proletariat] go 
through the stem but steeling school of labour. It is not a question of what this 
or that proletarian, or even the whole proletariat, at the moment regards as its 
aim. It is a question of what the proletariat is, and what, in accordance with 
this being, it will historically be compelled to do (Marx and Engels 1975: 36- 
7). 
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In this passage, Marx still seems to be within the boundaries of the kind of argument 
developed in the Paris Manuscripts where the revolutionary subjectivity of the 
workers seems to be grounded in a generic dialectic of the negation of the negation. 
Thus, in the proletariat all the inhumanity of private property is concentrated. 
Therefore, as that human incarnation of the complete negation of humanity, they are 
bound to revolt against those inhuman conditions. In turn, this revolt against inhuman 
conditions of life cannot but represent its negation and, therefore, the affirmation of 
humanity. It is this aspect which is generally emphasised within Marxism. Yet as our 
discussion of the limitations of that approach should make evident, it is not at that 
point that we have to focus. The key resides in the following points. 
First, it is crucial to note how Marx uses the term'compelled' to refer to the relation of 
the workers to their own revolutionary activity. We think that this shows how for 
Marx the alienated subject of that historical movement is capital (what he refers to as 
'private property'). Hence, the revolutionary powers are not 'self-developed' by the 
workers but are an alienated attribute that capital puts into their own hands through 
the transformations of their productive subjectivity produced by the socialisation of 
private labour, in turn the concrete form of the production of relative surplus-value. 
This is the reason why the revolutionary consciousness is itself a concrete form of the 
alienation of human powers as capital's powers. The abolition of capital is not an 
abstractly free, self-determining political action, but one that the workers are 
compelled to do as personifications of the alienated laws of movement of capital 
itself. In this sense, when the workers consciously organise the revolutionary abolition 
of the capitalist mode of production, they do so not as the incarnation of the powers of 
an abstract human practice deprived of social determinations, but as personifications 
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of the inverted existence of the powers of social labour, i. e. capital. The point is that it 
is an alienated action that in the course of its own development liberates itself from all 
trace of its alienated existence. Through its political action, the working class now has 
the historically-developed material capacity to abolish the alienated social relation 
that determines it as such - capital - in order to affirm its productive powers as 
potencies of consciously (and hence, concretely free) associated human individuals. 
Secondly, this leads us to the question of the specific qualitative content of 
revolutionary consciousness. We think that, as another aspect of their conception of 
revolutionary subjectivity as abstractly free, traditional Marxist accounts ultimately 
tend to pose the difference between revolutionary and non-revolutionary forms of 
consciousness in basically quantitative teens. In other words, the difference is 
referred to the quantitative scope of the struggle, i. e. whether it is aimed at partial 
aspects of capitalist society or at capitalist society 'as a whole'. So, revolutionary class 
consciousness is simply an extension of partial struggles based on that very same 
class identity constituted around the affirmation of an abstract human freedom against 
the (apparently) external coercion imposed by the capital-determined modes of social 
objectivity. But the point is that revolutionary political action is such because of the 
qualitative potentiality it embodies, and which resides in its being the form in which 
the fully conscious organisation of social life is historically-produced. In this specific 
determination, it has to be a fully conscious action itself. Thus, it is not just a question 
of struggling against capitalist society as a totality but of the determinate way in 
which the working class consciously grasps that totality as the way of organising its 
revolutionary activity. However general in its scope and fierce in its intensity, the 
political action of workers cannot be determined as revolutionary except when 
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grasping capital as a concrete whole, that is, in the totality of its social determinations. 
And this means, essentially, to comprehend the determinations of their own social 
being beyond any appearance presented by it. This does not only involve seeing 
through the transposed concrete forms of objectivity presented by the alienated 
consciousness in the capitalist mode of production, i. e. the value-form and its concrete 
development into capital. In addition, it also entails discovering the content behind the 
most general concrete form of subjectivity assumed by the alienated consciousness of 
the modern individual, namely, that of being abstractly free. 119 Thus, revolutionary 
workers must grasp the essentially alienated nature of their own subjectivity, that is, 
their existence as attributes of social capital, which has become the concrete social 
subject of modern society. But, in addition, this means discovering the material 
productive powers that, as social capital's mode of existence, they have developed in 
that inverted form. In this way, workers will discover the social necessity of the 
historical task that, as fully conscious yet alienated individuals they have to personify 
through their self-abolishing political action, namely: the revolutionary supersession 
of capital through the production of the communist organisation of social life. 
119 In History and Class Consciousness Lukäcs correctly grasped the necessity of this form of 
revolutionary consciousness. However, he failed to discover the essential content to be comprehended 
when social life is grasped as a concrete totality: not the free, self-determining action of the working 
Revolutionary subjectivity as productive subjectivity 
In the traditional Marxist account of the revolutionary abolition of capital, the latter 
presupposes the development of two sets of clearly distinct necessary conditions: the 
`objective' ones (generally associated with one aspect of the `economic' laws of 
motion of capital such as its crisis-ridden character, the mechanical impossibility of 
economic reproduction, the tendency for the concentration and centralisation of 
capital, generalised barbaric conditions of human civilisation) and the `subjective' one 
(class consciousness and organisation). The whole history of Marxism could be 
reconstructed on the basis of the ways in which the different currents emphasised one 
or the other factor or, alternatively, tried to combine the objective and subjective 
moments. But what unites most approaches and, we think, what dooms their attempt 
at discovering the concrete determinations of revolutionary action to failure, is the 
complete independence they posit between the political consciousness of the working 
class and the development of the materiality of the production process of human life. 
Because even when the need for material conditions is emphasised, the problem is 
that the particular condition or set of conditions generally posited as objectively 
grounding the necessity for the abolition of capital (be it a fatal economic crisis or the 
monopolisation of the property of capital simply as such) has no connection 
whatsoever with the political subjectivity of the working class. The latter is seen as 
developing according to its own different `logic', generally deriving from the 
determinations of the formal subsumption of labour to capital and, hence, irrespective 
to the material transformations of social life. To put it differently, those approaches do 
class as the identical subject-object of history, but social capital as alienated historical subject of 
modern society, the proletariat being its revolutionary mode of existence (see Starosta 2003). 
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not actually pose an inner material determination or necessity for the development of 
the revolutionary political consciousness of the working class. As pointed out before, 
they just provide an objective context which is seen as spurring, accelerating or 
facilitating the self-determining movement of the subjective factor which `reacts' to 
the former. But there is no real mediation between the materiality of social life and the 
political consciousness of workers. It is this mediation that our approach attempts to 
provide. 120 
As we have seen above, it is the historical necessity for the all-sided development of 
the universality of the productive attributes of the workers beyond its capitalist 
'integument' - generated by the alienated movement of capital itself - that is realised 
in the concrete form of the communist revolution. In this sense, the material 
conditions for the abolition of capital are not external to the concrete individuality of 
workers. Rather, they essentially pertain to their subjectivity as working individuals, 
that is, to their subjective powers consciously to organise the transformation of the 
environment into a means for the reproduction of human life. It is only when those 
material determinations of the development of human productive subjectivity emerge 
in the course of history that the proletariat acquires the social powers necessary to 
abolish their alienated general social relation. Hence, what this line of thought 
suggests is that the revolutionary political consciousness of the working class can 
only be a concrete expression of their productive consciousness. 
120 Despite all the flaws in their approach, Hardt and Negri and his colleagues researching on the 
`immaterial labour' thesis (see footnote 101 above) have at least the merit of trying to offer that 
material determination of political subjectivity. Postone (1978; 1996) also attempts to make that link. 
On Postone, see the editorial introduction to the symposium on Time, Labor and Social Domination in 
the journal Historical Materialism (Starosta 2004). 
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This has important broader ramifications for the nature of the revolutionary 
movement itself. Because overlooking that material determination of the political 
consciousness of the working class necessarily leads to conceiving of the 
revolutionary process in purely formal terms, that is, as a mere transformation of 
social forms. But what our approach suggests is that what the revolutionary 
movement realises (its content) is, fundamentally, the transformation of the 
materiality of the productive forces of the human individual and, therefore, of their 
social forms of organisation and development. In other words, it is about a material 
mutation of the production process of human life, which takes concrete shape through 
a social transformation which, in turn, expresses itself through a political action. 
Hence, this means, in the first place, that the revolution is not about the simple 
appropriation of the objectified form of the productive forces engendered by capital, 
although subjecting them to another form of social organisation. This is, broadly 
speaking, the standard classical Marxist understanding of the nature of the communist 
revolution (starting with Lenin's socialist use of so-called `Taylorism' to which we 
referred above, but also including the Council Communist reduction of the communist 
programme to the demand to `get rid of the bosses', i. e. self-management of existing 
material forms of the production process). 121 However, this also means going beyond 
the well-known `Western Marxist' correction, consisting in adding that the 
transformation of the social forms of human activity needs to be complemented by the 
development of an alternative `socialist technology, ' which would replace the existing 
121 The formalism entailed by the Council Communist ideology of self-management has been 
insightfully highlighted many years ago by some currents of the so-called 'Neo-Bordigist Ultra-Left' in 
France (Negation 1973; Barrot and Martin 1974). 
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forms of the material conditions of social labour that have been `moulded' by the 
needs of capital (Dyer-Witheford 2000: chapter 3 for a review of the Marxist 
approaches to `technology-as-domination'; Arthur 2003c; Murray 2004). In this 
alternative version, the external relation between material forms of the life-process 
and social relations still persists. On the one hand, we have social relations. On the 
other, we have the materiality of the productive forces of the human individual. Since 
the former have moulded the latter, the construction of a socialist society requires that 
both are transformed, as if it were possible to do one thing without doing the other. So 
conceived, the transformation of the material forms of the production process is once 
again reduced to an external objective condition instead of being grasped as the 
immanent content of the communist revolution itself. 122 
In a nutshell, it is not a about an external leap from capitalism to communism 
involving, on the one hand, the revolutionary abolition of capital and, on the other, the 
construction of a communist society, as if they were different things. 123 Hence, it is 
not that the historical powers of the capital-form to develop the forces of production 
are exhausted and comes to a halt, then comes a social revolution which changes the 
social forms of the life-process of humanity, in order to then set into motion the 
productive forces again, but now on a new social basis. Rather, as a political action, 
working class revolution is the conscious organisation of that material transformation 
122 When not reduced when not reduced to an ethical question, part of a `moral theory of human 
perfectibility' (Murray 2003). See also Gould (1978), who finds in Marx's Grundrisse a critique of the 
injustices of capitalism and sees the development of the fully developed social individual, hence the 
emergence in history of human freedom, as the realisation of justice. 
123 Needless to say, the need for a 'society of transition', very different from a period of transition 
within the capitalist mode of production, has no place in our account. 
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of the productive forces of the human individual through the change in the social 
forms of their organisation. Only because of this does the revolutionary process 
transform both `circumstances and human activity', i. e. involves `self-change', as the 
third Thesis on Feuerbach claims (Marx 1976e: 4). 124 This, we think, is also the 
124 This determination of revolutionary practice as a process involving self-transformation has been 
rightly emphasised by various authors (Geras 1989; Barker 1995; Smith n/d), who thereby provide a 
necessary warning against the uncritical glorification of existing forms of working class subjectivity as 
immediately `fit to found society anew'. However, we think that, in most cases, this process of `getting 
rid of the muck of ages' through `self-transforming' political practice, is seen in terms of the 
constitution of an abstract `socialist culture of solidarity', with no reference to the materiality of the 
production process of human life. In other words, the question is idealistically seen as `ethical' or 
`cultural' but not fundamentally in terms of productive subjectivity. Lebowitz (2003) does grasp the 
need to focus on the latter. However, he sees the question as a matter of two different, externally- 
related grounds for the development of the workers' revolutionary consciousness: on the one hand, the 
transformation of the materiality of the production process of human life and, on the other, the class 
struggle. By contrast, we are arguing that it is a question of the development of the materiality of 
human productive subjectivity taking concrete form through the revolutionary political action of 
workers. Meszdros (1995: 917-36) provides perhaps one of the most suggestive approaches in this 
respect, explicitly addressing the need for determinate material mediations as the ground for the 
development of 'communist consciousness on a mass scale' and seeing the revolutionary process as the 
political form in which that material content is realised. However, sticking to the immediate concrete 
form of fragmentation and division through which capital's tendency for the production of universal 
productive subjects is realised, he cannot see the social necessity for the material transformation at 
stake as the immanent product of the alienated movement of the production of relative surplus-value 
itself. The necessity of revolutionary subjectivity ultimately remains external to the general social 
relation presiding over the movement of modern society and is represented as consisting in the 
completion of a historic task that capital leaves unfinished. Again, revolution is seen as an external 
leap. 
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underlying meaning of Marx and Engels well-known passage from the The German 
Ideology, 
Both for the production on a mass scale of this communist consciousness, and 
for the success of the cause itself, the alteration of men on a mass scale is 
necessary, an alteration which can only take place in a practical movement, a 
revolution; the revolution is necessary, therefore, not only because the ruling 
class cannot be overthrown in any other way, but also because the class 
overthrowing it can only in a revolution succeed in ridding itself of all the 
muck of ages and become fitted to found society anew (Marx and Engels 
1976a: 52-3). 
Hence the general determination of the communist revolution: to be the political form 
of the riddance of the `muck of ages' engendered by the production of relative 
surplus-value, that is, of the historical production of the subjectivity of the `rich 
individuality which is as all-sided in its production as in its consumption, and whose 
labour also therefore appears no longer as labour, but as the full development of 
activity itself' (Marx 1993: 325). 
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Revolutionary subjectivity as scientific subjectivity 
If the simplest content of revolutionary consciousness entails the self-awareness about 
the workers' alienated subjectivity, the question immediately arises as to what is the 
specific form of consciousness capable of discovering the former. The answer to this 
question is self-evident in the very intellectual process we have been through in this 
thesis. In effect, inasmuch as the critique of political economy entails the reproduction 
in thought of the concrete unity of all the determinations of social existence implied in 
the social necessity for the abolition of capital, it becomes determined as the self- 
consciousness of the working class of the social determinations of its own 
revolutionary action as an alienated subject. An alienated subject, however, that has 
developed the material powers and historic task to put its own alienation (and hence 
its existence as working class) to an end. On the other hand, we have attempted to 
demonstrate throughout this thesis that the critique of political economy embodies 
such a transformative power only by virtue of its specific, dialectical form. In the first 
part of the thesis, this was just stated although not really demonstrated. If successful, 
our methodologically-minded reconstruction of Marx's dialectical critique of political 
economy, read as the dialectical unfolding of the determinations of capital leading to 
the social constitution of the revolutionary working class, should have substantiated 
that point. 
But there was another fundamental claim, only tangentially touched upon in the 
thesis, whose justification remained incomplete. We are referring to the historical 
determinations behind the distinction we made between representational scientific 
thought or logical representation and dialectical knowledge. As argued before, whilst 
322 
the former is the mode of scientific knowledge determined as a form of capital's 
reproduction, the latter is the mode of scientific knowledge determined as the 
conscious organisation of the practical critique of the capitalist mode of production. 
However, a proper grounding of this distinction was not possible at that stage of the 
thesis. It is only now, once we have discussed the determinations of the production of 
relative surplus-value through the system of machinery, that we can address that 
question properly. 
In effect, we have seen that it is the latter form of the material production process 
taken by capital's valorisation that calls into life the powers derived from the 
scientific regulation of natural and social processes. In this way, capital increasingly 
determines scientific knowledge as the general form of productive consciousness 
organising the life-process of society. Furthermore, we have seen that this also means 
that the productive consciousness regulating the labour-process ceases to be 
subordinated to the immediate subjective experience and attributes of the labourer. In 
other words, it becomes an objective consciousness. However, this is an objective 
consciousness which is not the expression of the `development of human powers as an 
end in itself' (Marx 1991: 959). It is determined as a concrete form of the expanded 
reproduction of capital through the production of relative surplus-value. In other 
words, it is an objective consciousness bound to reproduce its essential determination 
as an alienated consciousness. As we have already shown, firstly in our discussion of 
commodity fetishism and later on when dealing with the relationship between class 
struggle and the valorisation of capital, it is by falling prey to the inverted appearance 
as free consciousness taken by alienated consciousness that human beings reproduce 
the social relations producing the latter. In this sense, the objective character of 
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scientific knowledge faces a limit which it cannot trespass without ceasing to 
be a 
concrete form of capital's perpetuation: it must be strictly developed in such a 
form 
that it does not discover its own specific determinations as an alienated consciousness 
beyond any appearance. Thus, whilst being scientific - hence objective - productive 
consciousness as an attribute of capital must remain impotent to fully penetrate the 
appearances presented by the real movement of social life and, therefore, cannot 
become fully objective. How to reconcile these two determinations? 
We think that our discussion of the difference between dialectical cognition and 
logical representation in the first part of the thesis provides the key to the answer to 
this question. For, as we have seen, the very form of representational science (i. e., its 
method) condemns it to grasp the relations between real forms in their externality and, 
therefore, to stick to some inverted appearance presented by them. Moreover, in being 
impotent to reproduce the contradictory movement of the real by means of thought, 
this form of scientific knowledge leads to uncertainty about its own objectivity. It 
therefore has to seek the foundation for its own objectivity outside of itself, in the 
alleged general rules of correct thinking - logic - guiding the thinking activity of an 
abstract subject of knowledge. In other words, it is an objective knowledge ultimately 
resting on subjective foundations and which is therefore impotent ideally to reproduce 
the immanent movement of social and natural forms of the reality. Thus, we can now 
see the way in which the contradictory development of scientific knowledge within 
the boundaries of the reproduction of capital `finds room to move', namely: it does so 
by taking the form of representational science. The historically-specific 
determinations of social existence (and hence of social consciousness) become 
therefore expressed in the very form of the process of scientific cognition of reality, 
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i. e. in its method. The mode of scientific cognition being a social form as any other, 
it 
must have a historical determination as well. Armed with that scientific 
consciousness, the political action of the working class becomes condemned to 
personify the need of capital to reproduce itself, instead of personifying the necessity 
to supersede itself into the free association of individuals. 
Exactly the opposite line of reasoning applies to the form of consciousness that 
organises the action which, whilst alienated, in the course of its development 
transcends that very alienation. We are speaking of the `communist consciousness, ' 
the `consciousness of the necessity of a fundamental revolution' (Marx and Engels 
1976a: 52) whose content, as we have seen, is the development of the `control and 
conscious mastery of these powers' springing from `the world-historical co-operation 
of individuals' (Marx and Engels 1976a: 51). This fully conscious organisation of the 
development of the social powers of the human being - `the reality which communism 
creates' (Marx and Engels 1976a: 81) - presupposes that the latter ceases to see the 
determinations of his/her social existence as an external force existing independently 
of the individuality of his/her conscious practical activity upon nature. And this can 
only be the product of a form of consciousness which is fully objective in character 
and that can therefore recognise and organise the social determinations of human 
individuality. 
The great historic quality of capital is to create this surplus labour, 
superfluous labour from the standpoint of mere use value, mere subsistence; 
and its historic destiny [Bestimmnung] is fulfilled as soon as, on one side, there 
has been such a development of needs that surplus labour above and beyond 
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necessity has itself become a general need arising out of individual needs 
themselves-and, on the other side, when the severe discipline of capital, 
acting on succeeding generations [Geschlechter], has developed general 
industriousness as the general property of the new species [Geschlecht]-and, 
finally, when the development of the productive powers of labour, which 
capital incessantly whips onward with its unlimited mania for wealth, and of 
the sole conditions in which this mania can be realized, have flourished to the 
stage where the possession and preservation of general wealth require a lesser 
labour time of society as a whole, and where the labouring society relates 
scientifically to the process of its progressive reproduction, its reproduction in 
a constantly greater abundance; hence where labour in which a human being 
does what a thing could do has ceased (Marx 1993: 325, our emphasis). 
Thus, in the communist association not only will human activity take a mediated form 
but, as the social form of organisation of the universal development of `human powers 
as an end in itself' through conscious co-operation, it will develop the social 
mediation of individual activity to new levels and forms. That is, the human process 
of metabolism will not return to the simplicity of pre-capitalist forms of social 
production but, quite to the contrary, it will achieve even more complex forms than 
the ones produced under the alienated rule of capital. For the fully developed social 
individual, the problem at stake will be the integration of his/her individual productive 
action into the activity of a collective body composed out of the universal and all- 
round co-operation of human beings. And consciousness being the way in which the 
social forms of the life-process express themselves in the human head, how can the 
regulation by means of thought of such a complex process of reproduction take the 
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form of a consciousness not involving mediation? Certainly, then, social relations will 
become `transparent' under the free association of producers. However, this will not 
be the result of an immediate insight (cf. Cohen 1972), but of a scientific 
consciousness that passes through all the mediations involved in the fully conscious 
organisation of what will be a highly complex form of human activity. The necessity 
for a scientific comprehension of the social determinations of human life will not 
disappear under communism but will become the general form in which individuals 
organise their life-activities. Paraphrasing Marx, there is no royal road to the self- 
conscious organisation of directly social human practice! As he put it already as early 
as the Paris Manuscripts, 
My universal consciousness is the theoretical form of that whose living form 
is the real community, society, where as at present universal consciousness is 
an abstraction from real life and as such in hostile opposition to it. Hence the 
activity of my universal consciousness - as activity - is my theoretical 
existence as a social being (Marx 1992b: 350). 
Whilst necessarily scientific, `communist consciousness' must acquire a form which 
allows it to penetrate all inverted appearances presented by social being in order to 
discover its own alienated nature. We already know what this form is, namely: 
dialectical knowledge. Only the latter, as `the reproduction of the concrete by means 
of thought, ' ideally expresses the material power to organise the communist abolition 
of capital. Hence, whilst logical representation is determined as the scientific method 
determined as a form of capital's reproduction, dialectical knowledge is the mode of 
scientific cognition determined as the form of capital's transcendence and, a fortiori, 
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of the free association of individuals ('the reality that communism creates'). In brief, 
it is not just a question of abolishing the separation between intellectual and manual 
labour through the reduction of the latter to `quantitative and qualitative 
insignificance', but, fundamentally, of the revolution in the very general form of 
scientific intellectual labour itself. 125 
Revolutionary subjectivity as consciously self-organised subjectivity 
The rejection of the need for (dialectical) theory to achieve the transformation of the 
capitalist mode of production into the free association of individuals has generally 
come from the abstract critique of Leninist `vanguardism and substitutionsm' by so- 
called libertarian currents of Marxism! 26 Holloway's recent work is a case in point. 
For him, the postulation of the need for a scientific organisation of communist 
revolutionary activity can only lead to the separation between an intellectual elite and 
125 Inasmuch as it is determined to emerge for the first time in the course of history in the alienated 
form of the conscious organisation of the abolition of capital, dialectical knowledge initially takes the 
concrete form of critique of political economy. Once liberated from its existence as an alienated 
attribute of capital existing in the heads of the self-abolishing proletarians, dialectical social science 
does not wither away but must acquire a new concrete form: human natural science or the natural 
science of man (Marx 1992b: 356). 
126 This rejection is a particular expression of a more generalised `cultural mood' in the present times of 
general political retreat of the working-class. In the realm of theory, this mood is expressed in the 
emergence of post-modernism as the dominant ideological form taken by social theory. In the realm of 
practical politics, this acquires expression in the anti-intellectualism characterising the current 'anti- 
globalisation' movement (for concise suggestive reflections on this, see Aufheben 1992: 1-2). 
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the masses. In turn, this would mean that the revolution ceases to be the self- 
emancipation of the working class and becomes the changing of society by the self- 
proclaimed vanguard on behalf of the working class (Holloway 2002b: 30). 
Clearly, Holloway is not arguing for a complete refusal of the need for critical theory. 
He explicitly acknowledges that `intellectual work is part of that struggle' (Holloway 
2002b: 63). However, afraid that this claim could lead him to intellectual elitism, he 
then hastens to add that, although another expression of the class struggle, 
revolutionary thought does not enjoy any `privileged role' in the practical critique of 
capital. The fully developed consciousness of the social determinations of alienated 
human activity is just another form, co-existing alongside social struggles based on 
immediate consciousness, of the critique of alienated labour. Or, in Holloway's own 
words, theory is simply `a peculiar way of articulating our [the theorists'] 
participation in the conflict in which all participate' (Holloway 2002b: 30). The real, 
material unity of theory and practice to be achieved by the critical-revolutionary 
activity of the proletariat thus dissolves into the purely formal unity consisting in the 
co-existence of `critique in theory' and `critique in practice'. 
By contrast, we think that when its concrete determinations are properly grasped, far 
from leading to a Leninist separation between `party direction'/`intellectuals' and 
`masses', the scientific organisation of political action actually constitutes its only 
genuine practical critique. In effect, the general material content of the conscious 
revolutionary action of the proletariat suffices to understand why it can definitely not 
take the form of the institutionalisation of the separation of the conscious organisation 
of that action from its execution proper. And this is not just a matter of an abstract 
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moral superiority of radically democratic forms of social organisation over 
hierarchical ones. This is but a consequence of the materiality of the social 
transformation at stake, namely, the production of the consciousness about the social 
character of human transformative action as the general social relation reproducing 
human life. In other words, this is the consequence of the necessary conscious nature 
of such a collective process of social transformation, which can only be such precisely 
for being the organic unity of the conscious transformative practice of each 
individual. Only in this way can such action acquire the plenitude of its transformative 
powers. 127 
127 The reduction of the communist transformation to a question of radical democracy has been a 
longstanding characteristic of the anti-Stalinist left and gained new life in recent times within the so- 
called anti-globalisation movement. This `obsession' with democracy is an evidently understandable 
but abstract reaction of the revolutionary left to the bureaucratic experience of the Soviet Union (and 
also of Social Democracy in Western Europe). The critique of this 'formalist consciousness' with its 
'fetishism of organisational forms' has also been one of the themes insightfully developed by the 'Neo- 
Bordigist' ultra-left in France (Barrot and Martin 1974). As Goldner notes, the critique of capital from 
the perspective of radical democracy basically follows from the representation of capital as essentially 
a hierarchical relation of power (Goldner 1981). But as value-in-process, capital is a materialised form 
of social mediation that becomes the self-moving subject of human life, a determination which derives 
from the essentially unconscious form of social reproduction through the commodity-form. Hence, the 
content of the communist transformation is not the democratisation of society but the abolition of the 
determination of the human life-process as the material bearer of the self-expansion of capital through 
the conscious association of the fully developed social individuals. Inasmuch as its production involves 
the conscious organisation of collective human practice as an attribute borne by each human individual, 
one could call that 'democratic'. But without a critique of the commodity-form, money-form, capital- 
form and the abstractly free subjectivity of the private individual, the call for radical democracy 
mystifies rather than throws light on the communist revolution. 
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Thus, the monopoly over the conscious organisation of the general social character of 
human action by some individuals (let us say, the 'intelligentsia') can signal just one 
thing. Namely, that the rest of the members of society are acting unconsciously, 
uncritically accepting the appearance that the would-be leaders really are acting 
consciously, no matter how democratic the mediations between those two poles, or 
how much the leaders are predisposed to 'learn' from the spontaneous movement of 
the masses. 128 When Marx spoke of communism as the conscious association of 
individuals, he really meant it. And this is not just a matter of 'feeling like' associating 
with others or of instinctively doing it under the pressure of external circumstances 
(even less a question of ethical duty), but of being fully aware of the social necessity 
of this association in the totality of its determinations. ' 29 On the other hand, this is 
why the reproduction in thought of the social determinations of the political action 
that accomplishes the said transformation of the whole process of human metabolism 
(dialectics), must be by its very essence a collective class product whose production 
involves all individuals concerned. The development of science as the practical 
critique of capital thereby does not only involve the transformation of the mode of 
scientific cognition but also its generalisation. To put it simply, dialectical knowledge 
(hence, `communist consciousness') must become an attribute borne by each member 
of the self-abolishing proletariat as whole, regardless of the particular form of 
productive subjectivity inherited from the different role played as partial organs of the 
128 See Shandro (1995), for an interesting but futile attempt to save Lenin's theory of the party. 
129 Thus it is in the very essence of dialectical knowledge to require the reproduction in thought of the 
social determinations of human purposeful activity in the singularity of each individual action. This is 
why, by its very form, dialectical cognition is inherently self-critical: in each occasion it is set into 
motion, it subjects to criticism its existing forms (Inigo Carrera 1992). We shall return to this in the 
next section. 
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production and circulation of capital with which they enter the revolutionary process. 
Only in this way can the `genuine bond of consciousness and action' (Lukäcs) be 
established in the course of human history, thereby making the material unity of 
theory and practice become the general social relation reproducing human life. 
Final words: Whose revolutionary action is it anyway? 
The reader might be tempted to grasp what we have been doing in this thesis as an 
exercise in `Marxology', yet another interpretation of the works of Karl Marx. 
However, the very form of the dialectical method as discussed in this work already 
provides us with a first reason as to why it cannot be seen as an interpretation of texts. 
As argued above, the point of departure of any materialist dialectical investigation 
must be the conscious organisation of the form to be given to our transformative 
action in order to realise with the latter the potentialities existing in our reality (the 
here and now) to `change the world'. That is why we have been referring to this thesis 
as a critical reconstruction of Marx's work, a necessary moment of the broader 
question of the positive development of the critique of political economy, in turn, a 
concrete form of the conscious organisation of the practical abolition of capital. - 
In this sense, what should interest the contemporary reader of Marx's works is not 
`what he really said' but the development of the objective knowledge of the social 
determinations of contemporary social forms of existence of capital and, 
fundamentally, of our political action among its concrete forms. As argued earlier, 
this process cannot be spared from the development of the laborious analytical 
journey from the concrete to the abstract and the subsequent synthetic return from the 
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abstract to the concrete. In this endeavour, the reading of Marx's works, i. e. of 
socially pre-existing objectifications of dialectical knowledge, can only serve to 
enhance the potency of our process of cognition. In effect, inasmuch as it is an 
original development from the individual point of view but a process of re-cognition 
as far as its social character is concerned, we can engage in the inquiry with the 
advantage of being able individually to appropriate already existing social powers of 
the `general intellect', thereby giving our own process of self-knowledge increased 
agility and efficiency ('real economy of time', as Marx puts it in the Grundrisse). 
On the other hand, this necessity to re-cognise all the mediations involved in the 
forms of present-day social being is what gives the very form of dialectical cognition 
an intrinsically self-critical quality. Thus, in our presentation of the different forms of 
capital as the alienated subject of modem social life through the reconstruction of 
Marx's texts, we were both following the immanent necessity of those forms and, in 
the very same movement, providing a critique of his own discoveries. As we have 
seen, one of the critical results of our investigation has been the awareness of the 
incompleteness of the unfolding of the determinations of revolutionary subjectivity in 
Capital. A huge gap exists between Marx's exposition of the transformations of the 
materiality of the productive subjectivity of the collective labourer and the politically 
revolutionary subjectivity outlined in the end of Volume 1 of that work. Although we 
did argue that the core elements for such a systematic dialectical presentation of the 
social necessity of revolutionary subjectivity could be found in the Grundrisse, it was 
necessary to put together those pieces - scattered in what at the end of the day is an 
unpublished manuscript - and integrate them as necessary mediations into the 
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reproduction in thought of the qualitative determinations of the real subsumption of 
labour to capital. 
Furthermore, in this concluding chapter we tried to go beyond Marx in the 
specification of the determinations of the revolutionary subject. This we 
fundamentally did by explicitly addressing aspects of revolutionary subjectivity that, 
we think, are only implicit in Marx's work (although they certainly are there), 
namely: its alienated nature; its being a concrete expression of the historical 
transformations of productive subjectivity; the specific form of its essentially 
scientific character (hence the historicity of scientific method); and, finally, the 
materiality of its organisational form (the overcoming of the separation between 
`conception' and `execution' in the political action of the working class). In brief, we 
tried to advance in the positing of more concrete determinations of revolutionary 
subjectivity. 
And yet even if including more concrete mediations than Marx, this thesis evidently 
still remained at a considerably high level of abstraction. As much as Marx himself, 
we also considered `bourgeois society in the long view and as a whole' (Marx 1993: 
712). That is, with the exception of some digressions in passing, we only addressed 
the essential determination and general tendency behind revolutionary subjectivity, 
with no attention to the concrete forms in which the latter unfolds in the course of the 
history of capitalist development and, more importantly, in the contemporary forms of 
the essentially global accumulation of capital. On the other hand, we believe that our 
approach does provide us with the key to such an investigation, namely: the 
movement of the two-fold contradiction between universality and particularity and 
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between expansion and degradation of the productive subjectivity of the different 
organs of the collective labourer, as it springs from the production of relative surplus- 
value. This, we think, is the most important implication for future research that our 
thesis opens up. 
As a necessary moment of the class struggle, a most urgent task arises for that partial 
organ of the collective labourer responsible the production of the critical scientific 
knowledge of capitalist social forms (i. e., communist intellectual labourers). What is 
required is dialectical research on the present-day concrete forms in which the 
alienated development of the productive subjectivity of the workers towards its fully 
developed universality realises itself through its own negation; that is, by fragmenting 
the different partial organs of the collective labourer and by keeping the productive 
attributes of the labourers (even when they are expanded as in the case of intellectual 
labourers) miserably bound to being those required by the material forms of the 
production of relative surplus-value. 
Needless to say, and at this stage of our investigation this might sound redundant, this 
does not entail an abstractly theoretical interest but is the necessary method for 
discovering the form of political action that could mediate the immediate needs of 
workers with the 'historical interests of the proletariat as a whole, ' i. e. the 
development of the productive subjectivity of the global collective worker beyond its 
alienated capitalist form. In the 1840's, Marx and Engels put forward in the political 
programme of the Communist Manifesto the form of political action necessary to 
accelerate the process of social transformation: the revolutionary centralisation of 
social capital as the property of the national state. Thus they could argue that the 
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process of emancipation of the workers was global in substance but national in form 
(Marx and Engels 1976b). Yet it seems to us that in the era of the so-called 
'globalisation' of capital the updating of that political programme should start by 
modifying that statement. Today the political action of the class must be international 
in both substance and form. The necessarily collective enterprise of discovering the 
adequate concrete political forms for contemporary proletarian internationalist action 
immanent in the present forms of the global accumulation of capital, constitutes an 
urgent and unavoidable task. 
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